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Abstract 
 
This dissertation highlights and analyses the results of a Survey to assess the 
problems of corporate governance facing Islamic Financial Institutions (IFI’s) at this 
moment in time. The significance of the dissertation is in describing governance in 
Islamic financial institutions and how there are numerus matters under the 
investigation process, and to view the entire area of corporate governance from a 
religious context. A solution to deal with these problems from a religious angle, 
whereby the obligation of adhering to good corporate governance practices is 
perceived from the perspective of religious obligations. One of the objectives of this 
paper is to examine, and create greater awareness of, some of the critical issues 
related to corporate governance in Islamic financial institutions. A second, perhaps, 
a more significant objective is to emphasize how improvements in corporate 
governance in such institutions can come about by viewing them as a religious 
obligation, and thereby preserving their acceptance but safeguarding the interests 
of all stakeholders.  Islamic Shariah provides guidelines that can help the Islamic 
finance industry alleviate problems resulting from the dualism of improving financial 
efficiency and observing the rules of Shariah. A greater commitment to the 
objectives of Shariah may allow the industry to escape the argument that Islamic 
finance is dissimilar in form but effectively the same in substance to conventional 
finance. 
 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate governance, Islamic Finance, Islamic Financial Institutions, 
Shariah Governance, Ethics 
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Chapter 1  Introduction / Overview and Research Background 
 
1.1  Background 
 
Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed 
and controlled with the structure signifying the sharing of rights and duties among 
the unique members in the corporation. [OECD April 1999]  
 
There has been an increased interest in corporate governance as a consequence 
of events such as the Exxon Valdez disaster, or the Ford Pinto scandal sparking 
debates about the roles of large corporations in society and raising questions about 
their ethical standards, management decisions and corporate governance 
practices (Kiel and Nicholson, 2003). 
 
The development of corporate governance systems conventionally has been in 
response to corporate failures or systemic catastrophes. One of the original failures 
of governance was the South Sea Bubble of the 1700s, which revolutionized 
business laws and practices in England. The securities law in the U.S. was 
commissioned due to the stock market crash of 1929, and the secondary banking 
crisis of the 1970’s in the United Kingdom and the United States of America; the 
savings and loans debacle of the 1980’s are examples of the responsive nature of 
corporate governance.  
 
The history of corporate governance has been scattered by an arrangement of 
well-known company disasters, for instance, the collapse of the Bank of Credit and 
Commerce International, Barings Bank, Enron, WorldCom, HIH, OneTel and 
Parmalat, with each of these cataclysms being a result of incompetence, fraud and 
abuse as much as from an absence of oversight rules.  
 
Since Enron’s failure in December 2001, the corporate community and the 
authorities internationally have commenced examining the way corporations are 
run from many perspectives, including: 
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• Board composition and effectiveness 
• Executive compensation 
• Role of the investment banking community 
• Stock exchange listing requirements 
• Role of the accounting and auditors professions  
• Voting patterns of institutional investors 
 
Ihlas Finance House (IFH) of Turkey, the largest of the Turkish IIFS, with over 40% 
of the sector deposits collapsed in 2001 after it illegally misappropriated almost 
$1billion, with concentrated ownership and control allowing an incentive system 
biased in favour of shareholders. (Starr and Yilmaz (2004). The failure of IFH 
revealed the risks to the financial stability and reputation of other institutions 
offering Islamic financial services (IIFS) because of poor corporate governance, 
and their inability to manage liquidity in the absence of Shariah complaint 
secondary markets.  
 
The commitment of concerned stakeholders to Islamic religious principles cannot 
be taken for granted, and indeed the Islamic Financial Institutions are no less 
disposed to suffering violations of fiduciary responsibilities. The history of Islamic 
finance shows that cases of corporate governance failures have features in 
common with conventional banking scandals, including amongst others, collusion 
of the board with management, external and internal audit failures, neglect of 
minority shareholders’ interests, imprudent lending, and excessive risk taking by 
management. 
 
Good corporate governance is crucial to the ability of a business to protect the 
interests of the stakeholders, and in the case of Islamic institutions efficiency, 
stakeholders expect operations to be carried out in compliance with the principles 
of the Shariah. A corporate structure that enables an institution to implement good 
governance through Shariah-compliant operations is therefore fundamental. 
 
Good Islamic corporate governance principles include honesty, trust, integrity, 
openness, performance orientation, responsibility and accountability to Allah and 
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the people, mutual respect, and commitment to the corporation and all in harmony 
with the Islamic Shariah. 
 
Commonly accepted principles of Islamic corporate governance include: 
 
• Rights and equitable treatment of shareholders as per the Shariah 
• Interests of other stakeholders, as dictated by law and according to the 
Shariah 
• Role and responsibilities (of the board) to Allah and the people 
• Integrity and ethical behaviour, in compliance with the Shariah 
• Disclosure and transparency 
 
Commonly accepted principles of conventional corporate governance 
include:  
 
1. Promoting transparent and efficient markets steady with the rule of law  
2. Protecting shareholders’ rights 
3. Guaranteeing the equitable treatment of all shareholders  
4. Recognising the rights of stakeholders recognised by law  
5. Timely and accurate disclosure  
6. The effective monitoring of the management by the board  
7. The board’s accountability  
[OECD, 1999] 
 
It is clear that there is an overlap between these principles, as both Islamic 
corporate governance and conventional corporate governance are concerned with: 
 
1. shareholder and stakeholder rights 
2. effective disclosure 
3. transparency 
4. accountability of management and the board 
5. obeying the rule of law 
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Enhancing stakeholders’ value is a central purpose for any business, including 
financial services, whether conventional or Islamic. The stability, financial 
performances, and ability to intermediate resources will depend on stakeholders’ 
confidence in individual institutions and the industry. A particular confidence 
feature in respect of Islamic financial services is the requirement of conveying to 
stakeholders that their financial business is conducted in conformity with their 
religious beliefs. Corporate governance arrangements include structures and 
procedures that should provide sufficient comfort that the business is conducted in 
accordance with specified objectives and in meticulous compliance with Shariah. 
 
The need for Islamic Financial Institutions to get their house in order and 
implement good corporate governance practices, that are in line with recognized 
and expected business practice as well as being compatible with the Shariah are 
imperative. The key word being ‘implement’ practices and not just pay lip service to 
the principle.  
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1.2  Statement of the Problem 
 
Over the past decade, the world has seen a significant change in the role of the 
private sector in economic progress and job creation. As more and more countries 
have assumed market-based approaches to economic policy, mindfulness of the 
status of private corporations for the welfare of individuals has improved. 
Corporations create jobs, generate tax income, produce a wide selection of goods 
and services at sensible prices, and progressively manage our savings and secure 
our retirement income. Amid growing reliance world wide on the private sector, the 
issue of corporate governance has likewise increased in importance (OECD 
Principles of Corporate governance, 2004). 
 
Islamic finance from the position of corporate governance represents an array of 
fascinating features, as equity participation, risk and profit-and-loss sharing 
measures form the basis of Islamic financing. The ban on interest means that an 
Islamic bank cannot charge any fixed return in advance, they, however partake in 
the profit from the usage of the funds. The depositors also share in the profits 
according to a pre-set ratio, and are remunerated with profit earnings for assuming 
the risk.  
 
An Islamic bank is a partner with the banks depositors and the entrepreneurs and 
these financial arrangements infer rather diverse stakeholder relations, and 
therefore governance structures, as depositors have a direct financial stake in the 
bank's investment and equity participations. This leads to rather diverse 
governance issues that Islamic banks and financial institutions face as compared 
to conventional institutions. The Islamic financial institution is subject to an added 
tier of governance, compliant with Islamic law. 
 
The most common approach at present is to establish independent Shariah 
Supervisory Boards (SSB’s), in-house religious advisers and Shariah review units. 
The role of the Shariah Supervisory Board includes:  
 
(i) Certifying permitted financial instruments through fatawa 
(ii) Verifying that transactions comply with issued fatawa 
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(iii) Calculating and paying Zakat 
(iv) Disposing of non-Shariah compliant earnings 
(v) Advising on the distribution of income or expenses among shareholders 
and Investment Account Holders (IAH) 
 
A Shariah Supervisory Board’s responsibilities will differ according to provisions 
specified in the articles of association of the financial institution or those specified 
by national regulators. In addition to internal corporate arrangements, national 
regulators and international standard setters implement guidelines for Shariah 
Supervisory Board’s. These guidelines frequently refer to Shariah Supervisory 
Board’s general responsibility to guarantee Shariah compliance and also at times 
indicate areas of competence, composition and decision-making. 
  
The functioning of Shariah Supervisory Board’s raises five main issues of 
corporate governance:  
 
(i) Independence 
The Shariah Supervisory Board member’s dual relationship with the 
institution as providers of remunerated services and as assessors of the 
nature of operations could be seen as creating a possible conflict of 
interest. 
   
(ii) Confidentiality  
Some Shariah scholars sit on the Shariah Supervisory Boards of more 
than one financial institution, this provides the particular individual 
access to proprietary information of other possibly competing institutions.  
 
(iii) Competence 
Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) members should ideally be 
knowledgeable in both Islamic law and commercial and accounting 
practices. In reality, it would appear that very few scholars are well 
versed in both disciplines.  
 
(iv) Consistency 
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The activities of Shariah Supervisory Boards (SSB’s) are in the nature of 
creating jurisprudence by the interpretation of legal sources. It should 
therefore not be surprising to find conflicting opinions on the admissibility 
of specific financial instruments or transactions. 
 
(v) Disclosure / Transparency   
A transparent financial institution would ideally disclose the duties, 
decision-making process, areas of competence, and the composition of 
the Shariah Supervisory Board, as well as publish all fatawa issued by 
the Shariah Supervisory Board.  
 
The problem is that corporate governance is inadequate in Islamic Financial 
Institutions, and the author believes that this is due to the entire approach 
regarding the subject. Many Corporate governance structures have been put 
forward, implemented, along with principles and codes of behaviour. The 
importance of corporate governance in enhancing stakeholder value, as well as 
positive effects towards the organisation have been spoken and written about by 
many researchers and scholars. 
 
However, there is still something missing, there is a piece of the puzzle that is still 
not in place. The author believes that it is the fundamental view of corporate 
governance and the importance of it that is missing. The author will attempt to 
prove that corporate governance is a duty on every Muslim, as is prayer, hajj and 
other such duties incumbent on every Muslim. Therefore, the application of it is not 
a matter of choice, and nor should it be looked at from the benefits of doing so, 
although these are important, but rather should be considered at from the angle of 
being an obligation. Therefore, the application of corporate governance procedures 
is a form of worship, and also a duty for which a Muslim will be held accountable. 
He / she will be rewarded for their application and held accountable for neglecting 
them or inadequate application. 
 
It is not enough to assume that just because someone is a Muslim, and by that 
very nature is expected to obey the Shariah, that he / she will ensure that they do 
not do anything that will be against the Shariah in terms of corporate governance 
	Page 16 
duties. Although, in theory there is a mechanism of self-accountability, honesty, 
trust and therefore should be self-regulatory, the fact of the matter is that, this is 
just not the case, and a vigilant eye is necessary. 
 
One day Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) noticed a Bedouin leaving his 
camel without tying it and he asked the Bedouin,  
 
"Why don't you tie down your camel?"  
 
The Bedouin replied: 
  
"I put my trust in Allah." 
  
The Prophet then said: 
  
"Tie your camel first, then put your trust in Allah"  
[At-Tirmidhi Hadith No: 2517] 
 
  
This refers to the common sense and reasoning that Allah in His Infinite Mercy has 
bestowed upon the human intellect, so that we are able to take due precautions, 
plan and prepare for possible future events, and create a means of addressing 
those needs on our own. Therefore, preventative and preparative actions are 
necessary in all walks of life, and especially business. The need for regulation to 
ensure accountability is necessary, and not just relying on self-regulation due to 
the people following the Shariah of their own accord. 
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1.3  Research Aims and Objectives 
 
Research studies in the field of corporate governance are wide-ranging, with a 
great deal having been written about the benefits of good corporate governance, 
as well as on governance structures needed to ensure good corporate governance. 
 
Connected to the inconsistency of the theory and practice of Islamic Corporate 
governance, many precise research questions can be posed. 
 
• What does the Islamic system of life mean for corporate governance of 
financial institutions? 
 
• How do Islamic principles apply to corporate governance? 
 
• What regulations and guidelines does the Shariah provide to regulate 
corporations? 
 
• How does the Islamic Corporate governance approach compare with the 
conventional approach to corporate governance? 
 
• Is there a convergence in the approaches to corporate governance (Islamic 
and conventional) or is there divergence?  
 
• If approaches are ‘divergent’, how can the divergences be utilized in order to 
govern corporations on an Islamic basis? What standards need to be laid 
down if approaches are convergent? 
 
The problems facing Islamic Financial Institutions in terms of corporate governance 
are fundamentally no different than those facing conventional banks and financial 
institutions, except the additional need for conformity to the Shariah which give rise 
to further potential issues. 
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How does an Islamic financial institutions meet these challenges it is facing with 
regards to corporate governance? It is easy to talk about the need for good 
corporate governance and the benefits of it, but how does an Islamic financial 
institution meet the requirements?  
 
The Islamic financial institution must understand the role of the Shariah and the 
implications for an organisation and subsequently corporate governance. 
 
The problems can be summed up as follows: 
 
• Islamic Financial Institutions need to comprehend the objectives, role and 
purpose of the Shariah 
 
• Islamic Financial Institutions need to appreciate the importance of good 
corporate governance 
 
• Identify the problems that the organisation is facing with regards to 
corporate governance issues that are specifically related to the Shariah 
 
Primary Research objectives of this research: 
 
• To identify the specific corporate governance issues / problems facing IFI’s. 
Does an Islamic way of life provide a solution to these corporate governance 
issues / problems? 
• To identify specific Shariah related corporate governance issues / problems. 
How do Islamic principles, if at all, apply to corporate governance? Why is it 
that these problems exist for IFI’s is there are Islamic principles that do 
provide a solution? 
• To identify potential solutions for these issues / problems from an Islamic 
angle. Are there guidelines setup that provide solutions from Shariah 
principles? Who has set them up and why do these problems still persist? 
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Secondary Research objectives of this research: 
 
• Do all the IFI’s face similar problems across the globe, or are these 
problems regional? 
• Are there state / government implemented approaches to corporate 
governance for IFI’s that eliminates these problems in certain geographical 
regions?  
• Is it really a problem of a lack of good corporate governance principles or is 
it negligence in implementation of these principles by IFI’s? 
• Are the approaches to CG for IFI’s and conventional financial institutional 
converging or diverging? 
The author postulates that research will indicate that for both IFI’s and 
conventional financial institutions, corporate governance approaches are 
converging. The divergence being in the mechanism of implementation only, 
due to the added layer of Shariah compliance. The basic corporate form has 
already achieved a great deal of uniformity, where economies are 
approaching a worldwide consensus that managers should act in the 
interests of all shareholders.  
 
There are three principal factors driving economies towards consensus:  
 
1. Failure of alternative models 
2. Competitive pressures of global commerce 
3. Shift of interest group influence in favour of an emerging shareholder class 
 
There is evidence of convergence in a number of areas. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
and Hansmann and Kraakman (2000) report that governance systems in Germany, 
Japan, and the US show signs of convergence. Large shareholders are on the rise 
in US firms, whilst board structures in Germany and Japan are moving increasingly 
towards the US model of a single-tier board that is comparatively small and has 
both insiders and a meaningful number of outsiders.  
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This may be true of conventional approaches to dealing with corporate governance 
issues. Is it also true for Islamic corporate governance (compared to conventional 
approaches)? 
 
 
What about convergence in corporate governance mechanisms other than 
the legal system?  
 
Islam is the religion of ‘Fitrah’, and all human beings are born with the same innate 
belief and disposition, and hence will converge at some point in their approaches. 
A Muslim is not sent from another planet; a Muslim is just another human being 
who has remained on the innate disposition with which he / she was created. 
Therefore, an approach to management issues by those following Islam or any 
other religion, or no religion at all, will at some point converge, as their source is 
but the same.  
 
They may follow different religions, but humans in general, regardless of gender, 
nationality, religion, race or colour essentially have the same concerns and worries 
in life. In business the same applies as in life; according to the author, therefore the 
need to solve the same common problems is there for all humans. They will, 
however, differ on ways to solve the problems, which the author believes, will also 
ultimately begin to converge. The world is getting smaller due to technology 
advances and information is so readily available and so quickly accessible for all 
and from the comforts of your home. Individuals can now explore, analyse and 
investigate their problems and find solutions for them using the information 
highway and the numerous experts offering their advice and guidance. The need to 
formulate your own solutions, in order to make money is greater, as competition is 
stronger. In the changing and evolving world, the leaders of business need to 
change and evolve also, and in fact need to do so ahead of the competition. 
Investors expect it, they in fact demand it and if you are not able to meet their 
requirements, they will go elsewhere. 
 
The author believes, all this leads to a convergence in corporate governance, as 
best practice is shared or even imitated by others, there is a need to ensure that 
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the best corporate governance structures are implemented within your organisation 
to gain business confidence. If this means to copy or use someone else’s, then that 
will have to be done. This will eventually lead to a convergence in how they are 
implemented also, but presently corporate governance structures will converge, but 
with the addition of meeting the needs of the Shariah for institutions offering Islamic 
financial services (IIFS). 
 
The Islamic approach and has never been and is in no way opposed to 
conventional management approaches. As it is the way of life which our inner 
selves naturally converge towards, therefore approaches which try to achieve the 
same goals should converge somewhere along the route.  
 
"Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency 
and accountability"  
[Wolfensohn, 1999] 
 
The definitions of corporate governance as diverse as they maybe, are very similar 
in both Islamic corporate governance and conventional corporate governance 
approaches. As the goals of corporate governance are similar, then it is just natural 
that there is convergence in the approaches. Although the mechanisms in the 
implementation of them should differ, as one approach follows the law of the land 
and national regulations, whilst the other approach follows the Shariah additionally 
to the law of the land and national regulations. 
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1.4  Significance of the research 
 
The aim of this research is to fill a gap that the author feels has not been filled 
adequately. There is a great deal of literature on what constitutes Islamic corporate 
governance, and the importance of corporate governance. Many researchers and 
authors have covered the need for corporate governance, the importance of it, 
principles and governance structures. 
 
The author, however, feels that there is not a ‘religious’ approach to corporate 
governance. Although we are talking about Islamic financial institutions, which 
base their approach to finance on the Shariah, it is believed that the approach to 
corporate governance should also be more grounded in Shariah principles. 
 
The author will approach this subject from an ‘Islamic’ perspective, by first 
highlighting the duties incumbent on a Muslim in his / her everyday life due to being 
a Muslim, and establishing clearly from the Qur’an and the Sunnah that business 
dealings are as important in a Muslims life as prayer. A Muslim is duty bound to 
follow the rules of the Shariah, they are not discretionary nor are they at the whims 
of the Muslim. A part of the duty on a Muslim is his / her obligations at work, in 
business and when holding responsibility over others; corporate governance is one 
of these areas. 
 
This research will establish the importance of these duties, and apply them to a 
business and the businesses corporate governance issues. The solutions to the 
problems of corporate governance in Islamic Financial Institutions will be from 
classical sources of Islam, taking into account the opinions of the different 
Madhabs. The uniqueness and significance will be in how these problems are 
viewed and the solutions being provided from classical sources. 
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1.5  Scope / Limitations of the Study 
 
The Survey results will provide a good idea of some of the major issues faced by 
Islamic Financial Institutions with regards to corporate governance. Restraint is 
advised in drawing inferences due to the small size of the sample under study.  
 
Although the author would like to explore a vast array of Islamic Financial 
Institutions in Islamic and non-Islamic countries, as well as those that are fully 
Shariah compliant along with those with Islamic windows. It may not be possible, 
for several reasons, for this to happen, which will of course limit the empirical 
scope of the study. 
 
Another possible limitation could be the Shariah guidelines being provided. The 
author intends to use the opinions of ‘classical’ scholars of Islam to provide the 
solutions; due to the following of the different Madhabs by those in positions of 
authority in Islamic Financial Institutions, this may lead to problems of acceptance. 
Where possible, different views will be accommodated and opinions provided. 
 
If time permits, the author will research the views of the scholars of the various 
Madhabs on these problems and their subsequent solutions. This would in turn 
provide more detailed, and thorough and wide-ranging opinions on the solutions to 
the problems facing Islamic Financial Institutions. A view from each of the 
Madhabs based on their classical scholars would provide wide-ranging opinions 
and points of analysis. 
 
Many of the respondents (305 of them) could have been from the same company, 
so they could be providing the same information and hence the same viewpoint 
again and again, this would distort the statistics, as although it seems like 305 
respondents, the number of companies represented in the survey could be quiet 
small. The fact that they maybe from the same company can also distort the 
results, as a greater portion of one particular company may lead to an unbalanced 
interpretation of the results. 
 
It is feasible also that the respondents did not have accurate information regarding 
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some of the questions in the survey, and so gave an opinion based on his / her 
interpretations. This again would lead to unbalanced responses and distort the 
statistical analysis. 
 
The researcher has not analysed the Internet IP addresses of the respondents in 
order to determine the locations of the respondents for a number of reasons. They 
included confidentiality, if the respondent did not wish to identify their location or 
company where he / she worked, then IP analysis would betray this trust. Also, 
some respondents may be responding from other than their place of work or 
country of location, so an analysis of IP addresses would be misleading. 
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
Corporate governance is about how a business should fulfill the obligations it owes 
to shareholders and all other business stakeholders, and is established on the 
three principles of transparency, accountability and adequate disclosure. Corporate 
governance has become significant with the increased cognizance of the 
significance of safeguarding the rights of all stakeholders.  
 
The observation was articulated with the publication of the Cadbury Report in 
1992. Subsequent reports continued to develop on the Cadbury report, eventually 
taking form as the OECD Principles of Corporate governance in 2004, being 
instantly adopted by the EU, World Bank, USA and other OECD and non-OECD 
countries (Morck, 2005).  
 
The expression corporate governance refers to the way in which an organization is 
directed, administered, or controlled and embraces the set of policies and practices 
that affect manager’s decision making and contributes to the way a company is 
seen by current and potential stakeholders. Good corporate governance 
procedures substantiate that the management team is held suitably responsible 
and boosts personal integrity, strong internal controls, and suitable risk 
management practices at the institution and obliges a discipline on managers to 
maximize returns to the firm. 
 
Significant efforts have been under way since the early 1990’s within the OECD, 
the European Commission and individual European countries to appreciate the 
economic consequences of corporate governance and to frame recommendations 
on suitable governance structures and practices (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 2002). 
 
Scholars and practitioners of corporate governance give the term an assortment of 
definitions; economists and social scientists tend to define it broadly as, 
 
 "the institutions that influence how business corporations allocate resources 
and returns"  
(Mary O'Sullivan, 2000)  
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and 
 
"the organizations and rules that affect expectations about the exercise of 
control of resources in firms."  
(World Bank, 2002). 
 
The economic view of corporate governance says that managers of the company 
are the guardians of the assets and their main duty is to use those assets 
competently in the pursuit of the firm’s objectives and generate value for the 
shareholders.  
  
Mathiesen (2002) says, 
 
 "corporate governance is a field in economics that investigates how to 
secure / motivate efficient management of corporations by the use of 
incentive mechanisms, organisational designs and legislation. This is often 
limited to the question of improving financial performance, for example, how 
the corporate owners can secure/motivate that the corporate managers will 
deliver a competitive rate of return". 
 
According to Guillen (2000), corporate governance plays a key role in any 
economy by providing a structure for the division of labour and financial results in 
the firm. He restates the fact that a well functioning corporate governance system 
can contribute to economic efficiency and even social equity. 
 
“Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to 
corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”,  
[Shleifer & Vishny 1997]  
 
The Cadbury Report (1992) defines corporate governance as, 
 
“Corporate governance is the system by which businesses are directed and 
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controlled”. 
 
This definition focuses almost entirely on the internal structure and operation of the 
corporation’s decision-making processes. 
 
The legal viewpoint of corporate governance specifies the procedures and rules 
that postulate the incentive framework for companies to seduce financial and 
human capital, perform competently and avoid corruption (World Bank, 1999).  
 
The societal viewpoint is about communications, how the company presents itself 
to groups with a valid interest in the company’s dealings. This view rests on the 
principle that, whilst corporate governance is primarily concerned about the 
relationship between shareholders, management and the board in determining the 
direction and performance of the corporation (Monks and Minow, 2001), the scope 
ought to be even broader, incorporating ethical standards and crisis management.  
 
"Corporate governance is about promoting corporate fairness, transparency 
and accountability"  
[Wolfensohn, 1999] 
 
Most definitions refer to two things:  
 
1. Mechanisms by which corporations are directed and controlled 
2. Mechanisms by which those who direct and control a corporation are 
overseen 
 
This core view implies that it relates to how the many communities that define the 
business enterprise serve, and are served by the firm.  
 
According to Nordin (2002) corporate governance has two components: 
  
1. Self-governance relating to areas that are problematic to legislate 
2. Statutory regulation of governing authorities  
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Corporate governance in Islamic Financial Institutions symbolises a number of 
thought-provoking features due to equity participation, risk and profit-and-loss 
sharing measures, these in turn assume different stockholder relationships, and 
governance structures. Iqbal and Mervyn (2000), seek to outline an Islamic variant 
that includes more of an ethical dimension than simple stakeholder theory. 
 
Hassan (2009) advocates that corporate governance is indisputably one of the vital 
essentials of any corporations’ development and an even greater test for the firm 
due to the additional risk compared to the conventional banking system.  
  
The surveys of Siddiqi, (1981) and Haneef, (1995), on the contemporary literatures 
on Islamic economic thought establish that there is an absence of references and 
dialogue on the theme of corporate governance from the Islamic standpoint. 
Mannan, (1984) in his assortment of abstract of researches in Islamic economics 
also further stresses the lack of explicit research on Shariah governance.  
 
Banaga (1994) undertook a research study of external auditing and corporate 
governance in Islamic banks. Chapra and Ahmed (2002) wrote a book on Islamic 
corporate governance precisely concentrating on the issue of governance 
framework of Islamic financial institutions (IFI), both studies focused on the issue of 
auditing, accounting, general framework of corporate governance of Islamic banks. 
 
The definition of corporate governance from an Islamic viewpoint does not contrast 
much with the conventional definition, as both definitions refer to a system by 
which companies are directed and controlled with a purpose to meet the 
corporation’s objective by safeguarding the stakeholders’ interests and rights. 
Distinctively corporate governance within the Islamic model gives unique 
characteristics and features in contrast with the conventional system owing to the 
unique case of broader decision-making theory that uses the idea of Islamic socio-
scientific epistemology that is premised on the divine oneness of Allah (Choudury 
and Hoque, 2004).  
 
Corporate governance plays a fundamental role in the design and promotion of the 
principles of accountability, fairness and transparency of the companies to 
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safeguard investors’ interests. IFIs have been criticized for the lack of 
accountability and transparency, after some major scandals in relation to several 
respected IFIs. The Dubai Islamic Bank in 2009 where a lack of corporate 
governance practices resulted in a fraud case involving $501 million attracted the 
attention of economists, scholars and institutions to research and work on the 
improvement of corporate governance practices in IFIs.  
 
Khan and Sharif (2008) contend that, 
 
“The level of good governance required by sharia principles arguably 
transcends that of conventional financial systems, as Islamic financial 
principles categorize an IFI as a trustee of its investors. As such, the IFI 
must be transparent, act fairly and be held accountable to the investors. 
Considering the significant amount of wealth currently entrusted to IFIs and 
their role as the trustees of their investors, is it time for the introduction of 
more robust corporate governance practices tailored specifically for IFIs?”  
 
According to Khan and Sharif (2008), whilst conventional systems of corporate 
governance practices are converging, governance practices of IFIs seem to be 
diverging. This may be due to regulators responsible for supervising IFIs taking a 
non-prescriptive tactic, whereby rather than setting criteria and standards which 
IFIs must comply with to be authorized and licensed, the responsibility is placed on 
the individual IFIs to put suitable measures in place to ensure that the services and 
products they offer meet with Shariah principles.  
 
Choudhury and Hoque (2004) consider that the objective meanings of corporate 
governance in Islam is to state and achieve an objective measure by means of 
understanding the relations between critical variables supported by policies, 
programs and strategic partnership. Corporate governance in Islam plays vital 
roles in order to meet the goals and objectives of the corporation with Islam adding 
additional value through Maqasid Shariah. 
 
The core objective of corporations is to increase the shareholder’s value of wealth; 
this implies that in practice, numerous Islamic corporations assume the Anglo-
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Saxon model of corporate governance (Lim, 2007). 
 
The Anglo-Saxon model, also known as market-based systems or shareholder 
value system or principle-agent model is considered as the leading theory 
supported by the United States and the United Kingdom. The systems are 
characterized by an arm’s length relationship between corporations and investors 
who are said to be troubled mainly about short term returns (Frank and Mayer, 
2004).  
 
Figure 1: The Anglo-Saxon Model of Corporate Governance 
 
The above figure shows that the Anglo-Saxon model built on the corporate concept 
of fiduciary relationship between the shareholders and the managers motivated by 
profit oriented behaviour. A distinctive facet of the Anglo-Saxon system is the 
structure of corporate ownership where the share ownership is extensively spread 
and shareholders impact on management is frail. The central obsession of 
corporate governance in the Anglo-Saxon system is to guard the interest and rights 
of the shareholders.  
 
Studies on corporate governance for Islamic Financial Institutions imply that 
Islamic corporation may adopt a completely unique model of corporate governance 
or an adapted form of the Stakeholder oriented model as an alternative for its 
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framework. The former refers to the model built on the principle of consultation 
where all stakeholders share the same goal, the oneness of Allah (Choudury and 
Hoque, 2004) and the latter concerns on adopting the stakeholders’ value system 
with some adjustments (Iqbal, and Mirakhor, 2004) and (Chapra and Ahmed, 
2002).  
  
Any Islamic corporation specifically Islamic financial institution needs to have a 
suitable governance framework to guarantee the company’s growth and success.  
  
Corporate Governance and the agency problem  
 
“The trade of a joint stock company is always managed by a court of 
directors. This court, indeed, is frequently subject, in many respects, to the 
control of a general court of proprietors.  
…The directors of such companies, however, being the managers rather of 
other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be expected that they 
should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners 
in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own....”  
[Adam Smith, 1776] 
 
Whatever the tangible discipline of corporate governance a considerable capacity 
for managerial discretion remains leading to an agency problem, as well as a 
problem of mutual action.  
  
Agency theory relates to relationships in which the principal delegates the duty of 
running the firm to the agent, where the agent "acts for" the principal. Two 
problems arise in agency relationships.  
 
1. The agent and the principal might have conflicting goals 
2. The principal and the agent have different propensities to accept risk  
 
Agency theorists deem a structure of corporate governance as efficient if it assures 
that suppliers of finance obtain an appropriate return on their investment (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997).  
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Agency theory is concerned with bringing into line the interests of owners and 
managers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Stano, 1976; Fama, 1980; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) and is founded on the idea that there is an intrinsic struggle 
concerning the interests of a firm’s owners and the firm’s management (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983).  
 
The consequence of agency theory on corporate governance research can be 
seen in the supremacy of studies that examine two key questions: 
 
1. How the composition of boards of directors affects firm performance (e.g. 
Barnhart and Rosenstein, 1998; Wagner et al., 1998) 
  
2. How the leadership structure of the company, the duality of the CEO/ 
chairman role affects corporate performance (Dalton et al., 1998) 
 
As to the instrument by which a board is likely to impact on corporate performance, 
agency theory suggests that a greater proportion of outside / independent directors 
will be able to monitor any self-interested actions by managers. As a result of the 
checking, there will be a lower chance for managers to pursue self-interest at the 
cost of owners and so shareholders will receive greater returns.  
 
The agency model is widely recognized in the corporate community, as can be 
seen by the general acceptance of normative guidelines emphasizing the need for 
independent directors to monitor the behaviours of the board (Bosch, 1995; NACD, 
1996). Agency theory holds that managers will not act to maximise the returns to 
shareholders unless suitable governance structures are applied to the large 
corporation to safeguard the interests of shareholders (Jensen and Meckling 
1976). Agency theory declares that in the modern corporation where share 
ownership is widely held, managerial actions depart from those needed to 
maximise shareholder returns (Berle and Means 1932; Pratt and Zeckhauser 
1985).  
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How relevant is Agency Theory in the corporate governance model of Islamic 
Financial Institutions? 
 
In Islamic finance corporate governance, the agency problem is of primary 
concern. The theoretical structure of IFIs, which share profits and losses on both 
their asset and liability sides, pose a greater need for transparency to its 
investment account holders (Iqbal et al. 2007, p. 7).  
 
Iqbal et al further explain it as follows, 
 
“This is due to the agency problem faced by the investment account holders 
when they share in profit and loss of the bank, which themselves are the 
consequence of trade and investment decisions of the managers and 
shareholders of the banking firm. Bank shareholders (or their appointed 
management), as agent for investment account holders, exercise control 
over investment decisions. Unless their interests and risk profile is aligned 
with that of the depositors, agency problem will remain.”  
[Iqbal et al, 2007] 
 
A number of agency problems are faced in the contractual structure of Islamic 
banks that may affect the corporate social responsibility (CSR) disclosure 
presented by Islamic banks in their annual reports (Iqbal et al. 2007, p. 226). 
Safieddine (2009), by conducting one of few important empirical researches in this 
field, highlighted the specific agency problems that current corporate governance 
practices by IFIs face in the Gulf Cooperation Council member countries. He 
highlighted the following deficiencies in corporate governance practices of IFIs that 
could possibly lead to agency problems: 
 
• Formation of a governance committee is uncommon among IFI’s 
• Formation of an audit committee is uncommon among IFI’s 
• Clear internal audit functions are not properly established 
• Lack of access to relevant information and influence on management 
decisions from Investment accounts holders and other investors  
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While investment accounts holders trust managers with their money and solely 
accept the risk of the projects failure, they are not able to keep a track on the 
performance of their investments or oversee the activities undertaken by the 
management, leading to some agency problems remaining unresolved (Safieddine 
2009). 
 
Chapra and Ahmed (2002) surmise that the governance mechanisms that aim at 
protecting the interests of shareholders in conventional corporate structures may 
be insufficient for IFIs.  
 
Safieddine (2009) concludes that,  
 
“The implications reveal that a model of conventional and idiosyncratic 
governance practices that preserves both the foundations of Islamic finance 
and the rights of all investors, including investment account holders is much 
needed to be developed by regulators and adopted by Islamic banks given 
the implications on performance and the development of the industry.”  
 
A further problem underlined by detractors is the conflict of interest arising from 
relations of top management and the Shariah boards. Shariah scholars are being 
appointed by shareholders also influenced by top management, some Shariah 
scholars may feel the pressure and threat of losing their position on the board, and 
thus may approve products as being Shariah compliant whilst they are not. This 
could lead to huge costs including litigations, loss of revenue and a decline in the 
IFI’s reputation. This problem is more emphasised by the fact that in the majority of 
IFIs, the Shariah boards are not subjected to disclosure rules. In order to cope with 
this problem there is a need for more transparency and disclosure by the Shariah 
boards.   
 
Shareholder interests will be safeguarded only where the CEO does not hold the 
chair of the board or where the CEO has the same interests as the shareholders 
within an aptly developed enticement compensation plan (Williamson 1985). With 
both of the positions being held by the same individual, the shareholders interest 
will not be of paramount importance to the CEO. 
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Chapra (1992) is of the view that no western secular policy will flourish in 
challenging the core problem of the morality of corporate governance; this is 
because the filter instrument within which capitalist economies operate is not only 
poor in confronting ethical issues, but in most cases value judgements and ethics 
do not have a standing in mainstream economics as well as in corporate 
governance literature. The filtering instrument of the market, based on 
decentralised decision-making, driven by prices alone is unsuitable in trying to 
solve the main trials facing the world, a moral filter is essential.  
 
The pursuit of the morality of corporate governance involves a perception, which 
goes past pure economic efficiency and equity criteria. The key question being, to 
who are human beings answerable to?  
 
How does a worldview and strategy embrace the concept of the morality of 
corporate governance?  
 
According to Amartya Sen (1987), 
 
 "The distancing of economics from ethics has impoverished welfare 
economics and also weakened the basis of a good deal of descriptive and 
predictive economics".  
 
His inference is that economics, 
 
 "Can be made more productive by paying greater and more explicit 
attention to ethical considerations that shaped human behaviour and 
judgement".  
[Amartya Sen (1987] 
 
Consequently, it is essential to focus on human beings themselves rather than on 
the market. Corporate governance reform cannot be resolved by simply more 
criteria or increased guidelines and passing more legislation does not guarantee 
corporate scandals from happening, nor do governance rules and their compliance 
promise intellectual trust and honesty. The solution lies in the remoralisation of 
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human behaviour and the wider society, and the solution in fact lies in reorganising 
the entire society and reorganising an economic system in such a manner that, 
there is a transformation of the individual from the economic man to a morally 
aware human being who is ready to live up to the demands of brotherhood and 
socio-economic justice.  
 
The cause of corporate governance failure lies not in the rules of the game, but 
with the behaviour and attitudes of members of society, notably those trusted to 
boards of directors. Conventional corporate finance experts have overlooked this 
facet for it would seem that the academic literature produced by these experts has 
become progressively irrelevant to private policymaking.  
 
Stakeholder Model 
 
The definitions of a stakeholder are imprecise and disputed and have changed 
over the years Freeman (1984) defines stakeholders as, 
 
 “Those groups who are vital to the survival and success of the corporation”. 
 
The traditional definition of a stakeholder is,  
 
“Any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of 
the organization’s objectives”  
[Freeman 1984]  
 
Freeman (2004) added the consideration of the viewpoint of the stakeholders 
themselves and their actions as being vital to be taken into the management of 
companies.  
 
He states: 
 
“The principle of stakeholder recourse. Stakeholders may bring an action 
against the directors for failure to perform the required duty of care”  
[Freeman 2004] 
	Page 37 
Friedman (2006) states that this definition is more balanced and broader than the 
definition of the Standford Research Institute (SRI). The expression “can affect or 
is affected by” appears to contain individuals from outside the firm and also groups 
who may consider themselves to be stakeholders of an organization, exclusive of 
whether the firm considers them to be as such. 
 
Friedman (2006) states that the organization itself should be thought of as a 
grouping of stakeholders and the purpose of the corporation should be to manage 
their interests, needs and positions. 
 
The stakeholder, also known as the insider or bank-based model, and often named 
the Rhineland model, is one which an assortment of firm constituencies, including 
employees, suppliers and customers, and the communities’ companies are 
situated in have a say in the firm, and the interests of them all are to be balanced 
alongside each other in management decision-making (Aoki, 1999).  
 
Friedman (2006) expressed disapproval of the stakeholder method, when he 
alleged:  
 
“That group of writers come to coalesce around particular social 
constructions of reality, leading to writers referring to stakeholders without 
being aware of relevant theoretical issues that have been raised in other 
literatures.” 
 
Roberts and Mahoney (2004) have scrutinized 125 accounting studies that used 
the stakeholder language and revealed that nearly 65 percent “use the term 
stakeholder without reference to any version of stakeholder theory”.  
 
Managers are treated differently in the literature, with certain writers regarding 
them as stakeholders whilst others exemplify them in the establishment's actions 
and responsibilities. A very fascinating view of managers came from Aoki (1984), 
who viewed managers as referees between investors and employees. 
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Freeman (1984) and Savage (1991) gave two definitions of a stakeholder:  
 
1. “Group of people who can affect or can be affected by the achievement of 
the organization’s objectives” (Freeman, 1984) 
 
2. “Those groups who are vital to the survival of the organization” (2004) 
 
As these are diverse views on what stakeholders actually are, this leads to two 
opposing views (Kaler, 2002), the ‘claimant’ definition and the ‘influencer’ definition 
of what it is to be a stakeholder and the combinatory definition: any group or 
individual that ‘‘can affect or is affected by the achievement of an organisation’s 
objectives’’ (Freeman, 1984). This description has emerged as the most well 
known of the definitions of a stakeholder, and has more accuracy than the shorter 
version ‘‘those who can affect or can be affected by the firm’’.  
 
The literature contains many efforts at categorizing stakeholders using numerous 
conditions, (Frooman, 1999; Pesqueux et al., 2005; Phillips, 2003b; Winn, 2001): 
primary versus secondary, direct or indirect, generic versus specific, legitimate 
versus derivative, strategic and moral, core, strategic and environmental 
stakeholders, etc.  
 
Mitchell (1997) gave a theory of stakeholder identification and salience built on the 
qualities of power, legitimacy and urgency, relationships between managers and 
stakeholders and the way to group them originated from Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 
(1997).  
 
Phillips (2003b) distinguishes normative stakeholders, derivative stakeholders and 
dangerous or dormant stakeholders. Normative stakeholders are persons to whom 
the organisation has a moral obligation of fairness (Phillips, 2003b). An added 
persuasive basis for classification of stakeholders considers the level of the 
environment: the resource base, the industry arrangement and the social political 
arena (Post et al., 2002a).  
 
There are three important stages in the development of this literature, namely, as 
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shown in Figure 2. 
1. Classical stakeholder  
2. Strategic management 
3. Stakeholder approach 
 
Figure 2: The development stages in stakeholder literature.  [Freeman, 1984) 
 
Further, the stakeholder literature started spreading its wings to interesting areas like 
dynamics of stakeholder and stakeholder theories. Several empirical studies were also 
conducted to validate the theoretical claims relating to the stakeholder concepts. 
A detailed description of this literature map is available in the paper by Elias, Cavana 
& Jackson [4].  But for the scope of this paper we discuss three important stages in the 
development of this literature, namely, classical stakeholder literature, strategic 
management: a stakeholder approach and dynamics of stakeholders. 
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Figure 1: Stakeholder Literature Map 
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Researchers differ in their worldview on stakeholder notions, but most of them 
recognize Freeman’s book as a landmark in stakeholder literature. According to 
Freeman (1984), productive transactions with stakeholders are constructed on 
accepting the validity of the stakeholder and having processes to surface their 
concerns.  
 
Limited management themes have created more debate in recent decades than 
the basic notion, the model and the theories surrounding stakeholders (Donaldson 
and Preston, 1995; Friedman and Miles, 2006; Gibson, 2000; Wolfe and Putler, 
2002). Stakeholder theory can be understood as ‘‘a genuine theory though a 
perfectible one’’ (Le ́pineux, 2005). The pictorial authority of the stakeholder model 
and the simplicity of it are seen as contributing to the triumph of the stakeholder 
notion (Fassin, 2008).  
 
The extraordinary research on stakeholder theory has continued along three lines:  
 
1. The descriptive 
2. The normative  
3. The instrumental view  
 
(Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994; Donaldson and Preston, 1995;  
Friedman and Miles, 2006; Hendry, 2001) 
 
Freeman added a fourth dimension,  
 
4. Metaphorical use of ‘stakeholder’’’  
(Freeman, 1994)  
 
The criticisms from philosophical and theoretical positions have been widely cited 
upon in the scientific literature (Donaldson and Dunfee, 1994; Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995; Friedman & Miles, 2006; Gibson, 2000; Gond and Mercier, 2004; 
Kaler, 2003; Key, 1999; Moore, 1999; Sternberg, 1996; Weiss, 1995).  
 
A summary of the literature builds the impression that the ideas surrounding the 
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stakeholder are mentioned to in uncertain ways (Egels, 2005; Le ́pineux, 2005; 
Stoney and Winstanley, 2001).  
 
There is an absence of clearness and consistency in the meaning of a stakeholder, 
and certainly of a stake (Waxenberger and Spence, 2003). There are certain 
essential inconsistencies among some definitions and the graphical representation 
of the model. There is insufficient rigor in using the framework to managerial, 
organisational and strategic matters: ‘‘much of stakeholder literature is prone to 
magnifying, blurring and/ or neglecting’’ (Wolfe and Putler, 2002).  
 
The stakeholder theory suffers from numerous shortfalls and failings ‘‘owing in part 
to vagueness, ambiguity and breadth of the stakeholder theory itself’’ and in part to 
the ‘‘wide-ranging intuitive appeal, critiques are often implicit’’ (Phillips et al., 2003), 
whereas Hall and Vredenburg (2005) note that ‘‘stakeholder ambiguity is difficult to 
manage because it is idiosyncratic and context-specific’’.  
 
Stakeholder theory is understood as unsuccessfully tackling the environment 
surrounding a firm (Key, 1999). The model endures a problem of delimitation of the 
borders of the firm, with the diverse levels not clearly drawn. Stakeholders around 
the firm, particularly those in the direct business environment and those in the 
wider environment are slightly puzzled. Stakeholder theory is ‘‘mainly utilised to 
operationalise the question of to whom businesses have a responsibility’’ rather 
than for what (Egels, 2005).  
 
How relevant is the stakeholder model of corporate governance in an Islamic 
economic system?  
 
A stakeholder-oriented theory of corporate governance finds solid foundations in 
the Islamic economic system. The shareholder model stresses that the objective of 
the firm is maximization of shareholders’ wealth, and managers as agents of the 
shareholders have a fiduciary duty to include in activities that help achieve this. A 
massive literature is devoted to distinguishing appropriate contractual mechanisms 
in order to resolve the difficulties related with this principal-agent relationship. A 
fairly sizeable amount of studies have appeared that scrutinise this issue in the 
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perspective of Islamic financial contracts in general and participatory contracts in 
specific.  
  
Iqbal and Mirkhor (2004), point out that business ethicists have typically viewed 
this outcome to be ethically intolerable since it unreasonably neglects the rights of 
non-shareholder groups. Does this suggest that we may find a suitable model of 
corporate governance in the field of Islamic ethics in contrast to the Islamic law of 
contracts?  
 
Islamic commercial law is rather unambiguous around the rights and obligations of 
parties in contractual mechanisms governing the employer-employee and seller-
buyer relations. Provisions seeking to guard the weaker party are fairly routine in 
the Islamic law of contracting. However, law does not consider all the externalities 
imposed by shareholder wealth maximization choices on non-shareholder 
stakeholders. For example, a Mudaraba contract may be ended with the 
agreement of mudarib and rabb al-mal after a fixed period leading to the closure of 
business. However, this may lead to local communities suffering profoundly from 
the conclusion of this business. Even while the law would allow the owner of the 
business to pursue closure, ethical worries may petition the businesses 
continuation.  
 
Correspondingly employees invest considerable human capital in the firm, while as 
per the explicit Ijarah contract, an owner may terminate the employment after the 
contractual period is over, ethical concerns may petition his continuation for a time 
period long enough to find other employment.  
 
Iqbal and Mirkhor (2004), note, 
 
 “A firm in Islamic economic system can be viewed as ‘nexus-of-contracts’ 
whose objective is to minimize transaction cost to maximize profits and 
returns to investors subject to constraints that these objectives do not violate 
property rights of any party whether it interacts with the firm directly or 
indirectly.”  
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Islamic Governance Structures 
 
Figure 3, which sketches a conceptual framework of corporate governance for 
Islamic banks, central to such a framework, is the Sharia Supervisory Board (SSB) 
and the internal controls. 
 
Figure 3: Corporate Governance in an Islamic Bank 
 
[Suleiman, N.M] 
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The additional body of the governance structure which has no counterpart in 
conventional banks, namely the Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB). Figure 4 
summarizes the stylized governance structures of conventional and Islamic banks.  
 
Figure 4: Stylized governance structures of conventional and Islamic banks 
 
[Handbook of Islamic Banking] 
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Tawhid and Shura Based Approach to corporate governance 
 
Although as a term ‘corporate governance’ is comparatively new, the meaning is 
not new in Islam. The hallmark of Islamic business ethics lies in the great values 
that support business operations and transactions, along with the practice of 
justice, equality, truthfulness, transparency, protection of minorities, accountability 
and adequate disclosure. The three fundamental principles of transparency, 
accountability and adequate disclosure of the OECD code also underlie good 
practice in Islam. 
 
Corporate governance includes the nuts and bolts of how corporations ought to 
achieve their responsibilities to their stakeholders (Hakim, 2002).  
 
Muslim jurists agree on the concept of Tawhid as one of the philosophical pillars of 
Islamic economics, little is written on the Tawhid epistemological practice on 
corporate governance, though Choudhury and Hoque, (2004) do review it in their 
model.  
 
The foundation for the corporate governance framework also originates from this 
notion of Tawhid (Al-Faruqi, 1982). 
 
Allah says in Quran:  
 
“Those who remember Allah (always, and in prayers) standing, sitting, and 
lying down on their sides, and think deeply about the creation of the 
heavens and the earth, (saying): "Our Lord! You have not created (all) this 
without purpose, glory to You! (Exalted be You above all that they associate 
with You as partners). Give us salvation from the torment of the Fire”  
[Surah 3 Ayah 191]  
 
According to Chapra (1992), this verse provides the central principle of governance 
where everything created by Allah has a purpose and human being is fashioned to 
be the world’s vicegerent. By putting a trust to mankind as a vicegerent, Allah 
monitors and is involved in every affair of human being and He is aware and knows 
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everything all the times. As Allah knows everything and all mankind is accountable 
to Him, the principle of Tawhid is the basis of the corporate governance model in 
Islam, as all parties involved are accountable to Allah.  
 
There are four principles and instruments governing Islamic governance: 
 
1. Concept of Tawhid  
2. Principle of justice 
3. Principle of productive engagement of resources  
4. Principle of economic activities and recursive intention of the above 
 
All of these principles are the main foundations of the Islamic corporate 
governance where the Shariah rules entrenched in the Quran and Sunnah make 
the Islamic corporation market driven and at the same time support the principle of 
social justice (Choudury and Hoque, 2004).  
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Figure 5: Tawhid and Shura based approach Choudhury and Hoque (2004) 
[Choudhury and Hoque (2004] 
 
The stakeholders as vicegerents of Allah have fiduciary duties to uphold the 
principle of distributive justice via the Shariah process.  
 
There are two main institutions involved in the process of corporate governance: 
 
1. Shariah board  
2. The constituent of Shura groups of participants, the stakeholders  
 
The Shariah board plays a crucial role in guaranteeing that all corporation activities 
are in line with Shariah principles. The shareholders play a big role as active 
members and mindful stakeholders in the practice of decision-making and policy 
framework by pondering the interest of all stakeholders rather than maximizing 
profits.  
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The community, as stakeholders, must also play their part in offering mutual 
collaboration to safeguard the interest as a whole and to stimulate the social 
wellbeing function for social welfare. All of these processes are focused on fulfilling 
the objective of upholding the principle of distributive justice (Choudury and Hoque, 
2004).  
 
The general arguments of offering theoretical foundation of the stakeholder model 
of corporate governance in Islamic economic system try to establish that the firm’s 
objective is to maximize the welfare of all stakeholders and not the shareholders 
alone. A comparison of the Anglo-Saxon, the European model and a Shariah 
based model of corporate governance is shown in the table 1. 
 
Table 1: comparison of the Anglo-Saxon, the European model a Shariah based 
model of corporate governance 
Aspects The Anglo-Saxon The European Shariah Model 
Episteme Rationalism and 
rationality 
Rationalism and 
rationality 
Tawhid 
 
Objective The Anglo-Saxon The European Shariah Model 
Rights and 
Interests 
To protect the 
interests and rights 
of the shareholders 
The right of 
community in relation 
of the corporation 
To protect the interests 
and rights of the 
shareholders but 
subject to the rules of 
Shariah 
Corporate goal Shareholders 
controlling managers 
for the purpose of 
shareholders profit 
Society controlling for 
the purpose of social 
welfare 
Acknowledge profit 
motive oriented but 
balance it with the 
Shariah objective and 
principles 
Nature of 
Management 
Management 
dominated 
Controlling 
shareholder 
dominated 
Concept of vicegerency 
and Shura 
Management 
Boards 
One-tier board One-tier board Two-tier board 
Shariah board as the 
ultimate governance 
Capital related 
and ownership 
structure 
Widely dispersed 
ownership: 
Dividends prioritised 
Banks and other 
corporations are 
major shareholders; 
dividends less 
prioritised 
Shareholders and 
depositors or 
investment account 
holders (IAH’s) 
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The above comparison offers a summary of the diverse approaches of corporate 
governance style and structure. In the characteristic of epistemological method, 
Islam rejects the rationality and rationalism as the episteme of Shariah corporate 
governance and replaces it with the episteme of Tawhid. 
 
Table 2 shows Table 1 Alternative Approaches to Corporate Governance 
Decision-making 
basis  
 
Managed 
corporation 
model  
 
Socially responsive 
corporation  
 
Islamic corporate 
governance  
 
Legal concept of firm: 
decision- making by 
whom?  
 
CEO and senior 
management  
 
Executive and 
supervisory processes  
 
Shuratic decision- 
making process: 
consultation and 
consensus- 
seeking  
Economic concept of 
firm: decision-making 
for whom?  
Maximize profits 
Maximize share- 
holder value  
Stakeholders  Institution of 
Hisba   Role of 
muhtasib  
Accounting concept of 
firm: decision-making 
with what resources 
and to whom is 
accountability due?  
Financial 
governance by 
shareholders and 
suppliers of 
finance  
Corporate 
responsibility Triple 
bottom line: economic, 
social and 
environmental 
accountability  
Shariah 
supervision 
process Religious 
audit  
 
The above Table summarises the alternative approaches to corporate governance. 
Shura, Hisba and the Shariah supervisory process and religious audit establish the 
basic building blocks of a system of Islamic corporate governance. The type of 
participation inherent in Shuratic decision-making processes offers a medium for 
guaranteeing that corporate activities and strategies are fully discussed and that a 
consensus-seeking consultative process is applied. Directors and senior managers 
are expected to listen to the opinions of other executives before making a decision 
and Shura members would include, representatives of shareholders, employees, 
suppliers, customers and other stakeholder parties.  
 
The body of Hisba offers a structure of social ethics, relevant to monitor the 
corporation, with the objective of encouraging the right ethical behaviour, and also 
empowers Muslims to act as ‘private prosecutors’ in the goal of better governance 
by providing them with a stage for social action.  
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The Islamic corporate governance objective puts Maqasid Shariah as the final goal 
and this involves the idea of safeguarding the interest and rights of all stakeholders 
within the Shariah guidelines. The nature of ownership structure in Islamic 
corporate governance considers the shareholders and the Investment Account 
Holders (IAH) as the rightful owners rather than the shareholders alone.  
 
The nature of corporate governance’s goal is inclined to the stakeholder model 
where the governance style focuses on protecting the stakeholders as a whole. 
The Islamic view of the definition of the stakeholders enhances the understanding 
past participants in governance of the corporation to the religion of Islam as a 
whole. The corporate governance model from Shariah viewpoint deems Islam as 
the ultimate stakeholder alongside the other stakeholders, and puts the Shariah as 
the governing law of all business matters of the corporation. 
 
Slahudin (2008) investigates the significance of Islamic principles of corporate 
governance in accordance with the Qur’an and Sunnah, comparing them with the 
OECD. The Islamic principles of good practice are very similar to the OECD 
principles; however, they have not been efficiently applied as they have with the 
OECD principles. The OECD Principles cover six different issues and rights 
connected to corporate governance, while the Islamic principles have a larger limit 
and place accountabilities further afield than just shareholders, financiers, 
suppliers, customers, and employees. The concepts of Shura, Hisba and the 
Shariah supervisory process along with the religious assessment style the primary 
building blocks of a system of Islamic corporate governance and business 
organization (Lewis 2006).  
 
The three basic essentials of the Islamic faith that specify the foundation for 
corporate governance in Islamic banking (Haron and Shanmugam 1997), are:  
 
1. Aqeedah, belief in Allah 
2. Shariah, the law 
3. Akhlaq, behaviour, attitude, and work ethic  
 
Regulatory bodies and/or central banks in many countries to enable good 
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governance practices at Islamic Financial Institutions have established an Islamic 
corporate governance framework. The vital components of the framework are 
illustrated in Figure 6 below. 
 
Figure 6: Responsible parties for implementation of corporate governance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Haron and Shanmugam 1997] 
 
The framework offers standards and guidelines that are in agreement with Shariah; 
tackles the intermediary and multifaceted roles of Islamic financial institutions; 
seeks to guarantee accountability, transparency, and a satisfactory division of 
power among stakeholders; and seeks to avoid conflicts of interest.  
 
Islamic economists and scholars are divided into three groups concerned with 
which corporate governance approach is best for the future growth of IFIs.  
 
1. The proponents of the European model, the essence of the Islamic 
corporate governance has a wide commission, with obligations extending 
beyond shareholders and embracing financiers, employees and customers 
(Malekian and Daryaei 2010)  
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2. The proponents of the Anglo-Saxon approach imply that in actual practice, 
many Islamic corporations adopt the Anglo-Saxon approach (Hasan 2008). 
They argue that it is for the best of IFIs to work on the adaptation of the 
Anglo-Saxon approach that also makes it easier for them to enter the 
western financial world and compete with the existing conventional system 
 
3. They argue that the IFIs’ structures are completely unlike to those in 
conventional corporations, where the depositors in IFIs are also 
stakeholders and they do not generally get much attention in the Anglo-
Saxon as well as European approaches. It is the depositors and not the 
shareholders who provide a large proportion of funds (Chapra and Ahmed 
2002) 
 
Studies seem to suggest that Islamic corporation may adopt a totally different 
model of corporate governance or a modified version of the Stakeholder-oriented 
model as an alternative for its corporate governance framework (Hasan 2008). 
 
  
	Page 53 
Chapter 3 Research Methods 
 
Research Methodology 
Harmonizing the methodology to the research question is fundamental to any 
research strength (Punch, 1998).  
 
Johnson and Clark (2006) note, as researchers we must to be cognizant of the 
progressive pledges we make through our choice of research approaches, since 
this has significant effect not only on what we do but how we recognise what it is 
we are exploring. It would be easy to fall into the trap of thinking that one research 
philosophy is ‘better’ than another, which would miss the point, as they are ‘better’ 
at undertaking different things. Which is ‘better’ depends on the research 
question(s) you are looking to answer and the everyday reality is that a particular 
research question seldom falls entirely into only one philosophical area. 
 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) suggest that it is more proper for the researcher in 
a particular study to think of the philosophy accepted as a continuum rather than 
differing views. They note that ‘at some points the knower and the known must be 
collaborative, while at others, one may more simply stand apart from what one is 
studying’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).  
 
Tashakkori and Teddlie (1998) state that you should ‘study what interests you and 
is of value to you, study in the different ways in which you deem appropriate, and 
use the results in ways that can bring about positive consequences within your 
value system’ (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).  
 
Management research is concerned with the social realm in which we exist, 
Bhaskar (1989) asserts that as researchers we will only be able to understand 
what is going on in the social world if we recognize the social constructions that 
have given rise to the phenomena that we are endeavouring to comprehend.  
 
Our understanding of reality is a consequence of social conditioning and cannot be 
comprehended distinctly of the social actors involved in the knowledge derivation 
process (Dobson 2002).  
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Hakim (2000) using an architectural example links the most suitable choice of 
research method, where she presents the idea of the researcher’s chosen style, 
which, rather like the architect’s, may reflect ‘. . . the architect’s own preferences 
and ideas . . . and the stylistic preferences of those who pay for the work and have 
to live with the final result’ (Hakim 2000). This resonates the positions of Buchanan 
et al. (1988), who supports that ‘needs, interests and preferences (of the 
researcher) . . . are typically over-looked but are central to the progress of 
fieldwork’.  
 
The research approaches used possibly used for exploratory, descriptive and 
explanatory research (Yin 2003). However, regularly assigning strategies to one 
approach or the other is unduly simple, what is most important is not the label that 
is ascribed to a specific strategy, but whether it will allow the research question(s) 
and meet the designed objectives.  
 
One of the objectives of this research is to examine, and construct greater 
awareness of, some of the chief concerns related to corporate governance in 
Islamic Financial Institutions. A second objective is to offer important Shariah 
guidelines to develop corporate governance in these institutions and support them 
to not only maintain their stimulus of growth and international acceptance but also 
guard the interests of all stakeholders. 
 
Due to the nature of the research and the need to gain views of people from across 
the world, an electronic survey based approach was chosen as the research 
method. The survey strategy is usually associated with the deductive approach and 
is a popular and common strategy in business research and tends to be used for 
exploratory and descriptive research. Surveys are popular as they allow the 
collection of a large amount of data from a sizeable population in a highly 
economical way.  
 
The survey strategy is seen as authoritative by people in general and is both 
relatively easy to explain and to understand. The survey strategy allows you to 
accumulate quantitative data that can be analysed and can be used to offer 
possible reasons for specific relationships between the variables and to produce 
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models of these relationships. 
 
The data amassed by the survey strategy is unlikely to be as wide-ranging as 
those collected by other research strategies. For example, there is a limit to the 
number of questions that any questionnaire can contain if the goodwill of the 
respondent is not to be presumed on too much. Possibly the biggest disadvantage 
with using a questionnaire, as part of a survey strategy is the ability to do it poorly.  
 
The issue of the credibility of research findings is expertly articulated by Raimond 
(1993) when he subjects findings to the ‘how do I know?’ test: ‘. . . will the evidence 
and my conclusions stand up to the closest examination?’  
 
Rogers (1961; cited by Raimond 1993): ‘scientific methodology needs to be seen 
for what it truly is, a way of preventing me from deceiving myself in regard to my 
creatively formed subjective hunches which have developed out of the relationship 
between me and my material’.  
 
Reducing the risk of getting the answer incorrect means that care has to be paid to 
two particular emphases on research design, reliability and validity.  
 
Robson (2002) stresses four threats to reliability: 
 
1. Participant error 
2. Participant bias 
3. Observer error 
4. Observer bias 
 
It is worth mentioning that there are a variety of definitions in common usage 
(Oppenheim 2000) of the term ‘questionnaire’. Some reserve it wholeheartedly for 
questionnaires where the person answering the question basically records their 
own answers. Feasibly not surprisingly, the questionnaire is one of the most 
extensively used data gathering approach. Since each respondent is asked to 
respond to the same set of questions, it offers an effective way of collecting replies 
from a large sample before quantitative analysis. Bell (2005) and Oppenheim 
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(2000) support that it is far more challenging to create a good questionnaire than 
you might think. You need to guarantee that it will gather the exact data that you 
need to answer your research question(s) and complete your objectives.  
 
This is important because you are unlikely to have more than one chance to collect 
the data, where you will be unable to go back to those individuals who want to stay 
unspecified and collect extra data using another questionnaire.  
 
The design of your questionnaire will affect the response rate and the reliability and 
validity of the data you collect. Response rates, validity and reliability can be 
increased by:  
 
• Careful design of questions 
• Clear and pleasing layout  
• Lucid explanation of the purpose of the questionnaire 
• Pilot testing 
• Carefully planned and executed administration 
 
Many researchers use a questionnaire to gather data without reflecting on other 
methods, such as inspection of secondary source observation, semi-structured or 
unstructured interviews. Questionnaires are normally not good for exploratory or 
other research that requires large numbers of open-ended questions, and work 
best with standardised questions that will be understood the same way by all 
respondents (Robson 2002). Questionnaires, if worded correctly, normally require 
less skill and sensitivity to administer than semi-structured or in-depth interviews 
(Jankowicz 2005).  
 
The advantages of questionnaires according to Popper (1959, reprinted 
2004): 
 
1. Practical 
2. Large amounts of information can be collected from a large number of 
people in a short period of time and in a relatively cost effective way 
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3. Can be carried out by the researcher or by any number of people with 
limited affect to the validity and reliability 
4. The results of the questionnaires can usually be quickly and easily 
quantified by either a researcher or through the use of a software package 
5. Can be analysed more 'scientifically' and objectively than other forms of 
research 
6. When data has been quantified, it can be used to compare and contrast 
other research and may be used to measure change 
7. Positivists believe that quantitative data can be used to create new theories 
and / or test existing hypotheses 
 
The disadvantages of questionnaires 
 
1. Inadequate to understand some forms of information  
2. Phenomenologists state that quantitative research is simply an artificial 
creation by the researcher, as it is asking only a limited amount of 
information without explanation 
3. May lack validity 
4. No way to determine truthfulness of respondent   
5. No way of telling how much thought a respondent has put in 
6. The respondent may be forgetful or not thinking within the full context of the 
situation 
7. People may interpret questions differently 
8. There is a level of researcher imposition 
 
Two important considerations have determined my approach in this research. One 
of these is general in nature and is related to the state of the existing theory and 
practices of Islamic Financial Institutions, the other consideration is related to the 
precise aspects of the study. 
 
General considerations concern corporate governance principles and applications 
for financial institutions, wherever they may be located. Specific considerations, via 
the empirical study, to identify the common issues facing all Islamic Financial 
Institutions with regards to corporate governance and provide Shariah based 
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solutions to them. The detailed considerations apply to Islamic Financial 
Institutions and Shariah basis, whereas the general considerations can apply to 
any financial institution. 
 
An empirical study of corporate governance in Islamic Financial Institutions will be 
undertaken to identify via primary research the issues facing Islamic Financial 
Institutions. There have been many surveys conducted on corporate governance in 
conventional financial institutions; empirical studies of corporate governance in 
Islamic financial institutions are few in number. Those which have been conducted 
focus attention on specific issues, some of them address the accounting and 
auditing aspects of corporate governance, whilst others try to determine the overall 
strategies and investment policies as well as the role of Shariah supervisory 
boards (SSB’s) in the operation of Islamic banks, or compare the behaviour of 
Islamic and conventional banks. 
 
How the Questionnaire was developed 
 
A survey cannot attain success without a well-designed questionnaire, however, 
regrettably, questionnaire design has no theoretical basis to guide the researcher 
in developing a perfect questionnaire. All the researchers have to guide them is a 
lengthy list of do's and don'ts arising from the experience of other researchers. 
 
A good questionnaire design depends on the data that needs to be gathered; 
whether that contains qualitative information for the purposes of a healthier 
understanding or the production of a hypotheses or whether it is quantitative 
information that analyses current hypotheses. 
 
1. Exploratory questionnaires:  
For qualitative or data not statistically evaluated, it may be that no formal 
questionnaire is required. 
 
2. Formal standardised questionnaires: 
If the aim is to investigate and quantify hypotheses and the data is to be 
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analysed statistically, a standardised questionnaire needs to be designed. 
 
Such questionnaires are generally characterized by: 
 
• Prescribed wording and order of questions 
• Prescribed definitions or explanations for each question 
• Prescribed response format 
 
There are no hard and fast rules regarding how to design questionnaires, however, 
there are a number of points that can be kept in mind: 
 
1. Well-designed questionnaires should meet the research objectives 
2. They should obtain the most complete and accurate information possible 
3. Well-designed questionnaires should make it easy for respondents to give 
the necessary information and it should be arranged so that sound analysis 
and interpretation are possible 
4. They should be arranged so that the respondent(s) remain interested 
throughout 
 
Following the investigative phase, two key steps remain to be concluded before the 
task of designing the questionnaire may begin.  
 
1. To articulate the questions that the research is intended to address 
2. To determine the hypotheses around which the questionnaire is to be 
designed 
  
There are many steps involved in the development of a questionnaire and 
they include the following: 
 
Decide the information required 
 
Decide 'what are the things one needs to know from the respondent in order to 
meet the survey's objectives?'  
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The researcher may already have an idea about the type of information to be 
collected, but additional help can be obtained from secondary data. The researcher 
should be aware of what work has been done in the past, what factors have not yet 
been examined, and how the present survey questionnaire can build on what has 
already been discovered.  
 
What I did: 
 
I undertook much prior research and examined previous research and surveys in 
the area of corporate governance and specifically corporate governance in IFI’s. I 
examined the questions that were surveyed and looked at the analysis of results, 
as well as looking at suggestions for further research areas in this field. I had 
already formulated an idea on the areas of my research and the data that I wished 
to gather from previous personal interest, professional work and interactions with 
Islamic finance researchers. 
 
Define the target respondents 
The researcher must define the target market from where they wish to generalize. 
 
What I did: 
 
The target respondents were identified as those individuals who worked in IFI’s 
across the globe. The nature of the IFI was made clear in the survey and included 
all those who dealt with Islamic finance as part of their business activity. I did not 
focus on Islamic banks only, but rather included, Islamic finance consultancies, 
financial institutions, accountancy companies, legal firms and those who have 
Islamic finance as part of the nature of their business. This allowed the 
respondents to be a wider net than merely restricting to Islamic banks. 
 
I felt that this would allow a greater number of respondents to be included in the 
survey, provide a wider range of opinions and more informed and varied points of 
view. Although, this would make the job of analysis of data more difficult, I felt that 
doing so, would provide more enriched data for analysis.  
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Choose the method(s) of reaching your target respondents 
 
The method of reaching the planned respondents ought to comprise part of the 
questionnaire design process. The method of contact will sway not only the 
questions the researcher is able to ask but the phrasing of these questions. The 
main methods available in survey research are: 
 
• Personal interviews 
• Group or focus interviews 
• Mailed questionnaires 
• Telephone interviews 
 
Each has advantages and disadvantages, with a general rule that the more 
sensitive or personal the information, the more personal the form of data collection 
should be.  
 
What I did: 
 
Due to the respondents being across international borders and in numerous 
sectors of the economy, I felt the most logical, practical and achievable and easy to 
reach my target respondents was through an electronic survey. I felt that personal 
interviews, group or focus interviews, mailed questionnaires and telephone 
interviews were just not practical and would not allow efficient and effective data 
gathering. 
 
I therefore, employed the use of an online survey creation software that allowed 
me to create an online survey, and then send an invite to my respondents via an 
email. The respondents were given a unique login username and a password 
which they used to access the survey and complete it. The respondents were able 
to access the survey as many time as they chose, allowing them to complete the 
survey over a number of attempts (if they did not have the time to complete it at 
one time). 
 
This method was chosen, keeping in mind the factors of geographical locations, 
	Page 62 
the nature of Islamic finance institutions, as well as the variety of individuals who 
will be respondents. The nature of the information gathered was not of a personal 
nature, it was of a professional nature, the need for a very personalised approach 
was not necessary. Therefore, the respondents were kept anonymous in order to 
protect their confidentiality and to ensure that no repercussions would be 
forthcoming from any employer or place the respondent in a precarious position. 
 
Decide on question content 
 
Researchers must always be prepared to ask, 
 
 "Is this question really needed?"  
 
The lure to include questions without critically evaluating their impact on the 
attainment of the research objectives is startlingly strong. No question should be 
included unless the data it gives rise to is directly of use in testing one or more of 
the hypotheses established during the research design. There are only two 
instances when apparently "redundant" questions might be included: 
 
• Opening questions that are easy to answer and which are not perceived 
as being "threatening" 
 
• "Dummy" questions can camouflage the purpose of the survey and/or the 
backing of a study.  
 
What I did: 
 
After determining the data that was needed for the research objectives to be 
achieved, a mixture of question types was chosen and administered in the survey. 
No redundant questions were employed, in order to keep the survey succinct and 
precise, as the nature of the respondents demanded this, and the need to employ 
‘dummy’ questions was deemed inappropriate. I felt that the survey did not include 
irrelevant questions, but, rather questions that I felt were essential and gave rise to 
valuable data. 
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Develop the question wording 
 
Survey questions can be categorized into three forms: 
 
1. Closed questions 
Advantages 
• provides the respondent with an easy method of indicating the answer, 
and does not have to think about how to express the answer 
• Prompts the respondent so that he / she has to rely less on memory in 
answering a question 
• Responses can be easily classified, making analysis straightforward 
• Permits the respondent to specify the answer categories most suitable 
for their purposes 
 
Disadvantages  
• Do not allow the respondent the chance to give a different response to 
those proposed 
• They 'suggest' answers that respondents may not have pondered 
beforehand 
 
2. Open-ended 
With open-ended questions the respondent is asked to give a reply to a 
question in his/her own words, with no suggested responses. Open-ended 
questions have a number of advantages when utilised in a questionnaire: 
 
• Allow the respondents to answer in their own words, with no influence by 
any suggested alternatives 
• Often reveal the issues that are most important to the respondent, and 
may reveal findings which were not originally anticipated  
• Respondents can 'qualify' their answers or emphasise the force of their 
opinions 
 
 
However, open-ended questions also have fundamental problems which means 
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they must be treated with considerable caution.  
 
• Respondents may find it difficult to 'articulate' their responses  
• Respondents may not give a full answer simply because they may forget 
to mention important points.  
• Data collected is in the form of verbatim comments and has to be coded 
and reduced to manageable categories.  
• Respondents will tend to answer open questions in different 'dimensions' 
 
3. Open response-option questions 
 
The advantages of this type of question are: 
 
• The researcher can avoid the potential problems of poor articulation by 
being able to prompt the respondent into considering particular response  
• Recording during interview is relatively straightforward. 
 
The one disadvantage of this form of question is that it requires the researcher to 
have good prior knowledge of the subject in order to generate likely responses 
before issuing the questionnaire.  
 
Clearly there are going to be situations in which a questionnaire will need to 
incorporate all three forms of question, because some forms are more appropriate 
for seeking particular forms of response. In instances where it is felt the respondent 
needs assistance to articulate answers or provide answers on a preferred 
dimension determined by the researcher, then closed questions should be used. 
Open-ended questions should be used where there are likely to be a very large 
number of possible different responses, where one is seeking a response 
described in the respondent's own words, and when one is unsure about the 
possible answer options. The mixed type of question would be advantageous in 
most instances where most potential response-options are known; where 
unprompted and prompted responses are valuable, and where the survey needs to 
allow for unanticipated responses. 
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There are a series of questions that should be posed as the researchers develop 
the survey questions themselves: 
 
"Is this question sufficient to generate the required information?" 
 
It is good practice to keep questions as simple as possible, as the careless design 
of questions can result in the inclusion of two items in one question. Where it is 
difficult for the respondent to answer and equally difficult for the researcher to 
interpret the response.  
 
What I did: 
 
I employed Closed questions, Open-ended and Open response-option questions. 
This was a situation in which the need to incorporate all three forms of question 
types was appropriate. The mixed type of question was advantageous as most 
potential response-options are known, and the unprompted and prompted 
responses are extremely valuable, and the survey needed to allow for 
unanticipated responses. 
 
Put questions into a meaningful order and format 
 
Opening questions: Opening questions should be easy to answer and not in any 
way threatening to the respondents. The first question is crucial because it is the 
respondent's first exposure to the questionnaire and sets the tone for the nature of 
the task to be performed.  
 
Question flow: Questions should flow in some kind of psychological order, so that 
one leads easily and naturally to the next. Questions on one subject, or one 
particular aspect of a subject, should be grouped together. 
 
Question variety: Respondents become bored quickly and it usually improves 
response, therefore, to vary the respondent's task from time to time.  
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Closing questions 
 
It is natural for a respondent to become increasingly indifferent to the questionnaire 
as it nears the end. Those questions that are of special importance should, if 
possible, be included in the earlier part of the questionnaire. In developing the 
questionnaire, the researcher should pay particular attention to the presentation 
and layout. 
 
• Questions should be clearly worded and response options clearly identified 
• Prescribed definitions and explanations should be provided 
• Ample writing space should be allowed to record open-ended answers 
 
Check the length of the questionnaire 
 
It is best for a questionnaire to be as short as possible, as a long questionnaire 
leads to boredom on the part of the respondent. 
 
Pre-test the questionnaire 
 
Even after the researcher has progressed along the lines suggested, the draft 
questionnaire is a product evolved by one or two minds only. Until it has truly been 
used in interviews and with respondents, it is impossible to say whether it is going 
to attain the required results. For this reason, it is necessary to pre-test the 
questionnaire before it is used in a full-scale survey, to pinpoint any mistakes that 
need correcting. 
 
The purpose of pretesting the questionnaire is to determine: 
 
• Whether the questions as they are worded will achieve the desired results 
• Whether the questions have been placed in the best order 
• Whether the questions are understood by all classes of respondent 
• Whether additional or specifying questions are needed  
• Whether some questions should be eliminated 
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• Whether the instructions to interviewers are adequate 
 
Usually a small number of respondents are chosen for the pre-test. The 
respondents chosen for the pilot survey should be broadly representative of the 
type of respondent to be interviewed in the main survey. If the questionnaire has 
been exposed to a thorough pilot test, the final form of the questions and 
questionnaire will have grown into its final form.  
 
What I did: 
 
The survey was pre-tested on personal contacts who worked in the Islamic finance 
sector and comprised of the target audience for the survey. I chose 5 people who 
worked in the industry and gauged their feedback on questionnaire type, questions 
asked, length of survey, clarity of questions, response times, response methods 
employed, as well as an overall clarity and quality of the survey. The feedback 
attained was employed to improve the survey, and it was submitted to the same 
individuals for their feedback, in order to attempt to achieve the perfect survey. 
 
At the same time, the survey was being tested on individuals who were not from 
the target audience, in order to gauge their feedback and points of view on the 
survey. It was felt their feedback on the quality of the survey and the view from a 
‘non-professional’ would be invaluable to the survey. This was also incorporated 
into the survey. Each of the groups in the pre-test provided feedback on 2 separate 
occasions, each time amendments were made and the survey amended. The 
researcher feels that the survey was adequately piloted prior to its launch. 
 
Develop the final survey form 
 
A well designed questionnaire is essential to a successful survey, however, the 
researchers must develop their own intuition with respect to what constitutes 'good 
design'. A good questionnaire is one which helps achieve the research objectives, 
provides complete and accurate information, is easy for both interviewers and 
respondents to complete and is designed so as to make comprehensive analysis 
and interpretation possible.  
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Chapter 4: Roles of Stakeholders & their relationships 
 
This chapter is divided into 2 sections: 
 
4.1 Roles of stakeholders and their relationships in conventional  
4.2 Roles of stakeholders and their relationships in Islamic fiqh 
 
The division made to highlight the similarity in the relationships between IFI’s and 
conventional companies and then to further highlight the specific roles that Islamic 
fiqh places on IFI’s. 
 
The chapter is an extension of the literature review with respect to a review of the 
literature of stakeholders and their relationships, yet at the same time establishing 
the foundations for answering the some of the research questions raised in 
Chapter 1 earlier. 
 
4.1 Roles of Stakeholders & their relationships 
 
The question of who is, and who is not, a stakeholder has long been a point of 
dispute. Should stakeholder status be kept for constituencies that have a very 
close association with the organization? Or, should stakeholder status be broadly 
implied and take into consideration all of the groups that can affect and be affected 
by the firm?  
 
At the least, stakeholders are those from whom the organization has freely 
accepted benefits, and to whom the organization has subsequently incurred 
commitments of fairness, such as financiers, employees, customers, suppliers and 
even local communities. However, some are more contentious contenders for 
stakeholder status, for example, most firms have not accepted benefits from their 
competitors or pressure groups, although they can drastically impact the firm’s 
success. Should the firm consider them as stakeholders? And does it owe any 
commitments to them? 
 
Stakeholder theory maintains that normative stakeholders are owed a commitment 
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by the firm and the firm’s leaders, whereas derivative stakeholders hold power over 
the firm and may apply either a beneficial or harmful effect on it. Competitors can 
affect a firm and ought to be considered authentic stakeholders, but the firm and 
the firm’s managers have no moral obligation to attend to their wellbeing.  
 
Freeman’s original framework included eleven stakeholders on a non-exhaustive 
basis (Freeman, 1984); the most common form of the model is characterized in 
Figure 7 and comprises only seven stakeholders.  
 
Figure 7: The Stakeholder model – Freeman (1984) 
 
Freeman added further groups, markedly pressure groups in a later model and 
condensed the scheme to five internal stakeholders, Freeman (2003).  
1. Financiers 
2. Customers 
3. Suppliers 
4. Employees 
5. Communities (dropping competitors) 
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He placed a box around the following five stakeholders, and announced six 
external stakeholders:  
 
1. Governments 
2. Environmentalists 
3. NGOs 
4. Critics 
5. Media  
6. Others 
 
Without arrows linking these to the central hub, as shown in Figure 8.  
Figure 8: The adapted version of the stakeholder model – Freeman (2003) 
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What do stakeholders want?  
 
The fact that different people want different things from their relations with 
organizations makes it difficult to know with sureness what stakeholders are 
looking for. Stakeholder dialogues often focus on assigning some measure of 
organizational value or outcome.  
 
The legal position of the incorporated firm is straightforward, and provides for three 
sets of participants and a line of delegation of authority running from shareholders 
to directors to management. 
 
• Shareholders 
• Directors 
• Employees 
 
A very common way of distinguishing the diverse kinds of stakeholders is to 
consider groups of people who have classifiable relations with the organization; 
according to Friedman (2006) there is a clear relationship between them. 
 
The main groups of stakeholders are:  
 
• Customers 
• Employees 
• Local communities 
• Suppliers and distributors 
• Shareholders 
 
In addition other groups and individuals are considered to be stakeholders 
according to Friedman (2006): 
 
• The media 
• The public in general 
• Business partners 
Delegation 
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• Future generations 
• Past generations (founders of organizations) 
• Academics 
• Competitors 
• NGOs or activists 
• Stakeholder representatives (trade unions, trade associations) 
• Financiers other than stockholders 
• Competitors 
• Government, regulators, policymakers 
 
The stakeholder model states that all persons or groups with genuine interests 
contributing in a business do so to gain benefits and that there is no obvious 
priority of one set of interests and benefits over another. 
 
Figure 9: Contrasting models of the corporation: The stakeholder model 
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According to Freeman (1984), stakeholders can be viewed as anyone or group 
who can affect or can be affected by a firm. A narrower understanding could be 
that stakeholders are seen only as groups who have economic actions with the 
firms (Lovio in Heiskanen 2004).  
 
Clarkson (1995) terms primary stakeholders as those “without whose continuing 
participation, the corporation cannot survive as a going concern,” proposing that 
these relationships are described by mutual interdependence. They can be defined 
and classified in different ways and have been divided into groups based on the 
nature of their relationship to the company, along with their expectations from the 
corporation. The “web of life” view (Capra 1995) envisions corporations as 
fundamentally relational, that is, as a “system of primary stakeholder groups, a 
complex set of relationships between and among interest groups with different 
rights, objectives, expectations and responsibilities” (Clarkson, 1995: 107). 
 
The following are some of the stakeholders in a corporation and their 
objectives / goals: - 
 
Government. 
Authorities have economic interactions with companies and regulate business 
behaviours to safeguard consumers, they guarantee product standards and ensure 
legislations are followed in order to protect the rights of consumers and keep them 
safe from any dangerous actions of companies. 
 
Employees. 
They are employed to carry out assigned tasks to realize the company’s objectives, 
with success depending in large measure on the skill and commitment of the 
company’s employees. They want stability a safe working environment, good future 
prospects, job security and to be paid well. They are also the backbone of most 
corporations, without whom the corporation will find it difficult to stay in business. If 
the company antagonizes their best employees then customer service will suffer so 
they need to look after them. If they want to attract and retain top talent at all levels 
then they have to offer terms and conditions that are attractive, or they will lose 
them. 
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Shareholders 
Shareholders initial role is to provide the capital a company requires to grow and 
expand, or in the case of a startup venture, the capital it needs to launch products 
or services into the marketplace. They want a good return on their investment and 
future stability of the company, as well as maintaining their investments; otherwise 
they will take their capital and go elsewhere. 
 
Management 
Duty of preserving the health of the company by keeping stakeholder demands 
balanced, provide the resources that are necessary for the business to function 
competently, including the employment of workers, identifying suitable premises 
and procuring machinery, equipment and raw materials. Management must make 
timely decisions to ensure that the business remains profitable; they must motivate 
employees to perform well. They want what the employees want, as they are 
employees, although they may have other types of relationships with the 
organisation. 
 
Creditors 
These could be financiers and organizations that offer the company technical, 
managerial or marketing information, e.g. banks, insurance offices and investors 
other than owners. They have business actions with the company but the 
relationship is not essentially constant and they do not necessarily have routines 
with the company, Creditors’ rights are often protected under contract and backed 
by collateral of the company. 
 
Trade unions 
To protect the pay and working conditions of employees, which maybe achieved by 
making it easier to communicate with staff and arrange training opportunities.  
 
Customers 
Peter Drucker defined the purpose of a company to create customers, without 
whom the company cannot survive, and so in almost all situations the customer 
needs have to come first. The customer can always choose to take his / her 
business elsewhere, customers are the supporters of businesses in the economy, 
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as they purchase goods and services, support businesses in identifying the goods 
and services to be produced and identify changing trends in the market. The 
reason for a company’s existence is to provide products or services that meet the 
needs of their target customers and benefit them in a meaningful way.  
 
Supplier 
This includes all the players that are involved during the whole life cycle of the 
product, e.g. suppliers, distributors, consumers, even recyclers and waste 
management organisations. The relationship of these interest groups is economic. 
Ford (1980) suggests that companies pursue relations with others to gain the 
benefits linked with reducing costs or increasing revenues. By entering into 
relationships, organizations hope to gain stakeholder satisfaction and loyalty while 
stakeholders look for quality (Evans & Laskin, 1994).  
 
The local community / society 
Businesses must be conscious of the society as a whole, how the business 
activities affect society and not only those who are customers. The society keeps 
businesses in check by making them aware of their impact on society. The 
community provides the skilled workforce that a company depends upon to 
maintain the company’s competitive edge. It is advantageous for the business to 
have the support of the local community, as they will provide the necessary support 
or oppose the actions of the businesses. 
  
Future generations 
This group includes citizens, local inhabitants, future generations, societal 
organisations, universities and vocational schools, academics etc. The company 
can have external impact on these groups, or the groups might be willing to 
influence the company actions.  
 
Media 
Media can be viewed as a distinct group since it is both a stakeholder and 
information channel used by all other stakeholders at the same time.  
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Importance of stakeholders 
Engaging stakeholders involves establishing good lines of communication between 
a company and the companies numerous stakeholders and subsequently keeping 
a productive connection with them. Through this relationship, stakeholders can 
have their say and the company can listen and respond. Stakeholder theory 
(Donaldson & Preston 1995; Evans & Freeman 1988; Freeman, 1984) and 
empirical research (Clarkson 1995) indicate that companies do clearly manage 
their relationships with their diverse stakeholder groups. The idea of “paying 
attention to key stakeholder relationships” (Freeman, 1999: 235) has been a key 
topic in the strategic management literature; greater stakeholder satisfaction is 
essential for companies in a competitive atmosphere (D’Aveni, 1994). Maintaining 
relationships are necessary objectives for both the stakeholder and the 
organization (Dwyer, Schurr & Oh, 1987; Wilson, 1995).  
 
4.2 Roles of Stakeholders & their relationships in Islamic Fiqh 
 
Islamic banking and finance represents a wholesale departure from conventional 
banking and finance; from the viewpoint of corporate governance, it demonstrates 
a number of thought provoking distinctive features since equity participation, risk 
and profit-and-loss sharing arrangements form the foundation of Islamic financing.  
 
These financial arrangements infer rather different stakeholder relations as 
compared to conventional banking and finance, and as such affect governance 
structures from the conventional model since depositors have a direct financial 
stake in the bank's investment and equity involvements. The Islamic bank is 
subject to an additional tier of governance, since the suitability of the banks 
investment and financing must be in strict observance with Shariah law and the 
expectations of the Muslim community. For this purpose, Islamic banks employ an 
individual Shariah Advisor and / or Shariah Advisory Board, as well as Shariah 
review unit.  
 
Chapra and Ahmed, (2002) in their research on corporate governance of Islamic 
Financial Institutions (IFI’s) highlight the idea of justly protecting the rights of all 
stakeholders irrespective of whether they are equity holders or not. This supports 
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the stakeholder-centered model put forward by Iqbal and Mirakhor, where the 
governance structures guard the interest and rights of all stakeholders (Iqbal and 
Mirakhor, 2004). Their opinions are based on the principle of property rights and 
pledges to contractual agreements that administer the economic and social 
behaviour of individuals, society and state.  
 
Islam declares that Allah is the sole owner of property, and humans are merely 
guardians consuming and managing the property in harmony with the Shariah 
(Iqbal and Mirakhor, (2004)). The principle of property rights unmistakably offers an 
all-inclusive framework to identify, recognize, respect and protects the interest and 
rights of every individual, community, the state and corporation. 
 
There are numerous verses of the Qur’an pertaining to the principle of 
property rights, including: 
 
“Believe in Allah and His Messenger, and spend of that whereof He has 
made you trustees. And such of you as believe and spend (in Allah's Way), 
theirs will be a great reward.  
[Surah 57 Ayah 7] 
 
Ibn Khatir explains this Ayah in the following way,  
 
“Allah encourages spending from what He has made mankind trustees of, 
the wealth that you, mankind has, that He has lent you. This wealth was in 
the hands of those before you and was later transferred to you. Therefore, O 
mankind, spend as Allah commanded you from the wealth that He entrusted 
to you for His obedience. Otherwise, He will hold you accountable and 
punish you for your ignoring what He ordained on you in this regard”  
 
[Tafsir ibn Khatir] 
 
Imam Ahmad recorded that Abdullah bin Ash-Shikhkhir said, "I came to Allah's 
Messenger as he was reciting  
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 “abundance diverts you” 
 
and saying, 
  
The Son of Adam claims, 
 
 "My wealth, my wealth.''  
 
But is there anything belonging to you, except that which you consumed, which you 
used, or which you wore and then it became worn or you gave as charity and sent 
it forward.  
[Musnad of Ahmad bin Hanbal] 
 
The implied meaning of this verse lays down the principle of property ownership 
where mankind is only deemed as a representative of Allah. Islam recognizes 
private and society or state ownership, these imply the recognition of individual 
ownership in corporations as shareholders and Shariah rules provide guidelines to 
the individual, corporation and the state on how to deal with this property 
ownership.  
 
Contractual framework is also very unique in Islam.  
In the Quran, Allah clearly reminds the Muslims on the principle of fulfilling each of 
their contractual obligations where,  
 
Allah says in Quran: 
 
 “O you who believe, fulfill contracts”.  
[Surah 5 Ayah 1] 
 
This verse presents the basic foundation of the idea of a contract that every 
individual, society, corporation and the state are bound by, and that, which defines 
the rights, and obligations of the parties. 
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Ibn Khatir explains this Ayah in the following way,  
 
"Refers to the covenants, meaning, what Allah permitted, prohibited, 
ordained and set limits for in the Qur'an. Therefore, do not commit treachery 
or break the covenants. Allah emphasized this command when  
 
Allah said, 
 
“And those who break the covenant of Allah, after its ratification, and sever 
that which Allah has commanded to be joined” 
 
until, 
“unhappy (evil) home (i.e. Hell).)''  
[Tafsir ibn khatir] 
 
In relation to corporate governance, each stakeholder has a duty to perform his / 
her contractual obligations in agreement with the terms specified in the contract 
directly or indirectly.  
 
Who are the stakeholders in Islamic Financial Institutions? 
 
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004) formulate two tests to determine any individual to qualify 
as a stakeholder,  
 
• Do they have any explicit and implicit contractual obligations?  
• Whether the one whose property rights are at risk due to business exposure 
of the corporation 
 
In Islam, a stakeholder is the one whose property rights are at risk due to voluntary 
or involuntary actions of the company. In the event that someone’s rights are 
compromised as a result of a company's operations, that individual, group, 
community or society becomes a stakeholder.  
 
A saying of Prophet Muhammad (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) 
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supports this risk-based definition of stakeholder, 
 
‘A Muslim is the one from whose hand others are safe’ 
[Sahih Muslim Chapter No: 1 Hadith no: 65] 
 
Each element of Allah’s creation has been bestowed with certain rights and duties 
and each is duty-bound to respect and honour the rights and duties of others. 
These rights are bundled with the responsibilities for which humans are held 
accountable. Shariah offers a comprehensive framework to identify, recognize, 
respect and protect the rights of every individual in creation, community, society, 
and the state.  
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The stakeholders are the same as for conventional organisations, with the 
addition of the following additional stakeholders: 
 
1. Depositors (for banks) 
2. Entrepreneur 
3. Investment Account Holders (IAH) 
4. Shariah Scholars 
5. Shariah Supervisory Boards (SSB’s) 
6. Regulators 
 
Figure 10 illustrates out the key stockholders in an Islamic bank 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
[Suleiman, N.M]  
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Role of Stakeholders in Islamic Financial Institutions 
 
In considering an Islamic view of the role of stakeholders, it is noted that two 
fundamental concepts of the Islamic economic system pertaining to property rights 
and contracts govern the economic and social behaviour of individuals, society and 
the state. These two principles dictate the objective function of economic agents, 
including legal entities like firms.  
 
Islam’s framework of property rights and contracts also establish guidelines 
regarding who can qualify as a stakeholder, and if such a stakeholder has rights to 
influence the firm’s decision-making and governance. In a very broad sense, any 
group or individuals with whom firms have any explicit or implicit contractual 
obligations qualify as a stakeholder even though firms may have formal contracts 
with them through mutual bargaining. Islam’s recognition and protection of rights is 
not limited to human beings only but encompasses all forms of life as well as the 
environment.  
 
The following Hadith reflects the importance of being conscientious and mindful of 
the rights of other stakeholders and the significance of discharging the 
responsibilities associated with such rights, 
 
‘So give to everyone who possesses a right, his right’  
[Bukhari: Abu Dawud: Tirmidhi: Ibn Majah] 
 
The term ‘right’ denotes something that can be justly claimed, or the interests and 
claims that Shariah may have granted people.  The first axiom of property rights in 
Islam is that Allah reserves the right to stipulate for man the rules governing the 
property while it is in the temporary possession of man as Allah’s viceregent. The 
second axiom of the right of possession is a collective right and individuals can 
only earn a priority in the use of these resources. This proposition becomes a 
legislative basis for requiring preservation of society’s well-being and interests. 
This second axiom implies that while the individual’s possession of these 
resources and his share in the outcome is allowed, sanctioned and protected by 
the Shariah, it is so as long as it does not come into conflict with society’s interest 
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and wellbeing. This is endorsed by the saying of the Prophet (peace and prayers of 
Allah be upon him) stating that: 
 
 ‘Muslims’ blood, property and dignity are protected against each other’.  
[Imam Nawawi's 40 hadith Chapter No: 1, Hadith no: 35] 
 
Within property rights framework, one has contractual obligations to others 
including the community and the society according to the rules of Shariah and 
honouring of this obligation is considered a sacred duty.  
 
Some stakeholders may derive little benefit from the set of rights negotiated by 
shareholders and therefore would prefer other safeguards for their interests. 
Consumers, for example, instead of seeking a seat on the board of directors, or the 
benefit of fiduciary duties may settle for manufacturers’ warranties, consumer and 
product safety laws, and tort liability system because these protections better serve 
their interests. 
 
In Islam the expected behaviour of a firm would not be any different from the 
expected behaviour of any other member of the society. Since the firm itself does 
not possess a conscious, behaviour of the company’s managers becomes the 
behaviour of the firm and their actions are subject to the same high standards of 
moral and ethical commitment expected from a Muslim. The managers acting on 
behalf of the owners shape the firm’s economic and moral behaviour and it 
becomes their fiduciary duty to manage the firm as a trust for all the stakeholders 
and not for the owners alone. Accordingly, it will be incumbent upon managers to 
ensure that the behaviour of the firm conforms to the principles and the rules of the 
Shariah. 
 
The rights that are claimed for stakeholders are not ends in themselves, which 
ought to be recognized in any form of economic organization, but means for 
protecting constituency rights. In an Islamic system the observance of rules of 
behaviour guarantee internationalization of stakeholder rights. 
 
The stakeholders in conventional organisations also apply to Islamic financial 
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institutions with the addition of additional stakeholders, due to being Shariah 
complaint organisations. 
 
Depositors 
Depositors’ want their money to be safely kept by the bank and the value of their 
money to be safe over time. They do not wish to earn interest; neither do they wish 
the bank to use their funds to generate interest, as it is impermissible for them as 
Muslims. However, they would like to have their money returned to them as they 
have deposited it. In the case of banks experiencing problems, they want their 
money to safely be returned to them. 
 
Entrepreneurs 
They would like to become Musharaka partners for example, or partners in any 
other halal business manner. They would like the bank to invest the banks money 
into such partnership agreements, or facilitate a way where the banks provide 
funds from themselves or from one of its clients. 
 
Investment Account Holders (IAH’s) 
Within Islamic banks, depositors are exposed to a much higher risk than in 
conventional banks. Funds credited to customer accounts in Islamic banks are 
legally not deposits, the characteristic of a deposit is the unconditional claim for full 
repayment of the principal amount, in Islamic banks, this claim holds true only for 
money paid into current accounts. Which do not generate any income for the 
account holders. Shariah compliant accounts, which are intended to generate an 
income are not vested with an unconditional claim for full repayment, and 
Investment accounts are based on a Mudaraba type of contract implying a 
participation in the financial results of the employment of the funds be it profit or 
loss.  
 
Islamic banks operate on the principle of profit and loss sharing; the funds 
contributed by the Investment Account Holders are in part, equity investments. 
Investment Account Holders lack some of the rights that a shareholder enjoys, 
even though they are a type of equity holder with residual claims to their share of 
the bank’s assets (Archer, Abdel Karim, and Al-Deehani 1998).  
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An Islamic corporate governance framework should encompass the interests of all 
stakeholders, including the fair treatment of minority shareholders and Investment 
Account Holders at Islamic banks. The governance framework should encourage 
transparency and disclosure regarding decision making in all areas of an 
institution’s professional competence, which is of paramount importance to 
Investment Account Holders because their funds are normally pooled together with 
those of shareholders. The framework prescribes disclosure rules, firewalls to 
protect against conflicts of interest, and sanctions for breaches.  
 
Shariah Scholars and Shariah Supervisory Board (SSB) 
They want to ensure that the products on offer are Shariah compliant, as the 
customers rely upon the judgements of the Shariah board and Shariah scholars. 
They would also like to be remunerated for their work and experience. 
 
Regulators 
Same in Islamic finance and conventional finance, except in Islamic finance they 
can be more than just one body, as they need to be Shariah complaint is a 
necessity. 
 
In Islamic banks, there is a conflict of interest between Islamic depositors and 
shareholders, as both parties share the bank’s profit, which implies a distribution 
conflict. An employee would be expected to contribute his or her knowledge to the 
formulation and implementation of the organizational vision and the consultative 
procedures should be applied to all affected parties, for example, shareholders, 
suppliers, customers, workers and the community at large (Baydoun et al., 1999).  
 
Besides the implementation framework, Islam is very clear on the principles 
of corporate governance:  
 
“And consult them on affairs [of moment]. Then, when you have taken a 
decision, put your trust in Allah.” 
[Surah Al Imran Ayah 159]  
 
“Those who respond to their Lord, and establish regular prayers; who 
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[conduct] their affairs by mutual consultation; who spend out of what We 
bestow on them for sustenance.” 
[Surah al-Shura Ayah 38]  
 
Allah’s Messenger (PBUH) said:  
 
“None of you truly believes until he loves for his brother what he loves for 
himself.” 
[Reported in al-Bukhari and Muslim] 
 
The above verses and the hadith stress consultation with stakeholders at the time 
of decision-making and giving equal importance to all stakeholders (including 
minority shareholders). The OECD principles do not at any stage take into 
consideration the keynote emphasis on trusting in God. The process of decision-
making is also different from what the OECD envisages, Islam praises consultation 
and seeking consensus of stakeholders, whereas the OECD principles empower 
the Board of Directors and / or senior management to make the decisions.  
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Chapter 5: Survey to identify Corporate Governance issues facing Islamic 
Financial Institutions 
 
The researcher acknowledges the huge complexities that qualitative researchers 
face from selecting the research design, to analysing the enormous quantity of 
data and to articulating how the findings from the data can best be foregrounded.  
 
Analysis of Survey 
 
In discussing the results of the survey questions, the researcher will link the 
responses to the research question, the research objectives and the literature 
review. This will be undertaken on a question by question basis and no 
generalisation will be made.  
 
There were a total of 305 responses to the survey administered online with a 100% 
completion rate for the questions asked, provided the question was applicable to 
the respondent.  
 
The respondents were from the following types of organisations: 
  
 
The ‘Other category’, as per the responses of the respondents includes: 
 
• Manufacturing 
• Commercial bank 
165
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• Islamic University 
• Islamic Multilateral development financial institution with subsidiaries 
for insurance, trade finance, equity fund & private sector financing 
• Non-bank lending organisation 
• Educational charity 
• Training firm 
• Non-banking lending organisation 
 
Of these companies, they had the following compositions of committees: 
 
 
 
In the ‘other’ category, the committees included asset management, Human 
Resources (HR), Shariah compliance and asset liability management. Of the 
respondents 43% agreed that Institutional investors should be more involved in 
corporate governance activities, whereas only 2% said that Institutional investors 
are too involved in Corporate Governance activities and 15% said that Institutional 
investors should not be involved in Corporate Governance activities.  
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Figure 11 below depicts the recommended governance structure for a typical 
Islamic Financial Institution 
It is clear that the committees recommended by Stanley (2008) in the above figure, 
all existed in the institutions respondents in the survey conducted. One of the 
research questions posed was, “How does the Islamic Corporate governance 
approach compare with the conventional approach to corporate governance”, from 
these responses it indicates that approaches are similar from this context, as they 
have similar committee structures. The fact that the committee structures are 
similar indicates that there is correlation in the thought processes for both 
conventional and Islamic corporate governance. 
 
The Chairman of the board & CEO were held by the same individual for 36% of the 
organisations in the survey with only 2% of the respondents skipping the question 
as not applicable and 62% said that the positions were held by different individuals. 
According to Williamson (1985), shareholder benefits will be preserved only where 
separate individuals hold the CEO and the chair of the board. 
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One of the key elements of corporate governance in terms of boardroom 
independence and objectivity is the separation of the roles of the Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer. Basel II and the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance offer explicit recommendations on this separation, which is likely to 
lead to further strengthening of the Board’s objectivity and independence from 
management.  
 
Survey Question: In only 9% of the organisations in the empirical study, the board 
conducted a formal periodic assessment of the board or director performance, 
whereas in 63% of them an informal assessment was undertaken, 8% did not know 
and 20% said there was no assessment of the board or director performance. The 
director has received delegated power and therefore needs to give account and 
redress faults and shortcomings. Accountability aims for the formation of a network 
of complementary and corresponding checking mechanisms (Majone, 1994).  
 
The research summary problem of, “Islamic Financial Institutions need to 
appreciate the importance of good corporate governance”, is clearly indicated from 
these responses. It is clear that the organisations surveyed did not demonstrate 
this good practice of corporate governance by not conducting a formal periodic 
assessment of the board or director performance. And the secondary research 
objective, “Do all the IFI’s face similar problems across the globe, or are these 
problems regional”, it seems that this is an international problem for IFI’s and is not 
regionalised. 
 
Behn (2001) noted the view of accountability is more widespread now and properly 
structured accountability arrangements can provide legitimacy and improve agency 
governance and performance. The fiduciary duty of directors under most legislation 
is to do what is best for the company (Monks and Minow, 2004).  
 
Survey Question: The composition of the Shariah board ranged from 2 through to 
8, with the majority of respondents (65%) indicating 3 members on the Shariah 
board. Of these organisations, 80% of the Shariah board members hold positions 
on other Boards, 7% being on this board only, 10% did not know how many boards 
the Shariah members were on and 3% did not ask.  
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According to IFSB Principle 17: 
 
“For the Sharia board to have at least three members, possibly trained in 
different schools of jurisprudence, have a mix of members with different 
lengths of experience, and where appropriate, comprise of different 
nationalities In addition to their Shariah expertise, members of the Sharia 
board should possess some exposure in the areas of commerce or finance 
– for example, in retail banking, Takaful undertaking or capital market 
products. “ 
[IFSB, 2009] 
 
It is interesting to explore the breakdown of Islamic financial institutions and the 
Shariah scholars associated with them, for example: 
 
The top 5 out of 176 scholars Shariah Scholars are: 
 
• Sheikh Nezam Yacoubi    (77 positions occupied)  
• Sheikh Dr Abdul Sattar Abu Ghuddah   (72 positions occupied)  
• Dr Mohamed Ali Elgari     (64 positions occupied)  
• Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman Al Manee´a  (37 positions occupied)  
• Dr Abdulaziz Khalifa Al-Qassar   (37 positions occupied)  
 
[Source: Shariah Scholars in the GCC – A Network Analytic Perspective RELOADED “This 
2nd summary report (as of 01 September 2009) prepared by Funds@Work AG] 
 
These scholars make up at least 15% of almost 956 board positions; many of the 
scholars are active for consulting companies, which cater for the needs of banks, 
mutual funds, as well as asset management companies. 
 
Gulf cooperation Council (GCC) Shariah board composition, 
 
The top 6 scholars in some of the GCC countries: 
1. Bahrain (out of 51) occupy 48.21% of 195 board positions 
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2. Kuwait (out of 45) occupy 48.23 % of 226 board positions 
3. Qatar (out of 24) occupy 56.14% of 57 Board positions 
4. Saudi Arabia (out of 37) occupy 61.42% of 127 board positions 
5. The top 6 scholars in the UAE (out of 31) occupy 52.67% of 150 board 
positions 
6. The top 10 scholars in the whole of GCC (out of 138) occupy 46.09 % of 
755 board positions 
 
The top 10 scholars (out of 138) in the GCC make up 46% of 755 board 
positions (occupying 348 positions) they are: 
 
o Shaikh Nedham Mohamed Saleh Yacoubi  
o Shaikh Dr. Abdul Sattar Abdul Karim Abu Ghuddah 
o Dr. Mohamed Ali Elgari  
o Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman Al Manee'a 
o Dr. AbdulAziz Khalifa Al‐Qassar  
o Dr. Hussain Hamid Hassan  
o Dr. Essa Zaki Essa  
o Sheikh Dr. Ajeel Jasem Al‐Nashmi 
o Dr. Mohammad Daud Bakar  
 
The numbers indicate that about 68% of all Shariah board positions throughout the 
GCC are shared by only 11 of the active scholars  
  
1. 94 scholars on 467 board positions: estimated 5 board positions per 
scholar  
2. Disregarding all scholars with less then 3 actual board positions leaves 
400 positions for 38 scholars leading to 10.5 expected board positions 
per scholar  
3. The Top 10 scholars (15 or more positions) share 253 positions leading 
to 25.3 positions per scholar 
 
[Source: Shariah Scholars in the GCC: 
A Network Analytic Perspective RELOADED] 
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According to IFSB principle 1.1: 
 
“Ensuring that the Shariah board is more focused, with more time spent on 
each assignment and conflicts of interest adequately managed, which may 
imply that its members should not serve more than a limited number of 
clients” 
[IFSB, 2009] 
 
The IFSB is clearly worried with the conflict of interest issue, and further adds in 
the footnote to the guiding principles (2009), 
 
“It is important to ensure there are appropriate firewalls that can neutralise 
any potential conflicts. For example, it may be acceptable for a Shariah 
scholar to become a member of the Shariah board for IIFS operating in 
different segments of the IFSI or in different jurisdictions.” 
 
The author questions how individuals on so many boards can actually undertake 
the work effectively, especially when so many of them have other work alongside 
this, for example lecturing at universities? 
 
The author further questions how the IFSB principle 1.1, sub section 19, 
 
“should not serve more than a limited number of clients”; 
 
is adhered to by these scholars occupying so many positions? 
 
Does being on 30 + positions of Shariah fall with ‘the limited number’ and is it 
adequate according to the IFSB? How about 50+ Shariah boards? 
 
Being on some many boards must surely, by simple logic, lead to a conflict of 
interest? Is it possible for any individual to be present on the board of 30+ Shariah 
boards of Islamic financial institutions and keep each boards information 
confidential from the other? So many Shariah scholars are on different boards 
	Page 94 
together, is it possible to keep the information confidential under such 
circumstances? 
 
The primary research objective of: 
 
• To identify the specific corporate governance issues / problems facing IFI’s. 
Does an Islamic way of life provide a solution to these corporate governance 
issues / problems? 
• To identify specific Shariah related corporate governance issues / problems. 
How do Islamic principles, if at all, apply to corporate governance? Why is it 
that these problems exist for IFI’s is there are Islamic principles that do 
provide a solution? 
• To identify potential solutions for these issues / problems from an Islamic 
angle. Are there guidelines setup that provide solutions from Shariah 
principles? Who has set them up and why do these problems still persist? 
 
It is clear that these are all being overlooked or simply ignored by IFI’s, even when 
there are clear guidelines from IFSB, which are binding upon those companies who 
are located in certain countries. 
 
The Islamic Shariah clearly provides guidelines in dealing with the following 
research questions posed, 
 
• How do Islamic principles apply to corporate governance? 
• What regulations and guidelines does the Shariah provide to regulate 
corporations? 
 
The problem arises in the concerned parties following such guidelines from the 
Shariah and bodies such as IFSB. 
 
Survey Question: In the organisational survey, 7% of the Shariah Board members 
were employees of the organisation and 69% were consultants, 5% did not know 
and 19% indicated another relationship or it was not applicable to them. When a 
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Shariah board member is an employee of the organisation, a potential conflict of 
interest may arise, whereby the role as an employee of the company conflicts with 
that of the Shariah board member. The role as an employee requires that the 
employees work towards achieving the success of the business, whereas the role 
of the Shariah board is to ensure that the products are fully Shariah compliant, 
these could be conflicting. For example, if the Shariah board does not a approve a 
product, then it may affect the organisation in a negative manner, and may face 
undue pressure from superiors at work to ensure Shariah compliance to safeguard 
company interests. 
 
It would seem that the best relationship is where the Shariah board member is not 
an employee of the organisation in order to avoid any potential conflicts of interest. 
 
The prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said,  
 
“Leave what makes you doubtful for what does not.” 
[Related by Tirmidhi & Nasai] 
 
Yet again the Islamic Shariah clearly provides guidelines in dealing with the 
following research questions posed, 
 
• How do Islamic principles apply to corporate governance? 
• What regulations and guidelines does the Shariah provide to regulate 
corporations? 
 
However, there seems to be a disconnect between the Shariah guidelines and the 
adaptation of them by IFI’s. 
 
Survey Question: In 2% of the organisations, the board conduct a formal periodic 
assessment of the Shariah Board, whereas 23% conducted an informal 
assessment and a staggering 60% did not undertake any assessment and 15% did 
not know whether there was such an assessment of the Shariah board. According 
to Behn (2001), accountability will provide legitimacy and improve governance and 
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performance. The fiduciary duty of the directors to ensure the best for the company 
entails that the directors must assess the performance of the Shariah board. 
 
According to IFSB Principle 2.3:  
 
“There should be a formal assessment of the effectiveness of the Shariah 
board as a whole and of the contribution by each member to the 
effectiveness of the Shariah board. “ 
 
and sub section 36. 
 
“IIFS shall specify and adopt a process for assessing the effectiveness of 
the Shariah board as a whole, as well as the contribution by each individual 
member to its effectiveness. Members of the Shariah board shall be notified 
of this assessment process at the time of their appointment, so that they 
have a precise idea as to what is expected of them. “ 
 
and subsection 39: 
 
“The performance assessment report should be submitted to the BOD for 
observation and constructive comments. Where appropriate, IIFS shall act 
on the results of the performance evaluation, such as considering 
nominations of new members to be appointed to the Shariah board or 
seeking the resignation of any member of the Shariah board who fails to 
meet adequately the terms and conditions of his or her contract. “ 
[IFSB, 2009] 
 
How is this possible? Organisations signed up to IFSB principles simply disregard 
them. 
 
The above survey question and its responses deal with the following research 
questions posed: 
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• What does the Islamic system of life mean for corporate governance of financial 
institutions? 
• How do Islamic principles apply to corporate governance? 
• What regulations and guidelines does the Shariah provide to regulate 
corporations? 
• How does the Islamic Corporate governance approach compare with the 
conventional approach to corporate governance? 
• Is there a convergence in the approaches to corporate governance (Islamic and 
conventional) or is there divergence?  
 
There are Shariah principles, there are guidelines from IFSB for regulation, there is 
a clear understanding of good corporate governance. The IFSB principles are 
clearly grounded in the Islamic way of life, as guidelines from the Prophet 
Muhammad (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) provide sound advice for 
corporate governance issues relating to doubtful matters. There is clear 
convergence in the problems facing both conventional and Islamic financial 
institutions, however there is a divergence in how these problems are being 
tackled, it seems. 
  
Survey Question: In 3% of the organisations, the board conducted a formal 
annual performance review of the Shariah Board, 4% an informal review, 85% did 
not undertake any review and 8% did not know.  
 
For 3% of the organisations the board set specific annual performance goals 
against which the Shariah Board was evaluated, 76% did not and 21% did not 
know. This is not good practice since in order to undertake an evaluation of the 
Shariah board there must be clear targets set against which the Shariah board is 
evaluated. The board ought to be dealt with in a fair and just manner and held 
accountable to the performance targets that have been set, if targets have not 
been set against which they will be evaluated, then either party may be deficient. 
Either injustice will be done to the board, whereby they are held accountable 
unfairly or the board will not undertake fully the duties that it should as they have 
not been clearly laid out. 
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Allah says in the Quran: 
 
“Verily, Allah orders justice” 
[Surah An-Nahl Ayah 90] 
 
Ibn Al-Qayyim said, 
 
“Allah the Exalted has made clear in his law (Shariah) that the objective is 
the establishment of justice between His servants and fairness among the 
people, so whichever path leads to justice and fairness is part of the religion 
and can never oppose it.” 
[Source: Turuq Al-Hukmiyyah 13] 
 
According to IFSB sub section 21: 
 
“Principles of good governance, prudent risk management and 
professionalism require the appointment of the Shariah board to be made 
formally in writing and with the terms of reference clearly set out. The 
appointment letter, which becomes the contract for service for the members 
appointed to serve on the Shariah board of the IIFS, is the primary 
document that determines the form of relationship, level of fiduciary duties, 
and chain of accountability between the Shariah board, the IIFS and its 
stakeholders. As it is legally a binding contract between the two parties” 
[IFSB, 2009] 
 
IFSB principles provide robust guidelines. 
 
From the respondents, 33% of the board members in the firm were also on the 
Shariah board. The question of a potential conflict of interest again arises, as the 
responsibilities and duties of the board members and the Shariah board members 
are conflicting. 
The above results address the following research questions posed: 
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• Islamic Financial Institutions need to comprehend the objectives, role and 
purpose of the Shariah 
• Islamic Financial Institutions need to appreciate the importance of good 
corporate governance 
• Identify the problems that the organisation is facing with regards to 
corporate governance issues that are specifically related to the Shariah 
 
It is clear that the IFI’s either do not comprehend or simply choose to ignore the 
purpose of the Shariah, which in turn is undermining the importance of good 
corporate governance and raising the specific problem of conflict of interest of 
Shariah scholars and advisors. 
 
Survey Question: For 8% of the organisations the board had some form of 
Shariah Board succession plan and a staggering 92% did not. It is clear that 
organizations need to plan for talent to assume vital leadership positions or backup 
positions on a temporary and permanent basis. Leadership succession is of 
fundamental importance in strategic management and research shows that many 
CEOs are unwilling to step down (Boeker, 1992; Ocasio, 1994), and that 
unexpected and poorly managed successions have an adverse impact on 
shareholder wealth (Beatty and Zajac, 1987; Worrell and Davidson, 1987). 
Succession planning and management ought to support strategic planning and 
strategic thinking, without it, organizations will struggle to sustain leadership 
continuity or find appropriate leaders when a change in business strategy is 
needed.  
 
The fact that only 8% of the organisations surveyed had some form of Shariah 
board succession plan, shows that unexpected events may lead to a void in the 
Shariah board, which could lead to a hasty attempt to fill the void with personnel 
who are inadequately qualified and experienced to undertake the roles. This can 
possibly lead to a lack of confidence in the Shariah board, and henceforth in the 
decisions of the Shariah board, thus a loss in confidence in the Shariah compliant 
products on offer by the firm. According to the OECD principles of Corporate 
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Governance, overseeing succession planning is also one of the key responsibilities 
of the Board.  
 
According to IFSB sub section17: 
 
“Have a mix of members with different lengths of experience” 
 
[IFSB, 2009] 
a rationale for this is, 
 
“…considering that the industry needs a consistent supply of highly 
competent and qualified members of the Shariah board, adequate time and 
opportunity must be given to grooming a new group of people who can 
acquire the relevant competence and experience.” 
 
The IFSB clearly endorses a succession plan for the Shariah board. 
 
A code of ethics existed for organisations, which was applicable to 40% of the 
employees, 21% to Directors, only in 10% of the companies, the code of ethics 
was applicable to all of the Shariah Board members, 10% to the executive officers, 
5% of the respondents did not know who it was applicable to.  
 
A code of conduct is a policy or procedure that is precisely targeted to diminish 
unethical behaviour. Lack of a code of conduct can contribute to white-collar crime 
and the existence of a code of conduct can help with the clear nature of the 
expectation of behaviour (Turner and Stephenson, 1993). Clear expectations of 
behaviour, company loyalty, and management integrity may strongly impact the 
occurrence of white-collar crime (Mitchell et al., 1996; Russell, 1995; Hooks et al., 
1994).  
 
Mitchell et al. (1996) found that the mere presence of a code of conduct has no 
impact. Key, Messina, and Turpen (1998–99) find that executives at firms with 
known or suspected occurrences of fraud identified poor internal controls and weak 
ethics policies as the two primary contributors.  
	Page 101 
 
Survey Question: Only 30% of the respondents indicated that the Shariah Board 
members were formally educated about the workings of the organisation prior to 
joining or during their time on the board, and 60% replied that they were not and 
10% indicated that they did not know. 
 
When asked whether ‘The Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic 
Financial Institutions’ (AOIFI) standards were adhered to by the organisation, an 
interesting range of responses was received, including: 
 
• It is an educational institution and so does not apply 
• Do not make actual investments. We advise and inform our clients. 
• Optional and non-binding 
• Voluntarily 
• No, although Shariah standards are used as guidelines 
• The bank follows the AAOIFI Shariah Standards, which have been regulated 
by State Bank, formally.  
• Other non-regulated standards are followed but informally. 
"Informally" means no regulatory requirements are there but Shari'ah 
Board members follow it in more than 99% cases.  
• In one 1% cases some domestic Fatwas are adopted due to 
difference in Fiqh opinions 
• Partially depending on country of subsidiary 
• Guidance only 
• Yes, Audited Financial Statement issued in accordance with AAOIFI 
• In UAE the general rule is to follow AAOIFI standards but to what extent 
they follow is unknown 
• Both formal and informal standards are fallowed. Formal standards by the 
AAOIFI and informal by the Shariah board 
• All Shariah standards, which have been regulated, are followed formally. 
Other non-regulated standards are also followed informally. The board 
members and not the state set these standards. 
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Of the respondents 45% answered yes, 35% No and the remaining included some 
of the responses above or statements to the same effect.  
 
Countries where AAOIFI standards are either mandatory or recommended 
include: 
 
• Bahrain 
• Malaysia 
• United Arab Emirates (UAE) 
• Saudi Arabia  
• Lebanon 
• Syria 
• Sudan  
• Jordan 
 
Before the implementation of AAOIFI standards many financial institutions in these 
countries were functioning under a “semi-regulated market” (Al Baluchi, 2006). 
 
The specific research question posed, “Identify the problems that the organisation 
is facing with regards to corporate governance issues that are specifically related 
to the Shariah” is clearly highlighted by the responses to this question. The fact 
that the vast majority of the Shariah board are not formally educated about the 
workings of the organisation prior to joining or during their time on the board 
highlights a specific issue for IFI’s. The issue of credibility of the Shariah board 
may be raised, as they are issuing verdicts about areas where they have not really 
received any formal education. How is this possible? How is this credible? This 
approach is not the same as in conventional organisations. 
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Survey Question: The majority of the organisations board consists of outside, 
independent directors who do not provide services to the organisation in any 
vendor capacity. Do you: 
 
 
 
The vast majority agreed that this should be the case. The agency model is widely 
accepted in the business community, as is seen by the widespread acceptance of 
normative guidelines emphasizing the need for independent directors to monitor 
the activities of the board (Bosch, 1995; NACD, 1996). 
 
Economic theories are based on the belief that an independent board of directors 
will safeguard shareholders' interests and minimize opportunism on the part of 
management. Explicit in these formulations is the assumption that outside or 
independent directors (non-management directors) are more able to do this than 
insider directors. It seems that the respondents in the survey agree with this view 
from economic theories that the boards should consist of independent outside 
board of directors. The reality is that this is not the case in Islamic Financial 
Institutions (IFI’s). 
 
The empirical studies that have observed the impact of the insider-outsider ratio on 
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boards have discovered no reliable proof to suggest that increasing the percentage 
of outsiders on the board will improve performance. They suggest that pushing too 
far to remove inside and affiliated directors may harm firm performance by denying 
boards of the precious firm and industry specific knowledge they offer (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  
 
Some studies recognized a positive relationship between the percentage of outside 
directors and firm performance (Schellenger et al., 1989; Pearce and Zahra, 1992; 
Daily and Dalton, 1993), while other studies found no significant relationship 
between board composition and company performance (Mallette and Fowler, 1992; 
Daily and Johnson, 1997; Bhagat and Black, 1999; Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; 
Klein, 1998; Dulewicz and Herbert (2004) for the UK).  
 
Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, and Johnson (1998) and Wagner, Stimpert, and Fubara 
(1998) conducted meta-analyses of the research on board composition and 
performance. Dalton et al.’s (1998) analysis of 54 studies found no evidence of a 
link between insider-outsider ratio and company financial performance, and 
showed that neither the size of the company nor the measures used for director 
type nor company performance affected the findings.  
 
They also found some evidence of a U-shaped relationship between the insider-
outsider ratio and performance; as boards with a very high or low percentage of 
insiders performed better than those with a more even mix of insiders and 
outsiders. Barnhart, Marr, and Rosenstein (1994) and Barnhart and Rosenstein 
(1998) found evidence of a converse curvilinear relationship between the 
percentage of independent directors as classified by Institutional Shareholder 
Services (ISS) and some performance measures. They reported that firms where 
boards have a clear majority of independent directors or very few independent 
directors had lower stock market performance.  
 
According to IFSB principle 3.1, sub section 41: 
 
“A Shariah board can only be deemed “independent” when none of its 
members has a blood or intimate relationship with the IIFS, its related 
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companies or its officers that could interfere, or be reasonably perceived to 
interfere, with the exercise of independent judgement in the best interests of 
the IIFS by the Shariah board. In the case of Shariah advisory firms, it can 
only be deemed independent from the IIFS if they are not related parties, 
such as in terms of having common shareholders or common directors.  
[IFSB, 2009] 
 
The author recommends that the boards should include an appropriate mixture of 
independent non-executive directors, such that no individual or small group can 
dominate the board’s decision taking. The author would like to emphasise that 
International Corporate Governance Codes require that at least one third of the 
Board members should be Independent and a majority of the Board should consist 
of Non- Executive Directors.  
 
The questions of: 
 
• Islamic Financial Institutions need to comprehend the objectives, role and 
purpose of the Shariah 
• Islamic Financial Institutions need to appreciate the importance of good 
corporate governance 
• What does the Islamic system of life mean for corporate governance of 
financial institutions? 
• How do Islamic principles apply to corporate governance? 
• What regulations and guidelines does the Shariah provide to regulate 
corporations? 
 
It is clear that Islam and the Shariah provides answers to all of the above 
questions, yet it is clear that the IFI’s choose to either not follow them, ignore them 
or selectively follow them. 
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Survey Question: The organisations outside directors are independently minded 
in dealing with Company issues. 
 
 
 
Most agree that outside company directors would be independently minded in 
dealing with company issues. As to the mechanism by which a board is likely to 
impact on corporate performance, agency theory advocates that a larger 
percentage of outside / independent directors recognising that these two terms are 
not identical and will be able to monitor any self-interested actions by managers. 
As a result of the monitoring there will be less opportunity for managers to pursue 
self-interest at the expense of owners and so shareholders will enjoy greater 
returns.  
 
Students of corporate governance agree that the board has the following duties 
and responsibilities:  
 
I. Overseeing of management to include the selection, monitoring, 
evaluation, compensation, and replacement of the CEO 
II. The management of the board to include the selection and 
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replacement of board members 
III. Reviewing the firm's financial performance and approving the 
allocation of funds 
IV. Insuring compliance with the law and corporate social responsibility 
(e.g. Lorsch, 1989; Walsh and Seward, 1990; Jacobs, 1991) 
 
Although most agree (182 out of 305), that outside directors would be 
independently minded in dealing with company issues, it is to be noted that the 
survey did not ask for the actual figure of outside / independent directors at each 
organisation. 
 
Fama (1980, p. 294) claims that the board's 'most important role is to scrutinize the 
highest decision makers in the firm'. Mizruchi (1983, p. 433) advises that 'the 
ultimate center of control' in a publicly held firm is the board. Gilson and Kraakman 
(1991, p. 873) assert that 'in the corporate governance debate, all arguments 
ultimately converge on the role of the board of directors in general, and on the role 
of outside directors'.  
 
Research on corporate boards and board reform efforts has been dominated by a 
concern for board independence and its effect on the scrutinising of the CEO. 
Boards of directors play many roles, however, they are mainly responsible for 
providing oversight, advice and monitoring of the CEO. This independence of the 
board is central for effective Corporate Governance. Dalton (1998) says that 
outsiders are assumed to be more attentive, as they are not reliant on the CEO, 
shareholders or their representatives. While overall board configuration does not 
show a clear link with performance, the presence of more independent directors 
might support more ethical behaviour and deeper oversight into board committees.  
 
According to IFSB Principle 3.1, sub section 42: 
 
“Adapted from international best practices usually applicable to 
independent, non-executive members of the BOD, the following are 
examples of relationships that would deem a member of a Shariah board as 
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lacking independence from the IIFS he or she is serving, and thus must be 
avoided:  
 
1. A member of the Shariah board being under full-time employment by the 
IIFS or any of its related companies for the current or during the last 
financial year 
2. A member of the Shariah board who has an immediate family member such 
as spouse, children or siblings who are, or who were during the last financial 
year, employed by the IIFS or any of its related companies as a senior 
executive officer  
3. A member of the Shariah board, or his or her immediate family member, 
accepting any compensation or financing from the IIFS or any of its 
subsidiaries other than compensation for service on the Shariah board 
4. A member of the Shariah board, or his or her immediate family member, 
being a substantial shareholder of or a partner in (with a stake of 5% or 
more), or an executive officer of, or a director of any for-profit business 
organisation to which the IIFS or any of its subsidiaries made, or from which 
the IIFS or any of its subsidiaries received, significant payments in the 
current or immediate past financial year.“ 
[IFSB, 2009] 
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Survey Question: The Board has an updated role description that clearly outlines 
board member responsibilities and qualifications.  
 
 
 
The need for firms to make clear the behaviour expected from board members is 
generally recognised. For example, the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) 
Corporate Governance Council advises organisations to “clarify the standards of 
ethical behaviour required of company directors and key executives . . . and 
encourage the observance of those standards” (2003).  
 
The OECD, the Higgs report in the UK, the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and 
the Council of Standards Australia, has also developed similar guidelines for 
Corporate Governance. 
 
The Higgs report (2003), states that: 
 
“The board should set the company’s values and standards and ensure that 
its obligations to its shareholders and others are understood and met”.  
 
There is a recognised need for companies to provide information relating to 
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expected behaviour to all employees. The Investment and Financial Services 
Association Limited (IFSA) Guideline 17 (2003), commends the acceptance of a 
company code of ethics.  
 
The NYSE Rule 10 states: 
 
“Listed companies must adopt and disclose a code of business conduct and 
ethics for directors, officers and employees . . .” (2003)  
 
According to Islamic Principles, there is a need for clarity and transparency in all 
that an individual or an organisation does. The duties and responsibilities of a 
individual must be made clear in order for the individual to undertake his / her role 
truthfully and to the best of his / her ability. This necessitates that role descriptions 
are defined and outlined. The board member is the guardian of what is under his / 
her guardianship, according to the following saying of the prophet Muhammad 
peace and prayers of Allah be upon him): 
 
 “Every one of you is a shepherd and is responsible for his flock. The leader 
of people is a guardian and is responsible for his subjects. A man is the 
guardian of his family and he is responsible for them. A woman is the 
guardian of her husband’s home and his children and she is responsible for 
them. The servant of a man is a guardian of the property of his master and 
he is responsible for it. Surely, every one of you is a shepherd and 
responsible for his flock.” 
[Sahih Bukhari 6719, Sahih Muslim 1829] 
 
The board in its role as the ‘Shepherd’ or guardian needs to understand what 
comes under the role and is then held accountable for that, as Allah will ask the 
individual in the Day of Judgment about all of the covenants and promises that 
have been made in his / her life. Those promises may be made to Allah or made to 
people.  
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Allah says in the Quran, 
  
“And fulfill (every) covenant. Verily! The covenant will be questioned about. ”  
[Surat Al-Israa, Ayah 34] 
 
According to IFSB principal 1.2 sub section 20 
 
“In order for the Shariah board to have a precise chain of command and 
accountability towards the respective stakeholders of the IIFS, it has to be 
equipped with:  
 
Well-organised operating procedures with regard to meetings, the recording of 
meetings, decision-making processes and to whom its decisions will be passed for 
effective implementation, including processes to review those decisions whenever 
necessary; and   
[IFSB, 2009] 
 
According to IFSB Appendix 1: Key Terms of Reference for the Shariah Board, this 
is clearly outlined with appointment, resignation and termination of service, along 
with the reporting structure, the power and authority of the Shariah board and the 
primary duties.  
 
The author recommends that the members of the Board should be selected on 
merit, against objective criteria, and with due regard for the benefits of diversity, 
including gender diversity.  
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Survey Question: The majority of the organisations board consists of outside, 
independent directors who do not provide services to the organisation in any 
vendor capacity. Do you 
 
 
 
Hameed (2008) raises the issue of the competence of Shariah Supervisory Board 
members when it comes to the performance of conducting Shariah audit. He 
argues that although the members of Shariah Supervisory Board are well qualified 
in the task of issuing fatwas about the permissibility or otherwise of any financial 
product, they cannot stand as qualified auditors because they do not have the 
necessary qualification and training. Besides, their dual role of advising at the 
product development stage and auditing at the later stage creates ‘ self-review 
threat’ as per the international Federation of Accountants (IFAC’s) code of ethics. 
 
The respondents agree that the board should have independent directors who do 
not provide services to the organisation in any vendor capacity. Unfortunately, we 
do not have empirical data to show whether this is the case or not. An independent 
director is asked to provide his / her professional expertise and is duly 
compensated for this professional expertise. Should the director’s compensation 
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be tied to the success of the company in the capacity as an external vendor to the 
company also, and then it would present an ethical problem. Setting clear 
boundaries and abiding by good ethical practices best address the potential for 
conflict of interest. 
 
Are Islamic principles clear on safeguarding the rights and duties that an individual 
holds towards another and towards his / her work and business responsibilities. 
The Shariah clearly provides guidance on conflict of interest, as do IFSB principles. 
 
The following research questions posed, clearly show that there are issues. 
 
• What does the Islamic system of life mean for corporate governance of financial 
institutions? 
The Islamic way of life caters for conflicts of interest, but it is clear that left to 
their own devices, people will choose to ignore them. 
 
• How do Islamic principles apply to corporate governance? 
Principles of conflict of interest, confidentiality and transparency in Islamic 
principles are clearly being selectively applied here. 
 
• What regulations and guidelines does the Shariah provide to regulate 
corporations? 
Regulations of IFSB as a form of Shariah guidance are comprehensive  
• How does the Islamic Corporate governance approach compare with the 
conventional approach to corporate governance? 
The difference is in the application of the approaches to corporate governance. 
The problems facing conventional and IFI’s are the same, the means to solve 
with them is different. 
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Survey Question: The organisations outside Shariah experts are independently 
minded in dealing with Company issues. Do you 
 
 
22% of the respondents agree that the Shariah experts independently minded in 
dealing with company issues, whereas 28% do not argue that this the case, with a 
further 20% deciding to stay neutral and 11% strongly disagree. This makes 39% 
of the respondents disagreeing with the fact that the Shariah experts being 
independently minded. 
 
Allah has divulged the concept of transparency in the following verse: 
 
“O you who believe! When ye deal with each other, in transactions involving 
future obligations in a fixed period of time, reduce them to writing. Let a 
scribe write down faithfully as between the parties…”  
[Surah Al-Baqarah Ayah 282] 
 
This verse states that every transaction must be written to avoid injustice, and to 
preserve the terms and timing of these transactions, and the memory of witnesses, 
as mentioned at the end of the Ayah. 
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According to IFSB (2009) principles, no individual member of a Shariah board 
should be ‘connected’ with the company or serve another function within the 
company. Each member should be capable of exercising independent judgement. 
The management of the IFI should ensure that all relevant information is supplied 
to the Shariah board promptly and in such a manner that enables the board to 
discharge its duties properly. This will involve allowing the Shariah board 
independent access to senior management and providing for any further enquiries 
that may be made. 
 
IFSB Principle 3.3, sub section 41 clearly states: 
 
“A Shariah board can only be deemed “independent” when none of its 
members has a blood or intimate relationship with the IIFS, its related 
companies or its officers that could interfere, or be reasonably perceived to 
interfere, with the exercise of independent judgement in the best interests of 
the IIFS by the Shariah board. In the case of Shariah advisory firms, it can 
only be deemed independent from the IIFS if they are not related parties, 
such as in terms of having common shareholders or common directors.” 
 
 
Sub section 44 states, 
 
“In addition, wherever a conflict of interest is unavoidable, the member of 
the Shariah board or Shariah advisory firm should declare it in writing to the 
IIFS. They must similarly report any such conflict in regard to members of 
their family, business associates or companies in which they have an 
interest. Where there is such a conflict of interest, or a duty to another party, 
then they should abstain from participating in the relevant decision or action 
on behalf of the IIFS. Where a notification is made of a conflict, it should be 
recorded and retained by a designated officer. “ 
[IFSB, 2009] 
 
The approach to this question and the previous one is the same. 
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Survey Question: The Shariah Board and management work together to achieve 
strategic goals. Do you 
 
 
There does not seem to be any day to day cooperation between the Shariah 
boards and the management of most of the companies, which indicates that there 
are no interferences fro the Shariah board on the day to day operations. The flip 
side of this is that the Shariah board have no direct oversight on how the 
management are actually implementing the Shariah complaint products. This has 
been a major criticism of Islamic finance products, where the people implementing 
the Shariah complaint products di not understand the product and in fact ignore the 
principles that make the product Islamic. The negative opinions and harmful 
observations about the industry have resulted in Islamic financial products being 
viewed very sceptically. Islamic financial industry has been denounced as 
'deception' and 'charade' (Saleem 2006a and 2006b). Seniawski (2001) and 
Holden (2007) identify the current practice in Islamic financial industry as ‘legal 
hypocrisy’. ElGamal (2007 and 2008) claims that Islamic financial institutions are 
rent-seeking Shariah arbitrageurs using tricks to avoid prohibitions of Shariah law. 
8%
16% 17%
39%
8% 12%
Strongly	agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly	disagree Not	Applicable
The Shariah Board and management work together to achieve 
strategic goals. Do you
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The fact that the Shariah board and management do not work together in the 
majority of the companies in the survey, 47% disagree and only 24% agree that 
they do; this could be a blessing for the companies. As there are a limited number 
of Shariah scholars on the boards, as shown by the earlier breakdown, then 
working together with management will possibly lead to a huge conflict of interest, 
as the Shariah board will have detailed working knowledge of the companies. 
Seen, as there are so many boards, it would be increasingly difficult to keep this 
knowledge from being inadvertently shared between companies and boards. This 
could lead to the products of the numerous companies who have the same Shariah 
scholars to have similar products, which would hinder innovation. 
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Survey Question: The Shariah Board approves the organisations strategic plan 
and reviews or updates it annually. Do you 
 
 
 
The role of the Shariah boards involves, issuing fatawa on products, Shariah audit 
to ensure compliance, calculating zakat, dispose of non-Shariah compliant income, 
provide advice on the distribution of income to the stakeholders, as well as 
providing guidance on its wider social role within society. 
 
With these widespread roles of the Shariah boards, it can be argued that the role 
stretches to having input into the strategic plan of the organisation, in as much as it 
affects the Shariah compliance of the organisation as a whole, and with input on 
the mission of the organisation. 
 
This begs the question, should boards restrict their activities to simply being aware 
of their organization's strategy or should they be more actively engaged in terms of 
determining, evaluating, influencing and eventually approving the strategy?  
 
3% 4% 9%
43%
32%
9%
Strongly	agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly	disagree Not	Applicable
The Shariah Board approves the organisations strategic plan and 
reviews or updates it annually. Do you
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The responses from the survey indicate that 75% disagree (or strongly disagree) 
that the Shariah board has any involvement in the strategic plans of the 
corporation, whether that is in reviewing or approving it and only 7% actually have 
involvement. 
 
Survey Question:  The Board has an updated role description that clearly outlines 
Shariah Board member responsibilities and qualifications. Do you 
 
 
 
The responses to this should be unequivocal ‘yes, they’, however only 45% say 
they do and a further 23% disagreeing, with 25% staying ‘neutral’, which indicates 
that they do not know if this is the case. Good practice according to the IFSB 
principles clearly state that this must be the case, refer to Appendix 1, Key Terms 
of Reference for the Shariah Board (IFSB, 2009). 
 
IFSB Principle 2.1, 
 
“The IIFS shall ensure that any person mandated with overseeing the 
5%
40%
25%
9% 14% 7%
Strongly	agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly	disagree Not	Applicable
The Board has an updated role description that clearly outlines 
Shariah Board member responsibilities and qualifications. Do you
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Shariah Governance System fulfills acceptable fit and proper criteria.” 
 
Subsections 29 and 30 state, 
 
I. The IIFS should ensure that members of the Shariah board demonstrate the 
competence and ability to understand the technical requirements of the 
business, the inherent risks therein, and the management processes 
required to conduct its operations effectively, with due regard to the interests 
of all stakeholders. In assessing the competence and capability of a person, 
all relevant factors should be considered, including, but not limited to:  
 
o Whether the person has demonstrated, through qualifications and 
experience, the capacity to successfully undertake the responsibilities 
of the position 
o Whether the person is physically, mentally and emotionally fit to 
perform his or her duties 
o Whether the person has ever been disciplined by a professional, trade 
or regulatory body, dismissed or requested to resign from any position 
or office for negligence, incompetence, fraud or mismanagement; and  
o Whether the person has a sound knowledge of the business and the 
responsibilities of the position. 
 
• It follows that members of the Shariah board and officers of the ISCU and ISRU 
should at least possess the appropriate knowledge and skills in order for them 
to adequately execute their duties and responsibilities. IIFS should be diligent 
by carrying out background checks on candidates to be appointed to the 
respective positions. A list of minimum competencies for members of the 
Shariah board is set out in Appendix 4” 
[IFSB, 2009] 
 
The list of competencies as identified by the IFSB include, 
 
“…bachelor’s degree / ijazah from a recognised university in the sciences of 
	Page 121 
Shariah, including Islamic transaction/commercial law (Fiqh al- Muamalaat), 
and be able to demonstrate an adequate understanding of finance in 
general and Islamic finance in particular” 
[Appendix 4, IFSB 2009] 
  
There are other recommendations in terms of experience, which the author 
believes are not unreasonable. They would be expected from a professional in 
another field of work, if they wished to practice their profession and so should be 
the case here. 
 
The author would be intrigued to discover how many of these Shariah scholars 
actually have met the criteria of the IFSB. If they employed in the capacity of 
Shariah scholars without these qualifications and experience, then how is this 
possible? 
 
How can an Islamic financial institution employ people who are not suitably 
qualified? 
 
And how can Shariah scholars offer themselves as Shariah scholars and take on 
such roles, when they are aware that they are not suitably qualified? The issue of 
Amanah (trust) from both parties comes in question. 
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Survey Question: The Shariah Board actively seeks, identifies and develops 
business for the organisation.  Do you 
 
 
 
The Shariah boards compensation is tied to the success of the company, and then 
it would present an ethical problem. Professional ethics prevent should Shariah 
board members from holding shares in a company for which they provide their 
opinion. If the Shariah board stands to gain a higher financial gain as a result of 
soliciting business for the company, then a potential conflict of interest may arise, 
whereby possibly the Shariah board has to provide an opinion on a matter which is 
borderline halal or haram. The Shariah board may favour the transaction due to the 
future potential financial gain for them, to avoid this situation, Islamic principles 
would dictate that this potential conflict be avoided at all costs. 
 
  
8%
26%
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Strongly	agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly	disagree Not	Applicable
The Shariah Board actively seeks, identifies and develops 
business for the organisation.  Do you
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Survey Question: The Shariah Board appropriately and respectfully challenges 
the status quo for the purpose of enhancing shareholder value. Do you 
 
  
 
Most respondents do not agree that the Shariah board respectfully challenges the 
status quo for enhancing shareholder value, a total of 65% of the respondents 
disagreed. This maybe because the Shariah board does not wish to have a conflict 
of interest or just does not have the mandate to be involved in such activity with the 
firm.  
0.00%
7.00%
19.00%
43.00%
22.00%
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Strongly	agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly	disagree Not	Applicable
The Shariah Board appropriately and respectfully challenges the 
status quo for the purpose of enhancing shareholder value. Do you
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Survey Question: Are there any standards for corporate governance set for 
financial institutions? 
 
 
 
These could be IFSB, or those from the jurisdiction of the organisations location. A 
yes of 53% is still very low, with 33% saying No. This means that either the 
organisation has no standard to which it adheres or they operate whereby they can 
circumvent corporate governance standards, and rely on internal standards only. 
 
The Islamic finance institutions are encouraged to use the international benchmark 
for their corporate governance code particularly the AAOIFI Governance Standards 
and the IFSB Guidelines. According to OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, 
it is the responsibility of the Board to develop a corporate governance framework 
that ensures strategic guidance, effective monitoring of management and the 
board’s accountability to the company and its shareholders. The corporate 
governance code for Islamic Financial Institutions is strongly recommended to be 
made mandatory by law. The regulatory authorities should issue standards for 
compliance with all laws and regulations and responsibility pertaining to corporate 
governance.  
 
For those 33% who said No, then applying the IFSB or OECD standards seem to 
be a logical thing to do. 
 
Yes53%No33%
N/A14%
Are there any standards for CG set for financial institutions?
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It is clear that there are guidelines available to IFI’s which by their very nature are 
Shariah based and guided, as well as the duties that are incumbent upon a Muslim 
to undertake and follow. These being based on the Islamic principles of honesty 
and to giving the rights to those who rights are due towards; which in this case is 
towards your work and to those in authority over you. 
 
Survey Question: Are financial institutions required to provide any guidelines of 
their corporate governance structures? 
 
 
 
A resounding 42% of organisations did not have to provide guidelines for their 
corporate governance structures. These 42% of respondents who do not have 
guidance on corporate governance structures should, it would seem logical, adopt 
the IFSB ones. 
 
This clearly indicates that, these organisations DO NOT: 
 
• Comprehend the objectives, role and purpose of the Shariah 
• appreciate the importance of good corporate governance 
 
and although, 
Yes No N/A
0.00%10.00%
20.00%30.00%
40.00%50.00%
60.00% 55.00% 42.00%
3.00%
Are financial institutions required to provide any guidelines of their CG 
structures?
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The approach to Islamic Corporate governance is similar to the conventional 
approach to corporate governance, the implementations by IFI’s is not. 
 
The convergence is to the approach and not in its implementation, and it seems 
there is a divergence in implementation. There clearly needs to be a similar 
implementation of Shariah corporate governance by IFI’s as they have on their 
conventional approaches. It seems that the IFI’s will follow the approaches to 
conventional corporate governance when they are bound by regulations, 
however, the same regulation for Shariah corporate governance is not followed 
with the same enthusiasm. 
 
Survey Question: Does any existing law have provision for Islamic banking and 
financial institutions? 
 
 
The fact that 25% of the respondents were operating where there was no existing 
law for Islamic banking and financial institutions is quite concerning. However, it 
could simply be that other laws governing banking and financial institutions apply to 
these organisations.  
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Survey Question: Do the top management officials hold shares in the company? 
 
 
In 59% of the respondent’s top management did hold shares in the organisation, 
which can be a good thing, as they are more than just employees of the 
organisation and as such have a stake, which is greater than simply being an 
employee. The OECD Principles also require the disclosure of ownership of 
shares. 
 
Survey Question: Do the Shariah board members hold shares in the company? 
 
The fact that 25% of the respondents said that the Shariah board members held 
Yes59%
No41%
Do the top management officials hold shares in the company?
25
59
16
Yes No Don't	Know
Do the Shariah board members hold shares in the company?
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shares in the organisation is quite alarming due to the conflict of interest issue and 
the clear guidelines of the IFSB. This is not good practice and it must not take 
place to improve confidence in Islamic financial institutions. 
 
According to IFSB principal 3.1 sub section 42 
 
“…the following are examples of relationships that would deem a member of a 
Shariah board as lacking independence from the IIFS he or she is serving, and 
thus must be avoided:  
 
(iv) A member of the Shariah board, or his or her immediate family member, 
being a substantial shareholder of or a partner in (with a stake of 5% or more), or 
an executive officer of, or a director of any for-profit business organisation to 
which the IIFS or any of its subsidiaries made, or from which the IIFS or any of its 
subsidiaries received, significant payments in the current or immediate past 
financial year   ” 
[Guiding Principles On Shariah Governance Systems For 
 Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services, Dec 2009]  
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Survey Question: Are there procedures for the disclosure of any material interests 
in transactions or matters relating to the company? 
 
 
 
This is quite an alarming find, where more than 52% of the responded by saying 
that they were no procedures for disclosure of material interest, which is a clear 
route to a major conflict of interest and possibly leading to dishonesty. The 
principles of the IFSB are clear concerning such activities. 
 
According to OECD Principles of Governance, Section V. Disclosure and 
transparency 
 
“The corporate governance framework should ensure that timely and 
accurate disclosure is made on all material matters regarding the 
corporation, including the financial situation, performance, ownership, and 
governance of the company. “ 
 
[G20/OECD Principles of Corporate Governance, September 2015] 
 
  
44.00% 52.00%
4.00%
Yes No Don’t	Know
Are there procedures for the disclosure of any material interests in 
transactions or matters relating to the company?
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Survey Question: Do the Shariah Board or its representatives attend / participate 
in board meetings? 
 
 
 
50% do not attend, whereas 39% do attend. The Shariah board members should 
not be privy to what happens at board meetings, they should only be concerned 
with the Islamic legality of the products. For example by attending the meeting, it 
might emerge that the company is going through some difficult times and in order 
to survive requires the new products being developed to be Shariah approved. 
They may lead to the Shariah board member being lenient on the Islamic legality of 
the product in order to help out the company. This can arise from both the Shariah 
board and the company side, where the company may exert undue behind the 
scenes pressure and the Shariah board compromising on the Shariah compliancy 
of the product under the circumstances. 
 
The fact that the Shariah board attends 39% of the board meetings raises a huge 
question on transparency, confidentiality and conflict of interest. When so many 
Shariah scholars are present on multiple boards, then they can carry information, 
albeit inadvertently, to other companies. For example, when you are on 37 boards, 
keeping track of what information is from a particular board in your head can be 
39.00%
50.00%
11.00%
Yes No Don’t	Know
Do the Shariah Board or its representatives attend / participate in board 
meetings?
	Page 131 
very difficult. Although, they will keep records on paper, what is in the mind of the 
individual can become muddled up. And when you exceed 50+ boards, then the 
author believes the integrity of such information is hard to maintain. 
 
A Muslim avoids circumstances where such a conflict may occur, and the author 
believes the saying of the Prophet (PBUH), 
 
“He who guards against doubtful things keeps his religion and honour 
blameless” 
[Al-Bukhari & Muslim] 
 
and the hadith,  
 
“Leave that about which you are in doubt for that about which you are in no 
doubt” 
[Al-Tirmidhi and al-Nasai] 
 
That a person should not graze on the boundary / border, as surely the chance of 
transgressing the boundary / border becomes easier.  
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Survey Question:  Are corporate governance procedures and policies accessible 
freely to all the employees of the company? 
 
 
 
Firms have in place many policies to reduce or discourage fraud ineffective policies 
can contribute to the incidence of white-collar crime (Turner and Stephenson, 
1993; Russell, 1995; Hooks et al., 1994). Bell et al. (1998) find that where 
management frequently overrides controls and does not segregate duties, audit 
fraud is more prevalent. Indeed, ‘lax management attitudes, particularly toward 
internal controls, have frequently been linked to fraud and its detection’ (Holmes et 
al., 2002: 85).  
 
Good practice should be that all corporate governance policies should be easily 
accessible to all employees of the firm, as they apply to all of them. The employees 
and employers should be fully aware of the policies of the organisation. 
  
38.00% 37.00%
25.00%
Yes No Don’t	Know
Are corporate governance procedures and policies accessible freely to all 
the employees of the company?
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Survey Question:  The Board and management work together to achieve strategic 
goals. Do you 
 
 
 
 
The fact that 63% of the respondents agreed, shows good practice, with only 5% 
disagreeing. This is compares favourably with the conventional approach to 
corporate governance and shows a convergence in implementation. It also 
indicates IFI’s comprehend the objectives, role and purpose of the Shariah and 
appreciate the importance of good corporate governance. 
 
 
 
 
  
25%
38%
32%
4% 1% 1%
Strongly	agree Agree Neutral Disagree Strongly	disagree Not	Applicable
The Board and management work together to achieve strategic goals. 
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Question: Are Shariah board decisions audited by independent Shariah experts? 
 
 
 
The Shariah board has a unique relationship with Islamic financial institutions 
(IFIs), as they are responsible for monitoring the compliance of Shariah rules in 
their transactions and the issuance of Shariah products. The members of the 
Shariah board are made up of unique individuals who have knowledge of both 
Islamic Jurisprudence and finance and a strong commitment to developing Islamic 
Financial Institutions within the Shariah framework.  
 
Referring to the IFSB-3 the concept of corporate governance in IFIs is a set of 
organisational arrangements whereby the actions of the management of 
institutions offering Islamic financial services are aligned, as far as possible, with 
the interest of its stakeholders; provision of proper incentives for the organs of 
governance such as the Board of directors (BOD), Shariah Supervisory Board and 
management to pursue objectives that are in interests of stakeholders and facilitate 
effective monitoring, thereby encouraging IIFS to use resources more efficiently; 
and comply with Islamic Shariah rules and principles‟ (IFSB, 2006, pp.33). 
 
According to the Islamic Financial Services Board, Shariah Governance 
Framework refers to the set of institutional and organisational arrangements 
3%
84%
13%
Yes No Don't	Know
Are Shariah board decisions audited by independent Shariah experts?
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through which Islamic financial institutions ensures that there is effective 
independent oversight of Shariah compliance over each of the following structures 
and processes: 
 
1. The issuance of relevant Shariah pronouncement/resolutions 
2. Dissemination of information on Shariah resolutions to the operative 
personnel of the Islamic financial institution 
3. An internal Shariah compliance review or audit 
4. Annual Shariah compliance review or audit for verifying the internal 
Shariah review.  
 
The fact that 84% of the respondents said that independent Shariah experts did not 
audit the Shariah board decisions in their organisation is quiet alarming. 
 
According IFSB Principle 2.3: There should be a formal assessment of the 
effectiveness of the Shariah board as a whole and of the contribution by each 
member to the effectiveness of the Shariah board.  
 
Accountability is one of the fundamental beliefs of Islam.  
 
The Quran says, 
 
“If anyone does an atom’s weight of good shall see it in Allah’s court, and if 
anyone does an atom’s weight of evil shall also see it” 
 
[Al-Quran Surah 99: Verses 7-8] 
 
The Prophet (PBUH) is reported to have said, 
 
“Every one of you is a shepherd and every one of you is answerable with 
regard to his folk”.  
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Allah commanded the Prophet (PBUH) to declare: 
 
“I would, if I disobeyed my Lord, indeed have fear of the penalty of a 
Mighty Day” 
[Surah 6 Ayah 15; Surah 10 Ayah 15; Surah 39 Ayah 13]  
 
No one is above the law of Allah.   
 
The Prophet (PBUH) said, 
 
“I am the first one to submit to the will of Almighty” 
[Surah 6 Ayah 14] 
 
Abu Bakar, the first caliph of Islam announced said in his inaugural speech:  
 
“I have been given authority over you but I am not the best of you. If I do 
well, help me, and if I do ill, then put me right…The weak among you shall 
be strong in my eyes until I secure his right if God will; and the strong 
among you shall be weak in my eyes until I wrest the right from him…Obey 
me as long as I obey God and His apostle, and if I disobey them you owe 
me no obedience” 
[A. Guillaume, “The Life of Muhammad”] 
 
Accountability leads to improved decision making and to an improvement in 
performance and similarly it weeds out incompetence and mistakes. Holding the 
self to account is from Islam, how is it that those who provide Shariah rulings, 
which are from the law of Allah, do not hold their opinions to account? 
 
Do the boards believe that they are above accountability? The Prophet Muhammad 
(PBUH), the first caliph of Islam Abu Bakr, and the general Muslims will be held to 
account. This is what Allah has declared for all humans in this life, so why not the 
opinions of the boards be held to scrutiny by others? Do the Shariah believe that 
their decisions are perfect and unquestionable under any circumstances? Do they 
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believe that there is no besides them who is capable or worthy or scrutinising these 
opinions? Why do the companies not insist on their opinions being reviewed and 
scrutinised? 
 
Survey Question: Are there procedures to monitor the conflict of interest of 
stakeholders, in particular Shariah Boards & Management Board in place at your 
organisation? 
 
 
 
OECD Principle VI.D.6: Monitoring and managing potential conflicts of interest of 
management, directors and shareholders, including misuse of corporate assets 
and abuse in related party transactions.  
 
“It is an important function of the board to oversee the internal control systems 
covering financial reporting and the use of corporate assets and to guard against 
abusive related party transactions. These functions are sometimes assigned to the 
internal auditor, which should maintain direct access to the board. Where other 
corporate officers are responsible such as the general counsel, it is important that 
they maintain similar reporting responsibilities as the internal auditor.  
 
7%
80%
13%
Yes No Don't	Know
Are there procedures to monitor the conflict of interest of stakeholders, in 
particular Shariah Boards & Management Board in place at your organisation?
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In fulfilling its control oversight responsibilities, it is important for the board to 
encourage the reporting of unethical/unlawful behaviour without fear of retribution. 
The existence of a company code of ethics should aid this process. Which should 
be underpinned by legal protection for the individuals concerned. In a number of 
companies either the audit committee or an ethics committee is specified as the 
contact point for employees who wish to report concerns about unethical or illegal 
behaviour that might also compromise the integrity of financial statements. “ 
(OECD) 
 
The fact that 80% of the respondents said that there was no procedure to monitor 
the conflict of interest of stakeholders; in particular Shariah Boards & Management 
Board at their institution is worrying. This has closed the gates of transparency, 
and opened the doors to possible dishonesty and untruthfulness. This goes against 
all the established Islamic principles, and should be addressed immediately. 
 
Fama and Jensen (1983) mention mutual monitoring, accounting, and budgeting 
systems as critical for ensuring that management’s decisions are made with the 
interests of the shareholder in mind, and compliance with applicable laws and 
regulations (Kinney, 2000). The success of the management or internal control can 
affect the possibility of employee misconduct in a firm. Russell (1995) argues that 
widespread corporate fraud often requires a failure in internal control or operational 
governance systems.  
 
There is a correlation on the main issues facing these organisations and the 
industry in general at this moment in time. They are: 
 
The top 4 are very much the same for all organisations, 
 
1. Accountability 
2. Conflict of interest 
3. Transparency 
4. Lack of independence of Shariah Board 
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Others include: 
 
1. Confidentiality 
2. Lack of proper Corporate Governance infrastructure 
3. Due diligence 
4. Lack of standardization of views from Scholars 
5. Extremely high legal threat for products which are not covered by any 
law 
6. Lack of participation 
7. Greater accountability on decision-making 
8. Education of Shariah board 
9. Lack of relevant knowledge 
10. Review of decisions 
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Chapter 6: Compiling a coherent code, Islamic principles & regulations for 
Corporate Governance 
 
The following research questions were posed at the start of this research: 
 
1. What does the Islamic system of life mean for corporate governance of 
financial institutions? 
In summary, Islamic Financial Institutions need to comprehend the 
objectives, role and purpose of the Shariah, and do they? 
2. How do Islamic principles apply to corporate governance? 
3. What regulations and guidelines does the Shariah provide to regulate 
corporations? 
In summary, Identify the problems that the organisation is facing with 
regards to corporate governance issues that are specifically related to the 
Shariah and look at the guidelines provided to address them. 
4. How does the Islamic Corporate governance approach compare with the 
conventional approach to corporate governance? 
In summary, Islamic Financial Institutions need to appreciate the importance 
of good corporate governance 
5. Is there a convergence in the approaches to corporate governance (Islamic 
and conventional) or is there divergence?  
6. If approaches are ‘divergent’, how can the divergences be utilized in order to 
govern corporations on an Islamic basis? What standards need to be laid 
down if approaches are convergent? 
 
This chapter will attempt to address these questions in the light of the research 
undertaken and the analysis of the survey implemented. The Primary Research 
objectives of this research which have been addressed in this chapter, have 
included, 
• To identify the specific corporate governance issues / problems facing IFI’s. 
Does an Islamic way of life provide a solution to these corporate governance 
issues / problems? 
• To identify specific Shariah related corporate governance issues / problems. 
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How do Islamic principles, if at all, apply to corporate governance? Why is it 
that these problems exist for IFI’s is there are Islamic principles that do 
provide a solution? 
• To identify potential solutions for these issues / problems from an Islamic 
angle. Are there guidelines setup that provide solutions from Shariah 
principles? Who has set them up and why do these problems still persist? 
 
The secondary research objective of this research which has been addressed in 
this chapter is: 
 
• Is it really a problem of a lack of good corporate governance principles or is 
it negligence in implementation of these principles by IFI’s? 
• Are there state / government implemented approaches to corporate 
governance for IFI’s that eliminates these problems in certain geographical 
regions?  
 
The aim of this chapter is to address the research questions raised and also to 
elucidate the the duties that become compulsory on a person once he / she 
accepts Islam. The author will attempt to substantiate some of these duties, 
relevant to this research, upon a Muslim and then endeavor to prove how business 
dealings and actions and activities also fall into the realms of duties of a Muslim. 
 
Islam is a way of life, and not something you profess and then do, as you like. 
Once you accept Islam as a way of life, then you have to abide by the rules and 
regulations that Allah has laid out for the Muslim, and undertake these compulsory 
duties and responsibilities. These fall into all spheres of life. It is not just sitting in a 
masjid praying, nor is it simply reciting Quran and neither does it involve living like 
a hermit. Once the author has proven some of the duties upon a Muslim, and in 
particular those in the business field; it will become clear that the field of business 
and work is just as important as worship in Islam, as are other duties. 
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Allah will reward a person for them, as there is punishment involved if these duties 
are neglected willfully or manipulated in a manner that leads to harm for other 
people. 
 
A person joins the fold of Islam by sincerely believing in and professing faith in the 
oneness of Allah and the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace and prayers of Allah 
be upon him), embodied in the article of faith, “There is None worthy of Worship 
except Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah”. When pronounced by an 
individual sincerely enters him / her into the fold of Islam, but this has conditions 
attached to it which differentiates the person who will benefit from making this 
statement from one who will receive no benefit.   
 
The word Islam is a verbal noun originating from the trilateral root s-l-m, and is 
derived from the Arabic verb Aslama, which means, "to accept, surrender or 
submit." Thus ‘aslamaamrahu ila Allah’ means "he committed his cause to Allah" or 
"he resigned himself to the will of Allah." Aslama alone would mean "he committed 
himself to the will of Allah" or "he became a Muslim." Thus, Islam means 
acceptance of and submission to Allah, and believers must demonstrate this by 
worshipping Him, following His commands, and avoiding polytheism. The other 
major shade of meaning in the root is "to become reconciled with one another" or 
"to make peace." Salm means "peace." So does silm, which also means "the 
religion of Islam."  
[Hans Wehr, A Dictionary of Modern Written Arabic] 
 
Ibn Manzoor al-Africee al-Misree, the author of Lisanul-Arab states that Islam 
linguistically means ‘submission’. Technically it means, ‘To profess submission and 
to acknowledge the Shariah, and to be devoted to that which was revealed to the 
Prophet peace and prayers of Allah be upon him)’  
 
[Lisan Al-Arab by: Ibn Manzur Volume 7-8 Page 243 [Published: Dar Sader Beirut Lebanon 4th Edn 
2005. Translated by the author] 
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Abu Bakr Muhammad bin Bashaar in Lisaan Al Arab, translated into English by the 
author, commented on the technicality of Islam; when it is said that so and so is a 
Muslim, then it refers to one of two opinions: 
 
1. He is submissive to the command of Allah 
2. He is sincere to Allah with al-Ibaadah 
 
There are many implications upon the life of a person once he / she accepts the 
deen of Islam. These duties can be separated into 2 main categories: 
 
i. Rights of Allah 
ii. Rights of the People 
 
Islam is a complete way of life, and as such it demonstrates to an individual how to 
deal with all aspects of life, including guidance in business behaviour.  
 
Allah, stated in the Quran:  
 
“It is He Who brought you forth from the wombs of your mothers when ye 
knew nothing; and He gave you hearing and sight and intelligence and 
affections: That ye may give thanks (to Allah)”   
[Surah 16 Ayah 78]      
 
If Allah stopped His care for only a few moments, our entire world would collapse, 
in order to prevent such a catastrophic collapse of the universe, the only thing that 
Allah demands from His creation is to worship Him alone without any association of 
others in the worship.  
 
Allah stated in the Quran:  
 
“I have only created Jinn and men, that they may serve Me. No sustenance 
do I require of them, nor do I require that they should feed Me “.  
[Surah 51 Ayah 56-58]    
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Worship of Allah is not mere formalism, neither is it limited to the performance of 
certain religious acts, the concept of 'worship' in Islam is much more 
comprehensive than the commonplace meaning ascribed to the term. Every action 
performed is worship when it meets two fundamental conditions: 
 
(i) To be done with 'pure' intention 
(ii) To be done within the limits prescribed by Allah.  
 
Since Allah has created humans to worship Him, then he must have specified 
humans with a way to worship Him and indeed Allah has provided a way to follow 
His religion. A way that is comprehensive and does not leave a single stone 
unturned when guiding mankind. Allah has provided guidance through the Quran 
and the Sunnah of Prophet Mohammad for worshipping Him in all walks of life. The 
guidance of Allah is so comprehensive; it guides the Muslim from the simple 
everyday act of going to the bathroom as well as guidance on how to behave with 
rulers.  
 
There was a polytheist who exclaimed with amazement to Salman, the 
Persian,  
 
“Your Prophet has taught you everything, even how to defecate!”   
 
Salman responded, 
 
 ‘“Yes, he forbade us to face the direction of Mecca when urinating or 
defecating… 
[Al-Tirmidhi] 
 
So the messenger came and provided guidance for all aspects of life, from the 
smallest action that seems insignificant to the most significant in the life of a human 
being. The aspect of the business life of a Muslim, one of the most important, has 
likewise not been overlooked by Allah, for He has provided guidance on this also, 
for example 
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Allah in Holy Quran says: 
 
Do not devour one another’s property wrongfully, nor throw it before the 
judges in order to devour a portion of other’s property sinfully and knowingly.  
[Surah Baqarah Ayah 188] 
 
“And measure full when you measure. And weigh with an even balance. 
This is better and its end is good.”  
[Surah Al-Bani-Israel Ayah 35] 
 
“O Believers! Whenever you lend money for a particular period, write and 
someone among you must write it justly. And the one who can write must 
not refuse.”  
[Surah Baqara Ayah 282] 
 
Life is seen as an integrated and interrelated whole that includes moral, social, 
economic, political as well individual and collective pursuits. One of the main 
challenges to humanity is to relate and blend such activities under divine guidance. 
This right that Allah, requires for Himself from man is very easy to observe, simple 
to respect, clear to understand and practical to apply. The result and fruit of this 
belief in Islam is dedication, sincerity and full devotion to the truth, to justice, and 
leads to ethical and moral practice.  
 
The Prophet peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said, 
 
 "The lawful is clear, and the unlawful is clear. But between the two are 
ambiguous matters not known to many people. Whosoever avoids these 
matters has preserved his honour and his religion intact. But whosoever falls 
into them shall fall into the unlawful, in the fashion of a shepherd who 
pastures his flock around a sanctuary, so that he is near to violating it. 
Assuredly, every king has a sanctuary, and Allah's sanctuary on this earth is 
composed of his prohibitions."  
[Bukhari and Muslim] 
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The meaning of this is that the completely permissible is clear, there is no 
confusion in it and the entirely prohibited is clear. However, between these two 
matters are matters about which it is difficult for many people to distinguish the 
permissible and the prohibited.  
 
“Like the shepherd who pastures around a sanctuary, all but grazing therein. 
Verily, every king has a sanctuary, and Allah’s sanctuary is His prohibitions.” 
 
This is a parable which the Prophet (peace be upon him) used for whomever falls 
into uncertain maters, for it brings him closer to falling into what is absolutely 
unlawful. The Prophet (peace be upon him) compared the prohibitions to a 
sanctuary which is protected by the king, who prevents others from coming close to 
it. Likewise, Allah forbids contravening His prohibitions and prevented His slaves 
from coming close to them, and called them Allah’s boundaries, saying, 
 
“These are the limits (set) by Allah, so approach them not. Thus does Allah 
make clear His ayah (proofs, evidences, lessons, signs, revelations, verses, 
laws, legal and illegal things, Allah’s set limits, orders, etc.) to mankind that 
they may become the pious.”  
[Surah Al-Baqarah Ayah 187] 
 
This clarification defined what he made permissible for them and what he 
prohibited to them, so that they would not come close to the prohibited or go 
beyond the permissible. This is what He said in another verse that reads, 
 
“These are the limits ordained by Allah, so do not transgress them. And 
whoever transgresses the limits ordained by Allah, then such are the wrong-
doers.”  
[Surah Al-Baqarah Ayah 229] 
 
  
	Page 147 
The Rights of the Prophet  
 
There are no rights for any man on the face of the Earth, for a Muslim, greater than 
the rights of the Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him), Allah, stated in 
the Quran:  
 
“We have truly sent thee as a witness, as a bringer of Glad Tidings, and as 
Warner: In order that ye (O men) may believe in Allah and His Apostle, that 
ye may assist and honor Him, and celebrate His praises Morning and 
evening”.     
[Surah Al Fath Ayah 8-9] 
 
It is a must that love, care and full respect must be given to Allah‘s Prophet (peace 
and prayers of Allah be upon him), especially over all other people. Allah‘s Prophet 
(peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said:  
 
“One will not become a complete believer until Allah’s Prophet becomes 
more beloved to him than his own children, parents and all other people “.  
[Bukhari and Muslim] 
 
One of the rights of the prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) upon us 
Muslims is to believe him fully and wholeheartedly in whatever he brings of the 
news and reports of Divine inspirations.  
 
Allah, stated in the Quran: 
 
“But no, by thy Lord, they can have no (real) Faith, until they make thee 
judge in all disputes between them, and find in their souls no resistance 
against thy decisions, but accept them with fullest conviction.”   
[Surah 4 Ayah 65] 
 
Surah 4 Ayah 65 necessitates obeying the Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be 
upon him) by Allah, which in turn becomes the rights of the prophet over the 
Muslims.  
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Allah stated in the Quran:  
 
“Say: “If ye do love Allah, follow me: Allah will love you and forgive you your 
sins: For Allah is Oft-Forgiving, most merciful.”    
[Surah 3 Ayah 31] 
 
This Ayah judges against those who claim to love Allah, yet do not follow the way 
of Prophet Muhammad. Such people are not true in their claim until they follow the 
Shariah of Prophet Muhammad and his religion in all his statements, actions and 
conditions.  
 
The Qur’an speaks of the importance of following the Prophet, 
  
“He who obeys the Messenger has indeed obeyed Allah . . .”  
[Surah al-Nisaa’ Ayah 80]  
 
Allah described obedience to the Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon 
him) as being a part of obedience to Him,  
 
“O you who believe! Obey Allah and obey the Messenger . . .”  
[Surah al-Nisaa Ayah 59] 
 
To Obey Allah involves obeying the Messenger of Allah. 
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The Rights of the Governors and the People 
 
Governors or rulers are all those responsible for any organization in the 
government and Allah required the general public to obey the commands and 
instructions of their leaders. 
 
Allah, stated in the Quran:  
 
“O ye who believe! Obey Allah, and obey the Apostle, and those charged 
with authority among you”.  
[Surah 4 Ayah 59]       
 
Allah has made it compulsory to obey Him and the Prophet (PBUH), but he says, 
 
“and those” 
 
Which means to obey the rulers is only as long as they obey Allah and there is no 
obedience to the leaders when it involves disobeying Allah. The general public 
must assist their governors in achieving their missions and fulfilling their tasks and 
duties. Each and every citizen must know the importance of his role in society, and 
consequently in the government in general. If individuals fail to realize their duties 
and responsibilities, the situation will turn into chaos and confusion. It is only 
natural to have the commitment of the people and public for the administration to 
lead a decent government. Islam requires the full support of the general public for 
the governor as long as the governor follows the tenants of Islam.  
 
The Right of the Muslim  
 
The general rights are for the welfare and wellbeing of Muslims at large, and are 
instituted for a better society, much improved social relations, stronger ties and 
better citizenship. The rights that one Muslim has over another are many, some of 
which are individual obligations that are required of each person, others are 
communal obligations; if some people do them, the burden of sin is waived for the 
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rest of the society. And some are encouraged but not obligatory, so the Muslim is 
not sinning if he does not do them.  
 
Al-Bukhari and Muslim narrated, 
 
 “The rights of one Muslim over another are five:  
 
1. Returning the greeting of salaam 
2. Visiting the sick 
3. Attending funerals 
4. Accepting invitations 
5. Saying yarhamuk Allah (may Allah have mercy on you) to one who 
sneezes.”  
[Al-Bukhari and Muslim] 
 
And Muslim narrated: 
 
“The rights of one Muslim over another are six.”  
 
It was said:  
 
What are they, O Messenger of Allah?  
He said:  
1. “If you meet him, greet him with salaam 
2.  If he invites you, accept the invitation 
3.  If he asks for advice, give him sincere advice 
4.  If he sneezes and praises Allah, say Yarhamuk Allah (may Allah have 
mercy on you) 
5.  If he falls sick, visit him 
6. If he dies, attend his funeral.”  
[Muslim] 
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The Messenger of Allah (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said: 
 
"A believer to another believer is like a building whose different parts 
enforce each other."  
 
The Prophet then clasped his hands with the fingers interlaced while saying 
that.  
[Bukhari & Muslim] 
 
The Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) draws parallels to explain 
some issues; he likens the mutual assistance and solidarity of believers to the 
enforcement of the parts of a building. 
 
The Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said, 
 
"A Muslim is the brother of another Muslim. He does not betray his brother, 
lie to him and leave him unassisted. The chastity, property and blood of a 
Muslim are haram for another Muslim."   
[Tirmidhi] 
 
Betrayal is the opposite of trustworthiness, and includes all kinds of injustice, lack 
of trust and confidence. A Muslim does not betray what is entrusted to him.  
 
The Quran says:  
 
"The Believers are but a single Brotherhood..."  
[Surah al-Hujurat Ayah 10]  
 
 
A person may encounter various problems, big or small, in daily life, everything that 
pains man is a problem. Muslims help one another to overcome these problems, 
and they receive reward from Allah when they remove the problems of their 
brothers just like when they meet their needs. Those who do good deeds in the 
world will receive their reward on the Day of Judgment. 
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It is imperative therefore that one Muslim does not do injustice to another in his / 
her business dealings. When one person has authority or influence over the others 
in the business field, then they must ensure that they always act equitably and 
never harm another. 
 
Allah says in the Quran, 
 
‘O people! We created you from one man and one woman and made you 
divided in branches and tribes so that you may recognize one another. 
Undoubtedly the most respected among you in the sight of Allah is he who 
is more pious, verily, Allah is knowing, Aware.  
[Surah Al-Hujurat Ayah13] 
 
Towards Family & relatives 
 
Relatives have specific rights entitling them to special attention, visitation and 
support in times of need and to share in their concerns. Islam encourages a 
Muslim to be kind to his relatives even when they are unkind to him, and asks him 
to continue his relations even when they cut them off. Everyone who has a tie of 
relation with you has certain rights upon you, 
 
Allah said: 
 
 “And give to the relative his right.”  
[Surah al-lsraa Ayah 26] 
 
Allah also said:  
 
“And worship Allah alone, and do not set-up any partner to Him in worship, 
and be kind and good to the parents, and to the relatives.”  
 
[Surah an-Nisaa Ayah 36] 
 
So it is obligatory upon everyone to treat their relatives in the best possible 
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manner, and to support them in accordance with their needs, and what they seek 
of help and support.  
 
The Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said: 
 
“The best charity is that which is practiced by a wealthy person. And start 
giving first to your dependents.”  
[Bukhari] 
 
The Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said: 
 
“To give something to a poor man brings one reward, while giving the same 
to a needy relation brings two: one for charity and the other for respecting 
the family ties.”  
[Ahmad, Ibn Majah, Nasai, Tirmidhi] 
 
The Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said: 
 
 “Whosoever believes in Allah and the Last Day let him keep the ties of 
relations.”  
[Bukhari Hadith No.6138] 
 
Towards Society 
 
“Surely Allah commands justice and the doing of good (to others), and 
giving to the kindred, and He forbids indecency and evil and rebellion. He 
admonishes you that you may be mindful. And fulfill the covenant of Allah, 
when you have made a covenant, and break not your oaths after confirming 
them; and you have indeed made Allah your surety. Surely Allah knows 
what you do.”   
[Surah 16 Ayah 90-91] 
 
These ayahs certainly train a Muslim in the finest behaviour in order for them to 
form a strong society, by ordering justice among the people. The Qur'an explains 
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that it is obligatory for Muslims to practice justice in both their deeds and their 
speech so no one will be deprived of his / her right.  
 
The Messenger of Allah (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said: 
  
“Do not envy one another, and do not inflate prices for one another, and do 
not hate one another, and do not turn away from one another, and do not 
undercut one another in trade, but [rather] be Slaves of Allah and Brothers 
[amongst yourselves]. A Muslim is the brother of a Muslim: he does not 
oppress him, nor does he fail him, nor does he lie to him, nor does he hold 
him in contempt.” 
[Hadith No 35 Imam an-Nawawi’s 40 Hadith] 
 
 
The Messenger of Allah (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said: 
 
The Lord’s commandment for every one of His slaves is, ‘Spend on others, 
and I will spend on you’.  
[Bukhari & Muslim] 
 
He also said: 
 
“Have you seen him who belies the rewards and punishments of the 
Hereafter? He it is, who drives away the orphan and does not urge giving 
away the food to the poor.”  
[Surah Al-Ma’un Ayah 1 – 3] 
 
The Messenger said, 
 
“If any Muslim plants something or sows seed from which a man, a bird or 
an animal eats, it counts as a charity for him.”  
[Bukhari & Muslim] 
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The Shariah does not confine itself to giving rights to Muslims only, the general 
principle is that non-Muslims have the same rights and obligations as Muslims. 
Islam emphasizes the origin of all humanity is one; therefore all human beings 
have certain rights over one another.   
 
Allah says: 
 
"O mankind!  We created you from a single (pair) of a male and female, and 
made you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other (and not 
hate one another).  Surely, the most honored of you in the sight of God is 
(he who) is the most righteous of you.  And God has full knowledge and is 
well acquainted (with all things)."  
[Surah 49 Ayah 13] 
 
 
It is clear that there are rights and duties towards the society at large, and a Muslim 
cannot neglect them and nor seize to be a part of the society. 
 
Rights of the Employees 
 
Islam has defined a set of rules on labour and the labour force. An employer, 
according to Islamic teachings, must establish a just and cordial relationship with 
his employees and the labour force. Such a relationship must be based on 
equality, goodwill and the brotherhood of Islam. 
 
The prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) is reported to have 
said,  
 
“The best of income is that which results from honest labour”. 
[Musnad Ahmad, Hadith no. 8419]  
 
The Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said, 
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“The honest treasurer who gives willingly what he is ordered to give is one 
of the two charitable persons, (the second being the owner).”  
[Mishka’at] 
 
The employees have rights over their employers and vice versa. 
 
Rights of the Employers 
 
Islam equally requires workers to maintain good relations with their employer, and 
fulfill their duties towards their employer to the best of their abilities. Workers must 
not neglect or harm their employer or his work in any way.  
 
In order to encourage sincerity in work and to protect one's dignity, Islam made the 
earning of a laborer the best of all earnings if he were sincere in his work.  
 
Prophet Muhammad (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said: 
 
“Give the labor his wage before his sweat dries” 
[Ibn Majah] 
 
He also said:  
 
“Those are your brothers [workers under you] who are around you; Allah 
has placed them under you. So, if anyone of you has someone under him, 
he should feed him out of what he himself eats, clothe him like what he 
himself puts on, and let him not put so much burden on him that he is not 
able to bear, [and if that be the case], then lend your help to him.”  
[Bukhari, No: 2359] 
 
He also said:  
 
 “I will be foe to three persons on the Last Day: one of them being the one 
who, when he employs a person that has accomplished his duty, does not 
give him his due.”  
[Bukhari, No: 2109] 
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The Prophet (peace and prayers of Allah be upon him) said:  
 
 “The best earning is that earned against the labour of the hand with 
sincerity”  
[Ahmad, Hadith no.8393] 
 
It is clear that the duties upon a Muslim are widespread, the duty towards the 
society in general, as well as in business transactions ensures that the complete 
life of a Muslim is a form of worship to Allah, as such guidance has been revealed 
to show how a Muslim must go about them. This unique concept of worship in 
Islam is unparalleled and combines the mundane with the spiritual and the 
individual with the society. Worship in Islam has many features, the most general 
being inclusive of everything which is pleasing to Allah. It also refers to everything 
that Allah requires, including rituals as well as beliefs, work, social activities, and 
personal behaviour, as a human being is a whole, such that every part affects 
every other.  
 
Therefore, devoting oneself to Allah in Islam does not require a person to enter a 
place of worship nor embrace monasticism; rather, fulfilling this purpose of life is an 
active daily pursuit. A Muslim can be engaged in worship throughout the day, be it 
at home, work or anywhere else. 
 
Allah says in the Quran that to fulfill promises and commitments, 
 
“And keep the covenant. Lo! Of the covenant it will be asked.”  
[Surah Al-Israa Ayah 34] 
 
Promises and contracts are an important part of human life and human civilization 
and a form of worship. When promises are not kept, trust is lost and the whole 
society becomes weak. The Islamic understanding of worship allows the whole of 
one’s life to be an act of worship, as long as the objective of that life is the pleasure 
of Allah. A person can turn everyday activities into acts of worship by purifying their 
intention and sincerely seeking Allah’s pleasure through these activities. Business 
transactions fall into these categories, and hence a Muslim must be conscious of 
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them at all times. He / she must be clear about his / her responsibilities and act 
according to the guidance revealed by Allah, and shown by the Shariah.  
 
The issue of corporate governance falls into this category, as it is a multi-faceted 
right upon the Muslim. There are many stakeholders involved in corporate 
governance, which are also the same stakeholders that the Muslim owes an 
obligation towards. They involve Muslims, neighbour’s, relatives, rulers and society 
as a whole. This necessitates that corporate governance is undertaken as an act of 
worship, as the person will be held accountable for them. 
 
The day of judgement will come and it will hold a person accountable for all his / 
her actions, and this will include those of corporate governance activities. And for 
every stakeholder who feels they have been wronged by the individual due to their 
corporate governance activities, which might be due to a lack of transparency or 
honesty, then they will have recourse in front of Allah. And if these activities fall 
short of expectations, then there will be accountability and if they are as they 
should be, then there will be reward from Allah for the act of worship that has been 
undertaken. 
 
Allah says in the Quran, 
 
“Give full measure when ye measure, and weigh with a balance that is 
straight: that is the most fitting and the most advantageous in the end.” 
 [Surah Al-Israa Ayah 35] 
 
Honest business brings progress, success, and blessings. All business, whether 
commercial, social, or political must be done with a sense of justice and fairness.  
 
Man is Allah’s viceregent on Earth: 
 
The acceptance of Islam represents an agreement between the individual and 
Allah, where the model of the human has a duality of functions in the form of 
‘Worshipper’ and the ‘Vicegerent’. Human beings have a unique position in 
creation, as they have been designated as the vicegerent (Khalifa) of Allah on 
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earth. Khalifa means someone who takes the place of another in his absence or as 
an agent of the absolute owner (Asvat, 2011, p. 18).  
 
Man is the vicegerent of Allah on Earth (Surah al-Baqarah Ayah 30) and is not left 
without a purpose (Surah al-Qiyamah Ayah 36) according to the Creator. The 
Quran states that man was created as “the vicegerent on earth” [Surah al-Baqarah 
Ayah 30; Surah al-An‘am Ayah 165; Surah Faatir Ayah 39] and this expression is 
usually interpreted as “being the vicegerent of the Creator, that is, ruling the world 
in compliance with His laws”.  
 
The word vicegerent means to improve the world for and on behalf of Allah, to 
apply the orders and recommendations of Allah on Earth. Humans are seen as 
unique and privileged beings who are able to be caring, responsible, kind, just, 
wise, forgiving, and display many embedded good qualities.  
 
Islam strongly advocates all forms of positive governance. Islamic values 
expressed in ethical conduct are an integral part of the obligations laid upon the 
individual and the community. Rules of corporate governance derive from the 
underlying principle of assuring the economic wellbeing of the whole community on 
the basis of universal brotherhood, justice, honesty, fair dealing, avoidance of 
exploitation, mutual accountability, truthfulness and transparency, protection of 
minorities, adequate disclosure and equitable distribution of wealth.  
 
Islam commands authority over the totality of a Muslim’s being and behaviour, 
without any concession of special provision for ‘sacred’ and ‘secular’ domains. The 
two dominant factors that shape the nature of Islamic corporate governance, the 
Shariah, claims sovereignty over all aspects of conduct, individual and collective, 
and to encompass civil as well as criminal jurisdiction and the law includes certain 
economic and financial principles that have a direct bearing on corporate practices 
and policies.  
 
The Islamic concept of corporate governance emphasizes the traits that Allah 
expects in people: accountability, transparency, and trustworthiness (Mustapha 
and Salleh 2002). According to Islam, a company’s managers and staff, by virtue of 
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their individual responsibility to Islamic principles, are accountable to the 
shareholders, customers, regulatory bodies, and society at large. Tawhid 
encourages self-governance promoting the need to submit fully to Allah, and 
focuses on the unique relationship between people and Allah. 
 
Acting responsibly toward others and being responsible for oneself is a trust, 
neglecting personal and social responsibilities is a form of betrayal in the eyes of 
Allah. Muslims are called to be dedicated to their work, as it is a form of worship 
and are viewed as virtuous acts. Acting with integrity is required of a practicing 
Muslim under the principle of Khalifa (trusteeship). All of these aspects of Islam 
support the goal of strong corporate governance.  
 
Shariah governs Islamic Financial Institutions just as it governs individuals and 
their actions. The aim of Shariah for financial institutions is to support Islamic 
financial practices that do not exploit or do injustice to the institution’s shareholders 
and customers.  
 
Three basic elements of the Islamic faith provide the foundation for corporate 
governance in Islamic banking (Haron and Shanmugam 1997):  
 
I. Aqedah, concerns faith and belief in Allah 
II. Shariah, concerns practical actions taken by Muslims in manifesting their 
faith and beliefs 
III. Akhlaq, covers a Muslim’s behaviour, attitude and work ethic  
 
 
Regulations for Islamic Corporate Governance 
 
Strong corporate governance in Islamic financial institutions is fundamental for the 
progression of a vibrant and comprehensive Islamic finance industry. The 
regulation of Islamic finance needs to be aligned with the regulation of conventional 
finance consistent with Shariah requirements. This means the application of 
internationally recognized regulatory standards and principles with variations only 
as necessitated to reflect Shariah compliance.  
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Banking and finance regulation and supervision are a vital factor for economic 
development, efficiency, and stability with the necessity for the supervisory 
authorities to conduct persistent checks on compliance with these regulations. 
Regulation in the Islamic banking and finance industry is essential to preserve 
confidence in the system as a whole, helping increase the information available to 
investors, protecting interests of savers and ensuring the soundness of the 
financial system.  
 
International reforms implemented in bank regulation and supervision, such as 
Basel II regime, developed an extensive list of best practices that have important 
implications for Islamic banks. The adoption of sound corporate governance 
standards and practices ensures that Islamic banks are managed safely and 
soundly where risk taking activities and business prudence are properly balanced 
to and safeguard the interests of all stakeholders.  
 
If the corporate governance code for Islamic financial Institutions is made 
mandatory by law by the regulatory authorities where they are located, and they 
issue standards for compliance with all laws and regulations and also the 
responsibility pertaining to corporate governance. If the Islamic financial institutions 
nominate a high level officer responsible for following through the implementation 
of the corporate governance practices, this will improve confidence in the 
institution. 
 
In comparison with conventional banking and finance, Islamic financial institutions 
have an added Shariah board or Shariah supervisory board (SSB) in their layer of 
governance, and typically international Shariah review and compliance units and 
for some institutions an external Shariah review unit. These should, if implemented 
carefully and thoroughly improve confidence in the industry. 
 
The IFSB published the Guiding Principles on Shariah Governance systems for 
Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services in 2006, which were designed to 
help them establish and implement effective corporate governance practices.  
 
 
	Page 162 
These IFSB Guiding Principles are applicable to: 
 
30 Commercial banks 
31 Investment banks 
32 Finance houses 
33 Other fund-mobilizing institutions that offer only financial services and 
products complying with Islamic Shariah rules and principles 
 
The IFSB principles are divided into four parts:  
 
29. General governance approach of Islamic financial institutions 
30. Rights of investment account holders (IAH) 
31. Compliance with Islamic Shariah rules and principles 
32. Transparency of financial reporting in respect of investment accounts  
 
In addition, the Accounting and Auditing Organizations for Islamic Financial 
Institutions (AAOIFI) has also issued numerous accounting and auditing standards, 
many governance standards and codes of ethics as well as many Shariah 
standards.  
 
Compiling a coherent code of Islamic Corporate governance 
 
There are numerous Islamic corporate governance-guiding principles available 
across the globe. Some companies, due to the location and national regulatory 
body, come under legal jurisdiction of a country that has adopted the IFSB Islamic 
corporate governance practices; whilst others fall outside such jurisdictions and 
therefore follow them voluntarily, if at all. 
 
These countries that follow IFSB guiding principles as a matter of law, have 
extensive Islamic corporate governance codes to follow, and others that do not 
follow IFSB guiding principles as law, but have their own Islamic corporate 
governance guiding principles as law. Companies who fall outside these 
jurisdictions will follow the corporate governance principles adopted in their 
jurisdictions, whether they are OECD principles or those from the country itself. It is 
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clear that many Islamic financial institutions fall outside in countries that do not 
have Islamic corporate governance principles as law, and therefore only adopt 
them if they wish to. 
 
The author believes the problem is not so much in having these principles, but 
rather with actually following and obeying them. The problem lies with the practice 
and not the theoretical principles. 
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What are the key principles of Islamic corporate governance? 
 
According to the IFSB,  
 
• General Approach to the Shariah Governance System 
1. Principle 1.1: The Shariah governance structure adopted by the IIFS should 
be commensurate and proportionate with the size, complexity and nature of 
its business.  
2. Principle 1.2: Each IIFS must ensure that the Shariah board has:    
a. Clear terms of reference regarding its mandate and responsibility 
b. Well-defined operating procedures and lines of reporting  
c. Good understanding of, and familiarity with, professional ethics and 
conduct  
• Competence  
1. Principle 2.1: The IIFS shall ensure that any person mandated with 
overseeing the Shariah Governance System fulfills acceptable fit and proper 
criteria 
2. Principle 2.2: The IIFS shall facilitate continuous professional development 
of persons serving on its Shariah board, as well as its ISCU and ISRU, if 
any 
3. Principle 2.3: There should be a formal assessment of the effectiveness of 
the Shariah board as a whole and of the contribution by each member to the 
effectiveness of the Shariah board 
 
• Independence  
1. Principle 3.1: The Shariah board should play a strong and independent 
oversight role, with adequate capability to exercise objective judgement on 
Shariah related matters. No individual or group of individuals shall be 
allowed to dominate the Shariah board’s decision-making 
2. Principle 3.2: In order to fulfill their responsibilities, the Shariah board 
should be provided with complete, adequate and timely information prior to 
all meetings and on an ongoing basis 
 
• Confidentiality  
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• Principle 4.1: Shariah board members should ensure that internal 
information obtained in the course of their duties is kept confidential 
 
• Consistency  
• Principle 5.1: The IIFS should fully understand the legal and regulatory 
framework for issuance of Shariah pronouncements/resolutions in the 
jurisdiction where it operates. It should ensure that its Shariah board 
strictly observes the said framework and, wherever possible, promotes 
convergence of the Shariah governance standards 
 
The above 4 are general principles of Islamic corporate governance as outlined by 
the IFSB in “Guiding Principles On Shariah Governance Systems For Institutions 
Offering Islamic Financial Services”, 2009.  
 
They can be elaborated further, 
 
• Decision-making / Shura 
Proof of this being the ayah from the Quran, 
“And consult them on affairs [of moment]. Then, when you have 
taken a decision, put your trust in Allah”  
[Surah Al-Imran Ayah 159] 
• Accountability 
Proof of this being the ayah from the Quran, 
“O ye who believe! Betray not the trust of Allah and the apostle, nor 
misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you.”  
[Surah al-Anfal Ayah 27] 
 
If the Islamic financial institutions were to follow the IFSB rules as specified above 
to the letter of the law, then the author believes that confidence in the Islamic 
financial institutions would be much higher. At the moment although many claim to 
abide by IFSB guiding principles and pay lip service to the principles of Islamic 
corporate governance, they clearly violate or disregard or choose to circumvent 
certain principles. For example, competence of the Shariah scholars is a point well 
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known by all, as are issues of being independent and showing accountability for 
the members of the board. 
 
The OECD Principles of Corporate Governance were endorsed by OECD Ministers 
in and have since become an international benchmark for policy makers, investors, 
corporations and other stakeholders worldwide. They have advanced the corporate 
governance agenda and provided specific guidance for legislative and regulatory 
initiatives in both OECD and non-OECD countries (OECD, 2009). Just as in the 
OECD principles, the underlying fundamentals emphasized in Islam are 
transparency, consistency and equality in exercising the law.  
 
The following are the main areas of the OECD principles, 
 
Principle 1: Ensuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework 
Principle 2: The right of shareholders and key ownership functions 
Principle 3: The equitable treatment of shareholders 
Principle 4: The role of stakeholders in corporate governance 
Principle 5:  Disclosure and transparency 
Principle 6: The responsibilities of the board 
 
The main theme of the above principles fall in four basic areas, 
 
• Business ethics 
• Decision making  
• Adequate disclosure and transparency  
• The mechanism of book keeping and final accounts 
 
Morck (2005) states that the soundness of the OECD principles has been proven 
by their adoption all over the world. 
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Table 3 Comparison of Islamic CG Principles with OECD principles 
OECD principles and annotation Islamic principles 
Principle 1: Insuring the basis for an effective corporate governance framework  
• Promotion of transparent & efficient 
markets with rule of law & division of 
responsibilities  
 
• Promotion of business within ethical 
framework of Shariah  
• Belief in profit and loss   
• Primacy of Justice & social welfare with 
social and spiritual obligations  
• Prohibition of interest  
Principle 2: The rights of shareholders & key ownership functions  
• Basic shareholder rights Participation in 
Decision-making at the general 
meetings 
• Structures & arrangements markets for 
corporate control 
• Ownership rights by all shareholders 
including institutional shareholders 
• Consultative process between 
shareholders  
• Property as trust from Allah  
• Sole Authority is Allah  
• Society as stakeholders   
• Accountability not only to stakeholders 
but also to Allah, the ultimate owner  
 
Principle 3: The equitable treatment of shareholders  
• Protection to minority and foreign 
shareholders  
 
• Just and fairness of value  
• Equitable distribution of wealth to all 
stakeholders and disadvantaged 
members in the form of Zakat & 
Sadaqah  
• Social and individual welfare with both 
spiritual and moral obligation  
• Sensation of Equality  
Principle 4: The role of stakeholders in corporate governance  
• In creating wealth, jobs and 
sustainability of financially sound 
enterprises  
• Islamic accountability to Falah 
and social welfare orientation  
• Haram/Halal dichotomy in 
transaction  
• Social & individual welfare from 
both spiritual and material   
• Consideration to whole 
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community 
Principle 5: Disclosure and transparency  
• Matters regarding corporation  
• Financial situation  
• Performance, ownership & governance  
 
• Accountability with Shariah 
compliance  
• Socio-economic objectives related to 
firms’ control and accountability to 
all its stakeholders   
• Justice, equality, truthfulness and 
transparency  
• Wider accountability with written as 
well as oral disclosure  
Principle 6: The responsibilities of the board  
• Strategic guidance  
• Monitoring of management   
• Accountability to company and 
stakeholders  
• Accountability not only to company or 
board or stakeholders but also to Allah 
the ultimate authority who leads to 
welfare and success  
• Holistic and integrative guidance  
• Negotiation and co-operation  
• Consultation and consensus seeking for 
each decision with related stakeholders 
 
[Adapted from: Abu-Tapanjeh, A.M., 2009] 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions  
 
Good corporate governance has long been considered central for stakeholders in 
the business environment, although the goals changing from one firm to another; 
however, the important concern is to push a good code of mechanisms to uplift and 
govern the firm. Meyer (2004) says that systematic governance means adjusting 
the signals within a firm such that staff automatically do the right things, without the 
need for oversight. Sound corporate governance practices have become critical to 
efforts to stabilize and strengthen capital markets and protect investors (Darman, 
2005).  
 
When stakeholders perceive good corporate governance, it builds their confidence 
in the organisation and the system governing the organisation in which they will be 
investing. This will lead to an increase in investment into the organisations and the 
opposite happens when they do not have confidence in the governance of the 
corporation where they wish to invest their money. 
 
The governance of Islamic corporations has an added complication, that of 
compliance to the Shariah of Islam. An Islamic corporation is one that claims to 
follow the ethics and rules and regulations of Islam when it undertakes business, it 
does not mean one that is owned by Muslims or Muslim majorities. There are an 
increasing number of a people across the world that wish to invest within Islamic 
corporations, where the organisation follows the basic principles of Islam when 
undertaking business. The fundamental to this being the following of the Shariah 
when undertaking business. 
 
The primary characteristic of the Islamic economy has been to provide just, honest, 
fair and a stable society as intended by the Islamic ethical values and rules that 
Islam promotes. I have to unequivocally agree with Ahmad, (2000), Mirakhor, 
(2000) and Warde, (2000), who said that Islamic business is forever considered by 
the Islamic ethical norms and social commitments which are resolutely based on 
the ethical and moral frameworks of the Shariah. Asyraf, (2006) held that the 
Shariah rulings intertwine Islamic financial transactions with genuine concern for 
ethically and socially responsible activities whilst at the same time forbidding 
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participation in unlawful activities or those activities that are damaging to social and 
environmental wellbeing.  
 
The investors wish to have the same standard as international corporations that 
follow good corporate governance procedures, with the added component of 
compliance with the Shariah. They expect excellence in both areas, without those 
responsible for the organisation cutting corners in either of them. 
 
Those entrusted to ensure that the organisations follow the Shariah and comply 
with the rules of the Shariah have taken on an immense task, due to the fact that 
Allah (SWT) will hold them accountable on the day of judgement for their actions. 
These people have placed themselves in positions of authority and responsibility 
for ensuring that the wealth of a Muslim is earned in a halal way. If they fail in this, 
Allah (SWT) will hold them accountable and the people who have invested into the 
organisation due to this will take them to task on the day of judgement. 
 
The need to follow good corporate governance rules whilst complying to with the 
Shariah is an immense task, which many corporations have undertaken with 
distinction; whilst others have not fulfilled their duty and have fallen short for a 
number of reasons, greed and dishonesty being some of the reasons. The well-
known cases of misappropriation of funds from Islamic organisations have resulted 
in a loss in confidence with these organisations and also with the wider Islamic 
finance industry as a whole. The fault of these people for their actions goes further 
than the misappropriation of funds in itself; the loss in confidence in the Islamic 
fiancé sector as a result of these actions will also fall on their heads also. If their 
actions have led to a general fall in confidence and mistrust of the Islamic finance 
sectors, then those, whose actions have done so, need to be held accountable. 
Some individuals will mistrust the Islamic finance sector to such a degree due to 
this behaviour, that they have taken their money and invested it within the non-
halal form, as they believe that the Islamic finance sector is not trustworthy. These 
actions, although the responsibility lies on the owners of the capital, some of it has 
to be borne by the individuals who have contributed to this impression. Allah (SWT) 
will hold them accountable for this on the day of judgement, even though they may 
feel that they have escaped accountability in this life, and no matter how eloquently 
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they defend their actions and attempt to escape accountability and responsibility in 
this life, it will come to them on a day where they cannot escape the consequences 
of their actions. 
 
This research has attempted to: 
 
1. Analyse the problems facing Islamic financial institutions 
These were undertaken by an extensive survey, the results of which have 
been analysed  
 
2. Look at what the Islamic system of life mean for corporate governance 
of financial institutions 
The Islamic way of life was explored, demonstrating and proving that Islam 
is a holistic way of life that affects every aspect of an individual’s life, 
including his / her business transactions. These then had duties and 
responsibilities that the Muslim must adhere to. 
  
3. How Islamic principles apply to corporate governance 
Islamic principles of honesty, transparency, justice, competence, 
consistency, confidentiality and independence all apply to the business 
sphere of a Muslim. 
 
4. What regulations and guidelines does the Shariah provide to regulate 
corporations 
The Shariah provides guidance through the Quran and Hadith of the 
Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) to every aspect of a Muslims life. These have 
been codified into Islamic governance principles, including the 
comprehensive ones set out by the IFSB. 
 
5. How the Islamic Corporate governance approach compares with the 
conventional approach to corporate governance 
 
6. Is there a convergence in the approaches to corporate governance or 
is there divergence? 
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Corporate governance codes of good practice around the globe have a remarkable 
resemblance, all emphasise transparency, accountability, reporting, and the 
independence of the governing body from management.  
 
The factors leading to convergence in conventional corporate governance 
include: - 
 
o The codes issued by the World Bank and the OECD for example, clearly 
encourage convergence, as do the corporate governance policies and 
practices of corporations operating around the world 
 
o Securities regulations for the world’s listed companies are certainly 
converging, for example, The International Organisation of Securities 
Commissions (IOSCO) 
 
• International accounting standards are also leading towards 
convergence.  The International Accounting Standards Committee 
(IASC) and the International Auditing Practices Committee (IPAC) have 
close links with IOSCO and are additional forces working towards 
international standardization of financial reporting and auditing standards 
 
• Globalisation of companies is a force for convergence. Firms that are 
truly global with world-wide production, service provision, added-value 
chain, markets and customers and whose investors are located around 
the globe, are moving towards common governance practices 
 
• Raising capital on overseas stock exchanges encourages convergence, 
due to the need to conform to the listing rules of the market 
 
• International institutional investors have unequivocally demanded 
specific corporate governance practices if they are to invest there 
 
The forces for convergence in corporate governance are strong, with some 
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fundamental concepts having already emerged, including the need to separate 
governance from management, the importance of accountability to stakeholders, 
and the responsibility to recognize strategic risk. 
 
Table 4 Comparisons between corporate governance in Islam and OECD Principles 
  
Basis of 
Difference 
OECD Principles Islamic Principles 
Authority  
 
Directors have authority for 
decision- making. They follow 
the principles of OECD.  
Sole authority belongs to Allah; all 
decisions are to be made by abiding 
with the Shariah.  
Decision-
making  
 
Decision-making rests with the 
CEO and senior management. 
Voting is required just for the 
selection of a Board of directors 
(BOD) and few other decisions.  
Consultation and consensus are 
required for every decision from 
concerned stakeholders.  
 
Goal 
 
Maximization of profits and 
shareholders’ value.  
Commitment to equity, fair 
distribution of wealth, and 
consideration for the whole 
community.  
Accountability  
 
Senior management 
accountable to shareholders.  
Accountability to shareholders and to 
Allah.  
Ethics  Transparency, accountability 
and disclosure.  
Justice, equity, truthfulness, 
transparency, protection of 
minorities, wider accountability, 
written as well as oral disclosure.  
Application  
 
Principles are not equally 
applicable all over the world.  
Equally applicable all over the world.  
 
[Adapted from:  Slahudin, C]  
 
The OECD set of corporate governance principles have been efficiently 
implemented, whereas the more established Islamic principles of good practice, in 
place for fourteen centuries have not been efficiently implemented. The OECD 
Principles cover six different issues and rights related to corporate governance, 
whereas the Islamic principles essentially have a broader horizon and place duties 
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beyond shareholders, financiers, suppliers, customers, and employees, with a 
focus on the well being of humanity as a whole. The Islamic principles rest 
accountability ultimately on Allah, whose knowledge and authority are absolute.  
 
Table 4 shows the differences between the OECD principles and the well-
established Islamic principles. It is clear to see that there is no real conflict between 
the two, in fact the fundamentals are the same for Islamic and conventional 
approaches, as shown in Table 3 earlier. In fact Islamic corporate governance has 
essentially the same principles as conventional governance with additions of extra 
responsibility duty to the wider stakeholders they are responsible to, along with 
accountability to All (SWT) and the fact that the relationships between the 
stakeholders is different. For example, in the case of Investment Account Holders 
(IAH), instead of simply being depositors, they are viewed as investors (same as 
shareholders) and the responsibility that the organisation owes to them is similar 
as that to the other investors. These differences in the relationships between the 
stakeholders, and the fact that Islamic financial institutions have a greater number 
of them increase the duty upon the Islamic financial institution. 
 
The Qur’an makes a clear and detailed requirement in respect of good 
practice:  
 
“O you who believe! When you contract a debt for a fixed period, write it 
down. Let a scribe write it down in justice between you... You should not 
become weary to write your contract down, whether large or small, for its 
fixed term, that is more just with God, more solid as evidence, and more 
convenient to prevent doubts among yourselves... Take witnesses 
whenever you enter into a commercial contract.”  
[Surah Baqarah Ayah 282] 
 
“And if you are traveling and cannot find a scribe, then let there be a 
mortgage taken... And do not conceal any evidence for whoever hides it, 
surely his heart is sinful, and God is Knower of what you do.”  
[Surah Baqarah Ayah 283] 
 
	Page 175 
These two verses provide explicit guidance for disclosure and transparency. The 
emphasis is on making records of each aspect of the transaction so that there is 
full, clear disclosure for all parties; thereby preventing misunderstanding and 
conflict. 
 
Accountability  from the perspective of Islam is highlighted in the following 
verses of the Quran:  
 
“O ye who believe! Fulfill [all] obligations.” 
 [Surah Al-Ma’idah, Ayah 1] 
 
“O ye who believe! Betray not the trust of Allah and the apostle, nor 
misappropriate knowingly things entrusted to you.” 
 [Surah Al-Anfal Ayah 27] 
 
In Islam, the accountability applies to the whole of life; the rules for corporate 
governance do not apply only to the Board of Directors (BOD), and senior 
management but also to every person associated to the organization. By contrast, 
OECD rules make senior management accountable to the Board of Directors 
(BOD) and the Board of Directors (BOD) to shareholders. Islam makes the 
responsible people accountable not only to stakeholders, but also to Allah (SWT). 
 
The Accounting and Auditing Organisation for Islamic Financial Institutions 
(AAOIFI) has issued the Governance Standards for the Shariah supervisory 
boards. According to these standards, every Islamic financial institution will have 
independent Shariah supervisory board’s with specialist jurists in fiqh al-Muamalaat 
(Islamic commercial jurisprudence) with a wide ranging responsibilities and duties, 
just as the IFSB. It should be noted that the AAOIFI standard does not contain any 
information about the duration of a Shariah supervisory board’s membership or on 
the possibilities and procedures of dismissal and reappointment. Notwithstanding 
the AAOIFI standards, the precise rules and criteria for the selection and 
appointment of SSB members, the applicability and credibility of their Islamic and 
secular qualifications, their scholarly reputation, their doctrinal stringency or 
intellectual flexibility, their main occupations and sources of income, the duration of 
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their Shariah supervisory board membership and reappointment, as well as the 
quantitative and qualitative dimension of their financial and non-financial rewards 
are not open to the general public.  
 
Innovation generates new business opportunities, so long as the innovator has a 
competitive edge, when imitation sets in, temporary profits will diminish. Neither the 
management nor the Shariah supervisory board has any interest in too much 
revelation of the Islamic qualities of financial innovations as this could lead to 
imitation by competitors. The need to keep business secrets makes it even more 
opaque than conventional banking. Integrity of the Islamic qualities of the products 
and transactions is attained by the status and public recognition of the members of 
the Shariah supervisory board.  
 
The technical details of new transactions and innovative products is complicated, 
and distinguished and well-known Shariah scholars with a deep understanding of 
financial techniques are very limited. This possibly explains why the names of the 
same Shariah scholars are found in the Shariah supervisory board’s of several 
Islamic financial institutions, and in addition in advisory boards or committees of 
regulatory authorities and standard-setting organizations (such as AAOIFI or 
IFSB). Although the author believes that a world inhabited by over 1.5 billion 
Muslims, spread across 50+ Muslim dominated states and accounting for approx. 
23% of the world cannot produce more than a simple handful of Shariah scholars. 
 
This raises several governance issues at the policy level: 
 
3. If prominent members of Shariah supervisory board determine the Islamic 
framework of Islamic banks, set the tone of public opinion and give advice to 
regulatory agencies, how will the independence of regulators be assured?  
 
4. How will the independence of the Shariah supervisory board’s be 
maintained when so many of the scholars are on the boards of the different 
companies 
 
5. How will innovation be encouraged 
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6. How will the integrity of the product be maintained? If one Shariah 
supervisory board says the product is halal, so will the others, as they are 
the same people. Therefore, how will independence be maintained and the 
real of integrity of the board maintained 
 
7. Competence of the Shariah supervisory board members, as they do not 
reveal too much information, according to AAOFI, then it is difficult to 
determine truly how competent an individual is. 
 
8. And if the Shariah supervisory board is openly going to disregard the rules 
and regulations of organisations such as IFSB and AAOFI, then how can the 
honesty and integrity of the SSB be truly maintained? 
 
The author believes the problems can be summed up as follows: 
 
1. Islamic Financial Institutions need to understand the objectives, role and 
purpose of the Shariah 
 
2. Islamic Financial Institutions need to appreciate the importance of good 
corporate governance 
 
3. The need to follow the well-established principles of Islamic corporate 
governance, and not just pay lip service to them 
 
The problems of corporate governance in Islamic financial institutions, the author 
believes are widespread, but this research demonstrates, have much to do with the 
application of the principles rather than the actual principles themselves. There are 
sound codified principles of corporate governance from organisations like IFSB and 
AAOFI to name two, which many have paid lip service to and have agreed to follow 
and implement. These principles are wide ranging and many are very similar to 
other renowned worldwide accepted principles, such as OECD with much 
commonality in them. The difference being the implementation of the principles; 
due to the reasons outlined earlier on how there seems to be a convergence in 
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corporate governance principles around the world, and the forces that seem to 
drive this convergence, the author believes this equally applies to Islamic financial 
institutions. The difference and divergence arises, because unlike OECD set of 
corporate governance principles have been efficiently implemented, the more 
established Islamic principles of good practice, in place for fourteen centuries are 
not been efficiently implemented. 
 
Islamic banking is and will continue to be plagued with more governance issues 
than conventional banking; with the conflict between efficiency and distinctiveness 
of Islamic finance, it seems that the vitality of market limitations requires a 
proactive role in order to resolve the most serious governance problems and to 
preserve the uniqueness of Islamic banking.  
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Appendix 1 Corporate Governance Survey Questions 
 
“Corporate Governance in Islamic Financial Institutions” 
 
Name of Institution & Location:
 .................................................................................... 
Type of Business:  
 .................................................................................... 
Respondents Name:   
 .................................................................................... 
Position:    
 .................................................................................... 
No of Employees:   
 .................................................................................... 
No of Branches  
 .................................................................................... 
 
Section 1 
1. Type of firm 
¨ Islamic Bank 
¨ Investment Company 
¨ Money Manager 
¨ Insurance 
¨ Pension Fund 
¨ Stockbroker 
¨ Consultancy firm 
¨ Other............................... 
 
2. Indicate whether your board has the following committees (tick all that 
apply) 
Governance Committee 
 Shariah Board 
 Executive Committee 
 Nominating Committee 
 Risk Management Company 
 Investment Committee 
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 Compensation Committee 
 Audit Committee 
 None of the above Committees 
 Other............................... 
 Other (Please Specify) 
 
3. With which of the following statements do you strongly agree? 
¨ Institutional investors are too involved in corporate governance activities 
¨ Institutional investors are appropriately involved in corporate governance 
activities 
¨ Institutional investors should be more involved in corporate governance 
activities 
¨ Institutional investors should not be involved in corporate governance 
activities 
 Other............................... 
 Other (Please Specify) 
 
4. Are the Chairman of the board & CEO held by the same individual? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
5. Does the board conduct a periodic assessment of the board or director 
performance? 
¨ Yes (Formal) 
¨ Yes (Informal) 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
6. How many members are on the Shariah Board? 
 (If you don’t have a Shariah Board - leave blank) 
 
7. Do the Shariah board members hold positions on other Boards? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ We don’t ask 
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¨ Don’t Know 
 
8. Are the Shariah Board members Employees of the organisation or 
consultants? 
¨ Employees 
¨ Consultants 
¨ Don’t Know 
¨ Other............................................................ 
 
9. Does the board conduct a periodic assessment of the Shariah Board? 
¨ Yes (Formal) 
¨ Yes (Informal) 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
10. Does the board conduct an annual performance review of the Shariah 
Board? 
¨ Yes (Formal) 
¨ Yes (Informal) 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
11. Does the board set specific annual performance goals against which the 
Shariah Board is evaluated? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
12.  Are any of the board members also on the Shariah board? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
 
13. What is the remuneration package of the Shariah Board? 
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14. Does the board have a Shariah Board succession plan? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
 
15. What is this Code of Ethics? (If they have one adopted) 
 
16. Please indicate to whom the Code of Ethics is applicable (Tick all that 
apply). 
¨ All Employees 
¨ Directors 
¨ Shariah Board members 
¨ Executive officers 
¨ Not applicable 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
17. Has your organisation provided formal director education (onsite or offsite) 
to the Board of Directors in the past 12 months? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
18. Has your organisation provided formal director education (onsite or offsite) 
to the Shariah Board in the past 12 months? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
19. Are Shariah Board members formally educated about the workings of your 
organisation prior to joining or during their time on the board? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
20. Do you follow AOIFI standards, if ‘Yes’, in what capacity? 
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21. The majority of the organisations board consists of outside, independent 
directors who do not provide services to the organisation in any vendor 
capacity. 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
22. The organisations outside directors are independently minded in dealing 
with Company issues. 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
23. The Board and management work together to achieve strategic goals. 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
24. The Board has an updated role description that clearly outlines Board 
member responsibilities and qualifications. 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
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¨ Not Applicable 
 
25. The majority of the organisations Shariah board consists of outside, 
independent Shariah experts who do not provide services to the 
organisation in any vendor capacity. 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
26. The organisations outside Shariah experts are independently minded in 
dealing with Company issues. Do you 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
27. The Shariah Board and management work together to achieve strategic 
goals. Do you 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
28. The Shariah Board approves the organisations strategic plan and reviews or 
updates it annually. Do you 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
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¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
29. The Board has an updated role description that clearly outlines Shariah 
Board member responsibilities and qualifications. Do you 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
30. The Shariah Board actively seeks, identifies and develops business for the 
organisation. Do you 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
31. The Shariah Board appropriately and respectfully challenges the status quo 
for the purpose of enhancing shareholder value. Do you 
¨ Strongly agree 
¨ Agree 
¨ Neutral 
¨ Disagree 
¨ Strongly disagree 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
32. Are there any standards for corporate governance set for financial 
institutions? 
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¨ Yes 
¨ No 
 
33. Are financial institutions required to provide any guidelines of their corporate 
governance structures? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
34.  Does any existing law have provision for Islamic banking and financial 
institutions? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Not Applicable 
 
35. Could you please name any associations that you are members of (if 
applicable) 
 
36. What is the percentage share of the largest five shareholders? 
37. What is the percentage of Shares held by the Board of directors? 
38. Do the top management officials hold shares in the company? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
 
39. Do the Shariah board members hold shares in the company? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
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40. Composition of board members 
 Number 
Total No of Board Directors  
Executive Board members  
Non-executive board members  
Members of the Shariah Board  
Other, please specify  
 
41. Are there procedures for the disclosure of any material interests in 
transactions or matters relating to the company? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
42. Do the Shariah Board or its representatives attend / participate in board 
meetings? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
43. Are corporate governance procedures and policies accessible freely to all 
the employees of the company? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
44. Are Shariah board decisions audited by independent Shariah experts? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
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45. Are there procedures to monitor the conflict of interest of stakeholders, in 
particular Shariah Boards & Management Board in place at your 
organisation? 
¨ Yes 
¨ No 
¨ Don’t Know 
 
46. Could you list the top 5 Shariah corporate governance issues facing an 
organisation such as yours at this moment in time 
47. In your view what are the top 5 Shariah corporate governance issues at this 
moment in time. 
 
48. Please feel free to make other suitable comments / suggestions. 
 
 
